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Jesus the Greatest Ancestor: A Typology-Based Theological Interpretation of Hebrews'
Christology in Africa
African theology was spawned in response to yearnings for theological independence, and
desires to theologize in dialogue with African cosmologies; these practical elements still
remain today the raison d'etre, and are definitive of, African theology. This background
disguises a cardinal goal of African theology: to build and sustain authentic African
Christian communities in faith, ethos and worship. Because the Bible is a witness to
Christianity's primal events and traditions which are considered to be definitive of the
identity and self-understanding of Christianity (ever since) and, consequently, integral to its
faith, ethos and worship, its usage in African theology is imperative if it wishes to fulfil this
goal.
To show one of the ways the aforesaid could be done, this thesis uses the Bible to formulate
an African theology on ancestors by interpreting a section of it theologically. Such a
theology could help define the relationship between African Christianity and ancestors.
More specifically, the Christology of the book of Hebrews is interpreted theologically and
related to typology, with the result that Jesus is understood not only as superior to Jewish
mediatorial figures of angels, Moses and the Aaronic high priests, but, also, as the definitive
mediator to whom the Jewish mediatorial figures point. Subsequently, this Christology of
Hebrews is 'transferred' to Hebrews' contemporary context in Africa by means of a
theological re-interpretation based on typology (due to the similarities between the Jewish
mediatorial figures and African ones), resulting in the view that Jesus, as the definitive
mediator in Africa, is the greatest ancestor.
ii
The thesis goes on to argue that when this Christology of Hebrews in Africa ('Jesus the
greatest ancestor') is applied to African Christianity, ancestors can, firstly, be absorbed into
an African Christian consciousness as a work of God pointing to Christ, i.e., as types of
Christ. Secondly, ancestors can be perceived to be displaced by Jesus the definitive mediator
to whom, foreshadowing as types, they must give way now. Finally, and in consequence,
ancestors have to be abandoned now, specifically as objects of religious cultic practice, i.e.,
as mediators. The resultant effect of this African theology based on Hebrews' Christology on
African Christians is that ancestors are absorbed into their Christian consciousness while
allowing for an authentic belief in Jesus' unique and ultimate significance as the definitive
mediator between humans and God.
I, Peter Nyende, declare that this work was researched and written by me alone and that it has not
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CHAPTER 1
INTRODUCTION
What would be the meaning/significance of the Christology of Hebrews for
southern and mid-African Christian communities ('Africa' from here on)?1 This is a
question that is hugely significant, and whose answer, as shall be seen in the outcome
of this thesis, has far-reaching consequences for African theology. The question
draws our attention first to the field of biblical studies, then secondly, and,
specifically, to Christology (i.e., New Testament Christology), and even more
pointedly, to New Testament Christology within, thirdly, an African Christian
context. These three spheres converge in the aims and intentions (even motivations)
of this thesis, in that I wish to carry out an interpretation of Christology from a
specific biblical text within an African context for the purpose of contributing to
African theology and, potentially, pointing the way to how more of such
contributions could be made. But why should biblical scholarship concern itselfwith
African theology via biblical interpretations that are focused on extrapolating their
Christologies in an African setting, and how might that be carried out?
1 Mid-Africa is a term used here to refer to East and Central Africa. Although our thesis seeks to
relate to largely southern and mid-Africa Christian communities, it is not, in its entirety, related
exclusively to Christianity in these parts of Africa.
1
1.1 AFRICAN THEOLOGY
It is widely recognized that non-Western theologies have been struggling to
enunciate their particular approach to theology away from a Western dominated
Christian theological tradition in view of, and precipitated by, the demographics of
Christianity. Whereas Western Christianity has in the past, vis-a-vis the 'Third
World', dominated both numerically and in the forms of the expression that
Christianity has taken, today, Christianity in these parts of the world has numerically
outgrown that of the West. The result of this has been, again in relation to Third-
World Christianity, a move away from a culturally more or less unified, thus
culturally monocentric, European and North American Christianity, to one that is
rooted in many cultures, and in this sense culturally polycentric. The formation of
what is now known as the 'Ecumenical Association of Third World Theologians' in
1976 not only epitomizes this very fact, but also, the association is intended as a
vehicle for systematic aid to this movement towards regional theologies. As pointed
out in Davis' (1987) 3study, this umbrella organization of Third World theologians
emerged with the following five goals:
(a) to provide opportunities of sharing and dialogue among theologians; (b) to
evaluate the theologies of each area and their relationship to Western theology;
(c) to help the Christian communities to an indigenous understanding of
revelation, and to enable them to renew their service to the Lord according to
the cultural, economic, and political situation of each community; (d) to make
possible a continuing dialogue between Christians from these areas; and (e) to
study new relationships between missionaries and indigenous churches (86).4
2
Coptic and Ethopian Christianity are the exception here, Christianity having been received there long
before its spread by Western missionaries, from the middle of the last millennium, to other parts of
Africa and the 'Third World'.
3 The reference and bibliographical style of this thesis has followed The SBL Handbook ofStyle,
(Alexander et al [2002]). It should be noted here that in bibliographical entry, the handbook
recommends that book articles, unlike journal articles, should not be put in quotation marks (65).
4 For more on this see Fabbella and Torres (1978 and 1983), and Hood (1990).
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Accordingly, African theology was spawned in response to yearnings for
'theological' independence, and desires to theologize in tandem with African
cosmologies; these practical elements still remain today the raison d'etre, and are
definitive of, African theology.5 These African cosmologies (be they political, social,
cultural, historical, economic, or religious), it would be worth pointing out, become
for all practical purposes the context for African theological discourse, its site of
interpretation with its necessarily correlative orientations, agendas, interests,
questions, and experiences. Intimated here is a theology derived from the interplay
ofChristian tradition, or any aspect of it, on the one hand, and African cosmology, or
any aspect of it, on the other.
With regard to the Christian tradition, I would contend that the Bible, however
conceived, holds a central position, for it is incumbent on those who wish to
articulate an African theology to use the Bible in dialogue with African cosmologies
and culture for it to be a Christian theology. This is so because, as Mugambi (1989,
9-13) points out, when talking of African theology, it is not African theology en bloc
that we are talking about but an African Christian theology. It could further be
argued that the proper appellation should be 'African Christian Theologies' since
Africa is not a homogenous whole. Still, with minor exceptions and objections,
'African theology' is used as a generic appellation for theologies written or expressed
by African Christians for an African cosmology, or within the context of an African
cosmos. For this reason, the Bible takes on importance in attempts to articulate
African theologies (and, ipso facto, to realize the building and sustenance of
1
All studies and discussion on African theology point this out clearly. See Nyamiti (1978) and Pobee
(1979) for short introductions, and Ukpong (1984) and Parratt (1995) for comprehensive discussions
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authentic African Christian communities in faith, ethos and cultus). 6 The gravity of
this point requires we elaborate on it briefly.
From the earliest of times Christianity has concerned itself with authenticity, what
is Christian and what is not. This is clearly seen in the churches' Scripture and
canonical heritage (whether of the Western [Roman Catholic, Protestant and
kindred], or Eastern or even Ethiopian church) as the locus of what is authentic
Christianity. As Koester (1975) notes, 'the canon was created as a critical weapon in
a religious and cultural revolution ... it wanted to assure historical continuity and it
wanted to prevent departures into spurious cultural and religious objectives which
were seen as alien to the origins of the Christian faith' (8).7 Because Christianity's
primal events and traditions are considered to be definitive of the identity and self-
understanding of the Church (ever since) and consequently integral to its faith, ethos
on this.
6 It is important to mention that the building and sustenance of African Christian communities is a
chiefmotivation and goal in the desire by Africans to theologize within their African cosmologies. It
is understood that in so doing, Christianity takes root in the African psyche, a perception, which,
again, highlights the linking of African theology to the faith, ethos and worship of African churches.
The 'Inculturation Debate in Africa' (Bowie 1999), could be understood to be an attempt to pre-empt
the demise ofChristianity in tropical Africa akin to the occurrences in North Africa (Botha 1986) in
the 700s, Nubia (Shetrk 1993) in the 1300s, and in West and East Africa (Groves 1948) in the early
1800s. The analyses of the demise of Christianity in the mentioned places put the blame on the lack
of inculturation (the grounding ofChristianity in the local cultures). Moreover, these goals of African
theology is all the more important given the current state of the church in Africa as summarised by
Hastings (1976): 'The problems of the Christian churches in Africa today are many and deep; but they
are seldom problems of decline. They arise instead from the sheer rapidity of growth, from an almost
discordant vitality, from the need, and often too, the determination to reshape the pattern of church life
and thought learnt from European missionaries, directly and indirectly, to accord with the complex
religious and secular needs of African societies, while remaining faithful to the essentials of Christian
tradition' (16). Consequently, the use of the Bible in African theology is critical to achieving the ends
of inculturation: authentic, sustainable African Christian communities. See the deliberations of
African Catholic Bishops at the 'African Synod' of 1994 where this concern is strongly emphasized
(Brown, 1996, 75ff).
7 For more discussions on this see Metzger (1987, 1-8) and what Farley (1982, 108-117) calls the
'Scripture principle' behind the collection ofwritings (some ofwhich later formed the canon) by early
Christian communities.
*
However conceived, it is apparent that the primal event that constitutes the beginnings of the
Christian community to which the Christian Bible attests is the unique incarnation of God in Jesus
4
and worship, the Bible is requisite for a distinctive (and authentic) Christian
theology. As such, the Bible is viewed as nonnative, or as a criterion, for what is
authentically Christian, forcing theologies, not least African theology, that would
wish to be considered Christian inevitably to come under its scrutiny for validation as
Christian theology.9
1.1.1. African Theology and the Bible
It may well be said that the Bible is already central in African theology by virtue
of the vital role it is said to play in African Christianity.10 But the same cannot be
said of the Bible with regard to African theological scholarship. Not at least before
the middle of the 1970s when it was strongly felt that although African theology
affirmed the primary status of Scripture for its theology, it was not adequately
grounded in it (Fashole-Luke 1975). But ten years later, Mbiti's (1986) research on
the 'Use of the Bible in African theology' strongly suggested that it was playing a
significant role in African theology; a suggestion now supported by Ukpong's (1999)
commentary on biblical interpretation in modern Africa. But a closer examination
Christ (the Christ-event, his life, death and resurrection) and what that very understanding means for
humanity.
9 The authority of Scripture in determining what is Christian may also be approached from different
perspectives from the one just given. If we may use Fiorenza's (1990) study, there seem to be two
broad approaches to the Bible as a requisite for any Christian theology in recent times. One is the
functional approach where the understanding of the necessity of the Bible in theology is primarily
understood through its functions in the church (and society at large); because the Bible is used by the
Christian community to understand its faith and order its life, theology must reckon with it. The
second, which he calls the 'canonical approach', is similar to the one we have given above. The first
places authority in the Bible by virtue of its function in the church, the second by virtue of its
(irreplaceable) nature. One could also think of other ways in which authority is invested in the Bible
so as to render it central to Christian theology; for example, with Kelsey (1968) in its ability to
transform, with Farley (1982) in its role as a classic, with Maurice Wiles (1975) in its role as any other
religious book, and with Lindbeck (1984) 'as communally authoritative rules of discourse, attitude,
and action' (18). For our purposes, we have sought to establish the centrality of the Bible in African
theology by giving primacy to the 'canonical approach'. An argument justifying this primacy here,
even though relevant, is, for want of space, not pursued.
10 As early as 1978 Mbiti (1978) had (on the basis of a thorough research on articles and books, as
well as oral sources) established that the Bible was at the forefront of African Christianity.
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suggests otherwise. Only a few of the articles examined and cited by both Mbiti
(1986) and Ukpong (1999) indicate a sustained engagement with the Bible.11 It
seems that the use of the Bible in African theology has not been satisfactory. This is
a critical judgement that Fashole-Luke (1981) drew attention to in the early 1980s
when he wrote: 'The Bible has played a significant role in the development of
African Christianity ... what is now necessary is the interpretation of the Bible by
Africans primarily for Africans' (409). To understand more of this judgement, it is
imperative to look at the possible ways that the Bible can be used in theology.
We could conceive the use of the Bible in theology as taking place in three ways:
1. when the Bible is used as the subject matter for theology; 2. when it is used as part
of theological formulations or discourses; and 3. when it is used as a model for
theology.
The principle task of Christian theology, as Jeanrond (1984) puts it, is 'to study
again and again the basic texts of the New Testament and the Hebrew Scriptures and
to interpret them for successive generations of Christians' (55). The first use of the
Bible does exactly this. Using the Bible in a rather direct way as the primary source
of study, it can be regarded as biblical interpretation or biblical exegesis mixed with
its, or ending in, appropriation. For this reason the quest for the meaning of the Bible
(now and not just when it was written) is the fundamental rule in this usage. There
" Mbiti's (1986) reference has three, out of a possible 50 articles and books, titled 'Studies in Second
Corinthians', 'The Epistle to the Ephesians', 'Job - A meditation on the problem of suffering'.
Ukpong's reference has also three, but out of a possible 60, titled 'Galatians 3.28 - A Study on Paul's
Attitude towards Ethnicity: its Relevance for Contemporary Nigeria', 'Biblical Perspectives on
Women: Eve, the Mother of all Living (Gen 3.20)', and 'The Parable of the Unmerciful Servant (Matt.
18.21-35)'.
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seems to be much latitude on how this can be done. For example, a portion of
Scripture can be examined and the implications of the reading pondered; or the Bible
may be approached thematically where a theme taken from it or from elsewhere
leads the way in the reading of the Bible and the implications thereof pondered; or
yet again, the Bible can be called upon to give solutions to problems occasioned by
the circumstances and the experiences of a people. The content of the Bible here
predominates and is the subject matter of the theology that uses it this way.
However, there are theological discourses that are not based on the study of
Scripture in the sense outlined above but still in an ad hoc manner use the Bible.
Kelsey (1975, 122-134),12 following Toulmin's (1963) analysis of the standard
pattern of arguments, points out four ways that they do so. The Bible may be used to
provide data when appealed to in making a theological proposal. It may be used as a
warrant when invoked to move a theological proposal from its data to its conclusion
or claim. It could be used as a backing when it serves 'to show that the warrant is
true' (144). And lastly it may be used to approve of or rebut the applicability of the
warrant. In a good number of theological formulations, as Kelsey shows, the usage of
the Bible may be limited to only one or two of these uses, leaving the other
constituents of the theological discourse to be filled by other sources such as
philosophy, or some other spheres in human culture of thinking, validation, or
theory. This means that it is possible here to offer an other-than-biblically-structured
theological reflection (a philosophically-structured one for example) but still use the
Bible accordingly. Thus the degree to which the content of the Bible is the subject
12 See also his earlier 'Appeals to Scripture' (1988).
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matter of the theology that uses it this way depends on the part it plays in the
theological argument. However, unlike the first use of the Bible we have explained
in the preceding paragraph, the Bible when used in this sense may not have material
sovereignty of its parts as distinct from everything else in the content of this
theology, nor is it the subject of interpretation, as the primary datum, in this
theology. This is the second way we could conceive the Bible to be used in theology.
The third use of the Bible is not so much interested in its content for theology as it
is in using patterns detected therein to do theology. This way, the Bible is seen as a
model or a paradigm for doing theology. Green (2001) states it this way:
.. .we must give appropriate weight to the status of Scripture for how its
books, separately and together, while drawing on these paradigmatic
presuppositions (for example "the new-age inaugurating advent of the
Messiah, Jesus ofNazareth" [322]), model the instantiation of the good
news in particular locales and with respect to historical particularities ...
in the New Testament already, one finds 'theology' both in its critical task
of reflection on the practices and affirmations of the people of God to
determine their credibility and faithfulness and in its constructive task of
reiteration, restatement, and interpretation of the good news vis-a-vis
ever developing horizons and challenges (Ibid., my italics).
Some leading questions in studying the Bible for such purposes would be these: 13
What strategies for articulating the good news are contained in this text? What
strategies for bringing about faithfulness are to be found? How does the text proceed
in its theological reflection? On what sources (authorities) does the text draw? How
does this text participate in theological reflection? All of these questions are
intended to tease out of the Bible ways of doing theology in ever changing situations.
n I have adopted them from Green (2001) who employs this particular way of using the Bible in
'inquiring into how IPeter itself engages in the theological task' (322).
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The uses of the Bible so conceived make it possible to perceive that the
unsatisfactory use of the Bible being pointed out in African theology is with respect
to the first usage which seem to deal primarily with interpreting biblical texts. That
is, there is a relative lack of study and interpretation of the texts of the Bible by
Africans for Africans (to paraphrase the critical judgement Fashole-Luke made in the
early 1980s). Parratt (1995) states this shortcoming more precisely in observing that
'in general the contributions ofAfrican scholars in the field ofbiblical exegesis have
fallen short of their corresponding contributions to the study of African religions'
(56). Parratt must have in mind the substantive work on African religion by African
Christian scholars14 that puts to shame their literature on the Bible as illustrated in
the work we cited of Mbiti and Ukpong. So, African theology is in need of directly
engaging with the biblical texts if it is to help build an African Christian theology,
and all the more because it could be argued that, of the three uses of the Bible in
theology, this particular use is primary.15 In this thesis, therefore, I intended to
contribute to meeting this need both in its interpretation ofHebrews and, thereby,
pointing out a possible way that more such interpretations could be made.
1.1.2. African Theology andNew Testament Christology
But the need of the Bible in African theology does not stop with its use in African
theology in the sense just outlined. A further task which, if attended to as a priority
in biblical interpretation would significantly help in building African theology, must
be pointed out. Christology is basic to any Christian theology and not least an
14 For more on this, see Chitonda (2000) and Shaw (1990).
15 This is so because the other two uses of the Bible in theology seem to draw their use of the Bible
from biblical studies carried out by biblical scholars, whether directly through using their
interpretations, or, indirectly through a critical dialogue with the same.
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African theology. As Macquarrie (1990) sums it up, 'Christianity, as the name
implies, has Jesus Christ at its very centre, so that if Christology is concentrated on
the study of Jesus Christ, it is not so much a branch of Christian theology as its
central theme' (3). This being the case, the view of the Bible as normative, or a
criterion, for what is authentically Christian accentuates the need for African
theology to invest in the interpretations of the New Testament that are centred on the
person ofChrist. But there is a more fundamental reason for such investments by
African theology. The subject of Christology being tied up with the origins of
Christianity means that it is tied up consequently with matters ofChristian
authenticity. As already stated, the Bible is normative for what is authentically
Christian because it is the medium, as it were, that the Church has for the primal
events and traditions which are definitive of, and an essential reference for, its
identity and self-understanding, and consequently for its faith, ethos and worship.
Chief of these events and traditions is the person of Jesus Christ. As Koester (1971)
remarks and goes on to argue, 'Christianity started with a particular historical person,
his works and words, his life and death: Jesus ofNazareth' (205ff). Indeed,
whenever the theme of the origins ofChristianity is taken up, the figure of Jesus has
always featured centrally. In the words of Anderson (1964), himself concerned with
the theme of the origins of Christianity, 'he [Jesus] is the great converging point, to
which we all have to strike straight across the great expanses. Learned scholars of
the Church, dogmatician, theologian, and Biblical critic, have done just that with a
kind of unwavering instinct' (16). Consequently, in biblical interpretations,
Christological interpretations of the New Testament texts ought to play an integral, if
not a fundamental, role in contributing to the building of an African theology. This,
10
therefore, makes the interpretation of Christological texts of the New Testament
necessary in any attempt to contribute to an African theology through a direct
engagement with the Bible. In other words, when seeking to use the Bible in
building an African theology, New Testament African Christologies are imperatively
needed. But, perhaps, such a task may not be useful given that African Christologies
may be said to abound.16 African Christologies may abound indeed, but the crucial
question is: are these African Christologies the results of a direct engagement with
New Testament Christologies? Close scrutiny of them shows that indeed they use
the Bible but, again, not in the primary sense that we have argued above needs to be
the case. A look at African ancestor-Christologies will make this clear.17
African theologians have in varying degrees sought to articulate, specifically,
Jesus as an ancestor. Pobee (1979, 46-48), our first example, points out that
ancestors are members of the community who have died; that they are now 'elder
brothers of the living at the house ofGod' (46); that to qualify as an ancestor one
must have lived a long life, been exemplary in that life and done much for the
prestige of one's people; and that they are believed to influence life for the good or ill
of the community they leave behind. He then concludes that amongst the Akan
people ofWest Africa, Jesus should be understood as an 'ancestor' because their
ontology, abode, qualifications, and functions mirror his albeit, with one significant
difference: he is the Nana, 'the great and greatest ancestor' (94) for he is closer to
God than all other ancestors, making him more effectual at the enumerated ancestor
16 Studies on this can be found in Appiah-Kubi (1977), Schreiter (1991), Mnemba (1988), Onaiyekan
(1997), and Stinton (2001).
171 choose ancestor-Christologies because, as will become apparent, they are significant for this
thesis.
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duties. Turning to Nyamiti (1984) as our second example, Jesus should be
considered as a 'brother-ancestor' since, of all the different types of ancestors (he
calls them ancestor relationships [16]) in African society, 'brother-ancestor' comes
closest to capturing the relationship of Jesus with Christians. Nyamiti considers a
'brother-ancestor' to be 'a relative of a person with whom he has a common parent,
and ofwhom he is mediator to God, archetype of behaviour and with whom - thanks
to his supernatural status acquired through death - he is entitled to have regular
sacred communications' (23).
Bujo (1992) brings out, especially, the utter dependence of the living community
on ancestors through communion with them (23-32): 'The living cannot hope to
survive unless they render due honour to their dead and continue faithfully along the
tracks laid down by them' (24), he writes. With the understanding that Africans have
a sense of community which transcends the living members of a community to
include ancestors, he argues that ancestors are needed for the generation of what he
calls 'life-force' (23). Further, he perceives that because of the ancestors' superior
status to the living members in the community, they are more important in the
community and exercise a definite influence on the living by warding off evil and
bringing prosperity (29). Also he argues that ancestors are 'models for living' (30),
resulting in strength for the community and a better future. On the basis of this
ancestor phenomenon, Bujo proposes that Christ should be understood theologically
as 'ancestor par excellence', or simply 'proto-ancestor' (79), because he not only 'lived
the African ancestor ideal to the highest degree' but 'brought that ideal to an
altogether new fulfilment' (79). As for Kabasale (1991), our last example, ancestors
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are 'a source of life and an obligatory route to the supreme being' (116). They are
also elder brothers of the living and thus closer to 'the sources and foundations' (121),
presumably of life, knowledge, and power. Thus, for him, Christ should be seen as
an ancestor because he fulfils the roles of ancestors in Africa.
Common to these ancestor-Christologies is their identification of characteristics of
ancestors that they consider parallel to some characteristics of the Christology they
have in mind. These characteristics are mostly to do with roles and functions, with
the end result that their ancestor-Christologies perceive Jesus to be qualitatively a
superior ancestor because he better executes the roles and functions of ancestors in
Africa. The use of such a methodology in articulating ancestor-Christologies is
commendable and so far seems the only feasible one.18 We will not discuss here
their studies of'ancestor' which is an integral part of the said method till later, but
concern ourselves only with their Christologies. Presumably because the audience
they write to is assumed to know which Christology they are seeking to re-conceive
along the lines of an ancestor in Africa, they make no effort to identify and to explain
it. (Though it is easy to infer that the Christologies which they seek to re-conceive
are confessional Christologies, that is as explicated in the particular church tradition
they belong to.) It is largely on account of this that, inevitably, their ancestor-
Christologies fall short of African New Testament Christologies proper. This is not
to say that they do not appeal to Scripture, for they do. Pobee (1979, 83-87), for
example, seems to have the starting point of his Christology in various texts of the
18
Ukpong's (1994), though concerned with the relationship ofChristology to inculturation, calls this
the 'functional analogy approach' (42), which he argues is parallel to 'to the type ofNew Testament
christology that studies the christological titles' (Ibid.).
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New Testament that depict Christ as human and as divine from which he seeks to
communicate to the Akan society using the category of ancestor. However, there is
no comprehensive engagement with any Christology of a New Testament text in his
study, but the piecemeal usages of some New Testament texts in explicating Christ
as human and divine which Pobee subsequently tries to communicate to the Akan
peoples. In other words, his usage of the New Testament in articulating an ancestor-
Christology is more of a backing and a warrant for his theological proposal of Christ
as ancestor, and not so much as the primary datum, the subject of interpretation from
which he interprets Christ as an ancestor. His use of the Bible (to go back to our
discussion on the three uses of the Bible in theology) lies in the second usage, which
falls short of the kind of biblical interpretation that we are advocating as essential for
establishing an African theology. Bujo and Kabasale's ancestor-Christologies in this
regard are not any different.
This, then, brings us to Bediako's (1994, 96-104, 116-19) ancestor-Christology.
Unlike the others we have reviewed, he clearly has Hebrews' Christology as the New
Testament Christology with which he is engaging. He writes: 'the value for us in the
presentation of Jesus in Hebrews stems from its relevance to a society like ours with
its deep tradition of sacrifice, priestly mediation and ancestor function' (114), and he
goes on to articulate Jesus as the 'true ancestor'. He does so by declaring the
ancestors to have no reality and that it is in fact Jesus Christ who is the only 'true
ancestor' fulfilling the need that led African society to create the myth of the
ancestors in the first place. This is because Bediako perceives the cult19 of ancestor
19
My usage of this term is not in the strict technical term of sacrifice so that it could be taken to
signify here the sacrifices offered to ancestors. I use it in this thesis rather loosely to denote reverence
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as the 'product ofmyth-making imagination of the community' (116): theirs, he
argues, is a functional value, namely that of fostering social harmony within the
community and across generations (past, present, and future). This myth-making, he
continues to argue, is what makes ancestors sacred. He asserts that the power of
ancestors stems from, and is sustained by, the corporate belief of the community and
not from their intrinsic, real, demonstrable power to act. He contends that this is not
the case with Jesus who, coming into the world from the transcendent realm as the
Son ofGod, he argues, took on human nature, underwent death and conquered it by
his resurrection, showing and demonstrating his intrinsic powers. He concludes,
therefore, that Jesus is the true 'ancestor'. In other words, for Bediako, the beliefs
African peoples have about their ancestors are only true in the case of Jesus alone.
Bediako's attempt is a step in the kind of interpretation of African New Testament
Christologies that could contribute to an African theology. But, still, his explication
of Hebrew's Christology is sketchy and presumes too much in the sense that no
specific methodology seems to operate in his interpretation.
So we have to conclude that African theology is in need of engaging with New
Testament Christologies more adequately in constructing authentic African
Christologies and thereby African theologies. In this thesis, I intend, therefore, to
meet this need both in my interpretation of Hebrews' Christology and, through it,
trying to show how more of such interpretations could be conducted with other New
Testament Christologies.
of one or another kind. The reason for this will be forthcoming when I look at ancestors in Africa in
the fifth chapter.
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1.2 THE BIBLE AND ITS INTERPRETATION
Yet the identification of the crucial need of the Bible, and specifically the
Christology therein, in African theology, gives rise to a second problem, the problem
of procedure or method in conducting such biblical interpretations. In biblical
studies today, there exists an acute appreciation of difficulties in trying to arrive at
the meaning ofbiblical texts and in trying to determine the goals for which those
meanings are sought; biblical scholars are not all doing the same thing with the text,
nor do they have the same scholarly goals. The emergence of historical critical
studies for systematic interpretations of the Bible in the 1700s fostered a sense of
unity in biblical interpretations where the goal of interpretation was perceived as
arriving, through grammatico-historical methods, at some objectively determinable
meaning of the text. Biblical scholars and others alike who intended to use biblical
interpretations for theology, we may say, would have had such a determined meaning
of whichever text as their starting point. J. P. Gabler [1753-1856] (Eldredge and
Sandys-Wunsch [1980]), was perhaps the first one to delineate this clearly in an
attempt to free biblical research from dogmatic theology and in effect to herald the
sub-discipline of biblical theology in biblical studies.20 Green (2002) puts it thus:
'Gabler sketched a three-stage process by which one might move from historical
analysis of the biblical text to a biblical theology: 1. careful linguistic and historical
analysis; 2. identification of ideas common among the biblical writers; and 3.
articulation of the transcendent (timeless and universal) principles of the Bible' (7).
Thus, with few exceptions, it seemed to the minds of scholars (and still does to
20 For more on Gabler's programme see Eldredge and Sandys-Wunsch (1980), Morgan (1987) and
Stuckenbruck (1999). It seems that the influence of Gabler's programme still endures in, for example,
Stendahl (1962), in whose articulations Stuckenbruck (1999, 154-57) sees Gabler's sentiments in
modern garb.
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others) that the way interpretations of the Bible useful for contemporary theology
(whether biblical or systematic or even practical) would be conducted, differences in
details notwithstanding, was through 'what the text meant' (which was perceived as
objective and fixed) and 'what it means'. However, at least starting from the 1960s,
21
this method's legitimacy has relentlessly either been challenged or rejected," and
22
new methods proposed and practised to replace, compete, or co-exist with it. This
has turned the field of biblical interpretation into a methodologically problematic and
contested ground.23 In the first instance, any method proposed or practised in the
place of historical criticism brings with it new and perhaps weightier philosophical
and theological problems, enough to have it challenged or rejected as well. For
example, a structural approach could be charged with watering down the historical
elements in the biblical texts that are absolutely vital to its meaning (a philosophical
objection) and to the integrity of the Christian faith (a theological objection); whilst a
reader-orientated approach may also be charged with watering down the historical
contingencies of the biblical text vital to its meaning (a theological objection), and
with solipsism, which is nothing more than a projection of the whims and desire of
the reader onto the text, the stuff of textual manipulation (a philosophical
objection).24
21 The basis of these challenges have been philosophical (e.g. Lyotard [1978] and Kuhn [1971]) in
rejecting claims to objectivity, the very aspirations of historical criticism) as well as theological (e.g.
Childs [ 1970] and Winks [1973]) and sociological in the sense of substituting the academy for the
church as the primary conversation partner of biblical studies (Johnson and William [2002, 28, 38ff|).
22 See Porter (1997) for a comprehensive bibliography on works dealing with methods current in
biblical studies.
23 Various attempts at ways forward through the different proposals offered are good indicators of
this; see for example Clines (1993), Hengel (1996), Bockmuehl (1998), Bartholomew et al (2001),
and Johnson and William (2002).
24 A more concrete philosophical objection to literary approaches would be, for example, Derrida
(1981) and post-structural biblical scholars' objections to literary approaches to reading the Bible, like
structuralism, arguing that in the absence of an outside reference or the transcendentally signified in
language, what we have is an endless differential network of signs referring infinitely to signs-and-
more-signs and not meaning at all (280). A concrete theological objection would be, for example,
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Secondly, any attempt at an integration of these methods presses upon us the
question of what happens when the different approaches have competing and
irreconcilable philosophical presuppositions. Indeed some attempts have been made
towards an integration. Tate and Jonker, for example, have thought it possible to
integrate different approaches to biblical interpretation. In his Biblical
Interpretation: An Integrated Approach, Tate (1997) proposes a hermeneutical
approach that conjoins author-centred (the world behind the text), text-centred (the
world within the text) and reader-centred approaches (the world in front of the text),
which as he shows relate to historical criticism, literary criticism and reader-response
criticism respectively (191 -230). Founding his proposal on a 'basic communication
model' (xxiv) which indicates that meaning resides in an interplay of speaker/author,
language/text, and audience/reader, he argues that no approach has a monopoly in
determining meaning for all have limitations. Therefore 'interpretation is impaired
when any world is given pre-eminence at the expense of neglecting the other two'
(xxv), making the best hermeneutic an eclectic one (230). The problem though with
such a proposal and its kindred is that the philosophical presuppositions of the
individual approaches that do not agree seem not to be reckoned with. In noting that:
'Every method is.. .anchored to a set of underlying presuppositions that determine the
set of questions to be put to a text; and the answers are those expected in advance'
(195), Tate seems to touch on this problem but falls short of discussing its
implications for his proposal and, with it, in offering an answer on how an
integration of critical methodologies can be possible in the face of inimical and
Childs (1992) objecting to some forms of literary approaches because he feels they are divorcing the
Bible from its theological reality (723), or Noble (1996) objecting to reader-response approaches for
the same reasons. A concrete sociological objection would include calls, contra Raisanen (2000), that
the church is the primary conversation partner of biblical studies in the academy (Fowl 1998).
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competing presuppositions. Yet this is the single most important obstacle to any
kind of integration. A brief elaboration in general terms based on sketches of the
preceding sections should make this clear.
How would one bring together, for instance, a historico-critical and a rhetorico-
critical approach in reading a biblical text when they are not aligned philosophically?
For example, historical criticism largely presupposes that the biblical text is a
historical document, while rhetorical criticism, though recognizing its historicity,
sees it as rhetoric. Thus, when seeking for the meaning of a biblical text, historical
critics look for what was meant by the writer and this with reference to his/her first
audience, the sensus literalis sive historicus, whilst rhetorical critics look for what is
meant for those who receive the rhetoric of the Bible, and they do so with reference
to the dynamics of rhetoric, the sensus rhetoricus. Or, as a second example,
historical criticism has flourished on the presupposition of an absolute/objective
world that anchors true and objective knowledge. This presupposition colours its
interpretative methodology, so that when looking for the historical meaning of a text,
the historical critic will look to critically (we could say empirically) ascertained
historical events or contexts to determine and validate it. In addition, the said
presupposition brings to the centre the question of truth (understood to be relative to
a pre-existing objective reality). For this reason, the historical critic perceives that a
biblical text has a definitive meaning that should be sought for. But this is not the
case with rhetorical criticism: on the contrary it flourishes on the presupposition, that
an objective world is invariably relative to language and thus subjective or
perspectival. Meaning therefore is determined or validated through language,
understood in this instance as rhetoric, and thus contextual, communal, rational,
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affective and practical. The question of truth may not be at the centre, since it too
will be relative to a world mediated subjectively or created by language and thus
contingent. As such, a biblical text has a variety ofmeanings.
Unlike Tate, Jonker (1996) recognizes, in Exclusivity and Variety: Perspectives on
Multidimensional Exegesis, the severity of the problem posed by such competing
presupposition, and responds by proposing a 'multidimensional exegesis' as a way of
combining the different hermeneutical approaches regardless of their philosophical
disharmony. This integration of hermeneutical approaches:
refers to the interrelation among exegetical methodologies in a systematic and
ordered way. Every methodology is allowed to operate according to its own
approach, and by means of its own method(s). However, instead of operating
exclusively and on its own, the exegetical process and results are being
coordinated and related to those of other approaches and methods (71).
His proposal though lacks clarity, leaving a number of unanswered questions. For
example, who does the co-ordinating? Is it the historic or rhetorical critic? And
would not that presuppose a compromise of presuppositions of the methodologies in
question? To what end is the co-ordination? Is it, for example, for the purpose of
enhancing meaning? What kind of relationship does he have in mind, and to what
purpose? However, his illustrations (and that is what makes up the majority of the
book's content) suggest that what he means is the co-opting by one critical
methodology the findings of the other where applicable in its investigations of a text.
So that, for instance, 'A historical-critical methodology will integrate literary insights
only if they serve the investigation of the history of the text' (290) and, 'a narrative
methodology will integrate historical-critical insights only if they serve the
investigation of the literary character of the text' (Ibid.). On closer scrutiny, his
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proposal is, in fact, not an integration of approaches but an employment by a
particular approach (the one that has primacy in the alleged co-ordination and
relationship) of the insights of the other into its investigations where suitable. In
most cases this employment happens when that approach cannot within its own
presuppositions and methodology offer answers needful to its interpretation of a
given text, or when we have the literary in, and which at the same time eludes
interpretation by, the historic and vice versa (Barton 1994, 7-8), or still, when little or
no evidence is forthcoming to construct any conclusive historical background to a
text. His three such models (298-333) are indeed a good example of this. So, even
though Jonker's multidimensional exegesis comes closest to an integration of
henneneutical approaches, it cannot be considered strictly as such.
It seems, then, that with integration problematic, if not impossible, what is left is
exclusivism, a 'balkanization' of hermeneutical approaches in biblical studies. For
example, Templeton (1999, 293-329), who clearly understands the philosophical
presuppositions at stake, chooses literary criticism at the exclusion of historical
criticism in reading the Bible. For him, the Bible is literature rather than history on
the basis that 'many realities of which the New Testament speaks are simply not
accessible to the historian. What we have in the New Testament is the language of
the human heart, the language of emotion ...' (306). The Bible then should be
approached literarily; a position whose implications he alludes to in his
pronouncement: 'To lose the Bible as history is not to lose truth, but to lose one kind
of it and find another. But we have not lost it and do not lose it. We change the
question merely' (327). But the disadvantage of capitulating to exclusivism in
hermeneutical approaches is to fail to do justice to the complexity of the genre of
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biblical literature for it is not, as Templeton suggests, just either literature or history;
it is both and maybe even more. As Barton (1994) points out, 'the Old (and New)
Testament contain(s) some very strange literature; perhaps it will not be surprising if
it takes more than one kind of sensibility to understand it' (15, in brackets mine).
In light of the difficulties just outlined that attend integrated approaches and their
alternative at the opposite end, exclusivistic approaches, we are left with yet a final
methodological problematic, that of choice of method in the variety of approaches
available. Which method do we choose for our interpretation of a biblical text and
why? Such a decision may not be an easy one to make, because it entails an intimate
knowledge of hermeneutics, a capacity to balance a mass of subordinate judgements,
one over against another, and a clear awareness of scholarly goals in sight. This may
be the reason why, almost a generation ago, Keck (1974) hoped for, somehow, a
convergence of approaches leading to a redefined common method in Biblical
studies when he wrote:
The contours and direction of scholarship are affected by factors other than the
sequence of research problems in which one scholar refines the work of his
predecessor. In addition to counter moves (e.g. Ritschl's rejection of his teacher,
F. C. Baur), one must also reckon with the emergence of new questions and a
resurgence of older ones which, though sighted, were never fully developed.
The confluence of such factors initially has the effect of fragmenting the
received tradition, but out of it may come a reintegration of the discipline with a
different configuration. In biblical study we may now be in the former state,
when new questions and methods appear to be fragmenting the received tradition
of historical critical inquiry. The rise of the interest in the nature of language
and in linguistics, the fascination with (many-sided) structuralism and the desire
to reconstruct early Christianity according to 'trajectories' are samples of the
various efforts to reconstitute biblical criticism... One may expect that in the
future, once these several approaches have developed, they will converge to
produce a basically new shape to biblical study. (435, emphasis mine).
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Thirty years later this methodological redefinition has yet to occur, but rather, to
the contrary, biblical scholarship continues to witness unprecedented proliferation of
critical strategies.25 So, attempts to meet the need of African theology to engage
with the Bible directly in order to help build an African Christian theology, must, as
a corollary, make choices on which method to use, perhaps, even, must search for
new methods to follow in interpreting the Bible. Such methodological choices
should be based on a justifiable hermeneutical and theological rationale, and be tied
to the scholarly goal of the interpretation, which in the case of this thesis is already
prescribed: the establishing of an African theology for the building of African
Christian communities. Hermeneutical issues are, therefore, invariably an integral
part of this study. Indeed in this study, i will propose an appropriate methodology
through which Hebrews can be interpreted for the sake ofbuilding an African
theology. It is precisely such a methodology that may point a way through which
others may also choose to engage, in a primary way, with the Bible in building an
African theology.
1.3 NEW TESTAMENT CHRISTOLOGY AND ITS INTERPRETATION
It would be expected that problems of procedure in New Testament interpretation
are manifest in instances of the interpretation ofNew Testament Christologies.
However, this is not quite the case. If anything, it seems that interpretations ofNew
25
Undoubtedly this situation has left its mark on African theology's use of the Bible. Parratt (1995,
203-204) in his comprehensive look at African theology points it out as an enduring problem, but
argues that the existence of other approaches does not invalidate the traditional historical critical
method which ensures that biblical teaching is not severed from its roots. If we are to follow
Ukpong's (2000, 22ff) rather prescriptive survey of biblical interpretation of the Bible in Africa in the
1990s, most of these other approaches are a variety of reader-response. West (2000, 37-38) who I
think offers a more descriptive account of biblical interpretation in Africa, sees the use of a variety of
critical methods in biblical inteipretation by African biblical scholarship (in which case, it reflects the
field of Biblical studies), but with still a predominance of historico-critical approach.
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Testament Christologies are encumbered by the opposite problem, that of the
inability to break away from historical criticism as the dominant methodology in
their interpretation. This can be illustrated by reference to Leander Keek's (1986)
essay on 'the renewal ofNew Testament Christology'. There, he proposes a
theological approach to the study ofNew Testament Christology informed by 'the
history of ideas but which will deliberately pursue Christology as a theological
theme' (362). This is particularly pertinent for our purposes, since his concern with
New Testament Christologies mirror, the one in this thesis: i.e., their usefulness for,
or contribution to, theology. In Keek's observation,
The scholarly literature shows that what is called New Testament Christology
is, by and large, really a history of Christological materials and motifs in early
Christianity, and their ancestry. The massive preoccupation with history has,
to be sure, produced impressive results. In fact, today it is difficult to imagine
a study ofNT Christology which is not influenced by this historical analysis of
early Christian conceptions of Christ and their antecedents (362).
This is well corroborated by surveys ofNew Testament Christologies in the 20th
Century. As an example, Hurtado (1979) points out that William Bousset's Kyrios
Christos 'determined the agenda for the scholarly study ofNT Christology since the
publication of the book in 1913' (307). This determination of agenda, he further
points out, was not in terms of the material interpretation of the New Testament
Christology but in tenns ofmethodology which was that of the
religionsgeschichtliche Schule generally. So, in the case of his (Bousset's) book, we
see 'an emphasis upon knowledge of Jewish and pagan background as indispensable
for scientific study of earliest Christology, attention to the process of development of
Christology and the factors in early Christianity that provoked this development'
(307). Despite questions levelled at some of Bousset's views (as Hurtado himself
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does), this methodology, he concludes, has made critical study ofNew Testament
26
Christology what it is today.
Keck (1986) goes on to observe that nowhere else is this methodology more
evident than in the 'fascination with the palaeontology ofChristological titles' (368)
in New Testament Christology.27 But Christological titles are not the only
manifestation of the dominance of the historico-critical methodology in New
Testament Christology. To the study ofChristological titles we may add 1. the
28
studies on the origins and developments of Christology in early Christianity and 2.
29
studies seeking an understanding of the historical Jesus. Historical Jesus studies,
however, have a life of their own, their origins much earlier than Bousset, for him to
be credited as influential to their methodology. However, the latest phase of
historical Jesus studies is clearly at one with what is credited as the influence of
Bousset so far as its efforts to understand Jesus relative to 'a concrete time and place'
(Meier 1991, 86) are concerned (albeit in this case, the concrete time and space is,
significantly, early Judaism).30 For our purposes, what we should note running
through all these different concerns of current New Testament Christologies is the
same methodology, i.e., historical criticism.
26 See also Boers (1970) and Perrin (1974, 41-56); some other relevant discussions on New Testament
Christology that point to the influence of Bousset are Hurtado (1984) Fossum (1991) and Zeller
(2001).
27 Cullmann (1959), Hahn (1969) and Lindars (1983) may be considered representative of this.
28
See, for example, Moule (1977), Charlesworth (1992), and Gieschen (1998).
29 For significant studies see Sanders (1985), Crossan (1991) and Meier (1991-2001).
30 A survey and evaluation of historical Jesus studies could be found in Evans (1995), Scott (1994),
and Charlesworth (1991).
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In Keek's judgement, though focused on titular Christologies, this state of affairs
had a significant shortcoming. He points it out this way: 'To reconstruct the history
of titles as if this were the study of Christology is like trying to understand the
windows of Chartres Cathedral by studying the history of coloured glass. In fact,
concentration of titles finally makes the Christologies of the NT unintelligible as
Christologies, and insignificant theologically' (368).31 As we have observed,
historical approaches to New Testament Christology are not limited to titles of Jesus,
but searches for the origins ofNew Testament Christologies, and even their
development, do not help bring about theological understandings of Christ. Also,
searches for the historical personality, identity, wisdom, etc. of Jesus will not help in
the apprehension of Jesus theologically, at least not directly. Keck, therefore, sought
to have this redressed arguing that the study ofNew Testament Christology would be
renewed 'if it recovers its proper subject-matter - Christology - and its proper scope,
the New Testament' (362). To do this Keck proposed an alternative approach to the
study ofNew Testament Christology, one that would be informed by 'the history of
ideas but which will deliberately pursue Christology as a theological theme' (362).
Fundamental to what Keck considers as teasing out a theological explication of
New Testament Christology is the question of the identity and, particularly, the
significance of Jesus. For the purposes of renewing New Testament Christology,
Keck wants the interpretation ofNew Testament Christology to move, as it were,
beyond verification to signification. On the principle that significance cannot be
31 Keek's judgement is in need surely of qualification, for not all studies of the titles of Christ in the
New Testament are arid theologically both in their motivations and utility (or in their ramifications),
for their meaning to be dismissed as theologically unintelligible. But the point of his judgement still
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arrived at by speaking of Jesus in isolation, but 'is intelligible only in relation to
something or someone' (363), he argues that the subject-matter of Christology is in
its network of relationships. In this case, the relationship (or correlationship) in view
is that of Christ to God, to humanity and to the cosmos. Thus he posits,'... from
statements about God or world, or humanity, one can infer the appropriate
christological correlates, and vice versa' (363). Keck calls this web of relationships
the grammar or syntax of the signification of Jesus. So for Keck, we may say, the
key to the theological significance of Jesus is to recover the subject matter of
Christology via (using grammar as an analogy) the syntax of the mentioned
relationships. Thus: 'the religious and theological signification of Jesus emerges only
when one reflects on this event [Jesus] in relation to God, world and the human
condition and its resolution' (372). An example of what this would mean, he
suggests, is to view every statement about Christ 'to implicate God' (363), which is a
relationship that in Keek's judgement of contemporary Christologies of the New
Testament is the most neglected. Another example of what this would mean, but
with respect to the anthropological relations, is:
... if the human condition is viewed as bondage, Christ is the liberator and
soteriology will be expressed in the idiom of liberation. Christology will then
show what there is about Christ that makes it possible for liberation to occur
through him. Or, if Christ is hailed as the great teacher, the human condition
will be construed as ignorance or illusion, so that salvation will be a matter of
learning the truth (364).
Against the background of this understanding, he, accordingly, points out three ways
to the study ofNew Testament Christology that in the end aid in understanding the
significance of Jesus.
stands: historical studies of the titles of Jesus are not theological studies of the same, and, therefore, in
themselves do not render Christology theologically fully intelligible.
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Firstly, he proposes an approach to New Testament Christology that contends with
this grammar. In such an approach, what is aimed at is 'a systemic grasp of the way
the correlates of Christ and God, world, and the human condition are expressed or
implied' (370). Seeking to justify this further he states:
Attending to the correlates of christology is, moreover, particularly appropriate
to the New Testament because this literature consistently expresses the identity
and significance of Jesus in relation to something else - doxology, paraenesis,
cult narrative, etc. There are no sections of the NT [New Testament] devoted to
Christology as a discrete topic in its own right. Attending to the syntax of the
signification of Jesus is therefore not attempting to impose an alien structure on
the texts but a way of ordering the relational character of Christology as it
appears in the NT (371).
Secondly, he proposes that the study ofNew Testament Christology should be
limited to the New Testament. This would mean a Christology that is focused on
New Testament texts rather than individual authors or communities, on the one hand,
and, on the other, a Christology that is focused on the texts or corpus of texts as they
exist and 'with what they were designed to do' (371). Concerning the latter, some
leading questions in the study ofNew Testament Christology would be these: 'What
is the overall construal of Jesus' identity and significance in the text? What is the
structure of this Christology and to what extent are the logical correlates expressed?
What degree of coherence and completeness does this Christology have?' (372).
The third proposal has to do with the plurality ofChristologies in the New
Testament. Rather than following the historical mode in dealing with diversities in
New Testament Christology that result in, for example, trajectories, or genetic
relationships, Keck proposes a Christological approach to diversity. By this he
means the asking ofChristological questions of each Christology. Questions such as:
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'what sort of anthropology does each entail? What is the range and depth of the
human condition which each allows to become visible? ... '(373). Also, he means
pursuing 'the consequences of the canon's juxtaposing precisely these Christologies'
(374), which he believes is deliberate rather than accidental.
Going by the current literature on New Testament Christology, it seems that
mainstream New Testament Christology are historical in nature. This means that the
move from verification (i.e., titular Christologies) to signification (i.e., theological
Christologies) envisaged in Keek's call for the renewal ofNew Testament
Christology has not taken place. It is my contention that this move from verification
to signification has not taken place because Keck has not linked such a move with
the new interpretative approaches in biblical studies, yet one would think that they
are potentially useful in enabling the kinds ofNew Testament Christological
interpretations he desires. If I may point out Keek's short coming more precisely, he
fails in his article to bring into dialogue his proposal for theological Christologies
with methodologies that may be consonant with such a goal. To my mind, this is a
grave omission since one of the critical issues in New Testament Christologies (as in
New Testament studies generally) can be identified to be, perhaps first and foremost,
methodological. The abundance ofmainstream New Testament Christologies
informed by the history of ideas, as has been shown, are enabled by (and thus in
direct relation with) the hermeneutics of historical criticism. This should mean, at
least, that a call for a change of focus in interpretations ofNew Testament
29
Christologies is invariably a call, to whatever the extent, for a change in approach to
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their interpretation as well.
A new method would supply different sets of questions to be posed to the
Christologies of the New Testament; questions whose answers would result in an
evaluation of the person and work of Jesus theologically. Keck, of course, has
suggested an important framework for the study ofNew Testament Christologies,
and from it questions that need to be posed to New Testament Christologies, which
may indeed lead to a theological Christology. The main problem is that he has not
related this framework and questions to any interpretative approach to New
Testament Christology, even if he has not ignored the question of approaches
altogether. But still, Keck has inadvertently illustrated that the interpretation ofNew
Testament Christologies needs to move procedurally beyond historico-critical
approaches if it is to be useful for theology, and in our case, for African theology.
However, such interpretations can be possible only where a methodology or
approach consonant with the aforementioned goals of interpreting New Testament
Christologies that way is used. This presses on us the necessity for choosing an
appropriate methodology or even searching for a new one in biblical studies, a choice
that must be carried out on the basis of a justifiable hermeneutical rationale and tied
to the goals of the desired interpretation.33 But, further still we may argue, that the
choice made on which way to proceed in interpreting the Bible with the ultimate aim
32 Keifert's (1984) discussion, though concerned with integrating linguistic and historical interpretative
paradigms for New Testament Christology, may serve to make this clear.
33 There are signs that interpretation ofNew Testament Christology is opening up to the variety of
approaches available in biblical interpretation. However, this seems largely limited to narrative
criticism, which is in turn limited to the Gospel narratives and especially applied in interpreting
Markan Christology (see, inter alia, Broadhead [1993], Davidson [1993], and Cook [1997, 67-108]).
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of contributing to the building up of an African theology should be consistent with
the one used in, specifically, interpreting New Testament Christologies. Put
differently, the interpretation of the Bible generally should not be divorced from the
interpretation of specific aspects of its content as is apparent when New Testament
interpretation generally is opened up to different approaches while New Testament
Christological interpretation is conducted almost exclusively via historical criticism.
In this study, therefore, 1 will aim to propose a form ofbiblical interpretation that is
useful for the interpretation of the Bible generally, and its Christology particularly.
1.4 METHODOLOGY AND OUTLINE OF STUDY
In summary, then, the Bible, and especially its Christology, needs to bear on
African theology in a primary way if its articulators wish it to be a Christian theology
and so help to build and sustain authentic African Christian communities. However,
in order to conduct an interpretation ofChristology from a specific biblical text
within an African context for the purpose of contributing to African theology and,
potentially, to point the way to how more of such contributions can be made requires
that one adopt an appropriate methodology, or propose a new one, through which to
achieve such a goal. Consequently, in Chapter 3 of this thesis, I will, on the basis of
a hermeneutical and theological rationale which I shall broach, propose a typology-
based theological interpretation, as the most appropriate form of biblical
interpretation for Hebrews, and one that is also in tandem with the goal of
contributing to an African theology. On the way to this proposal, we shall consider
closely, in Chapter 2, why the aim and nature of theological interpretations of the
One, of course, could also come across the occasional social approach to New Testament Christology
as can be found in Robbins (1984) and Slater (1999).
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Bible make them the most appropriate genus of biblical interpretation suited for the
goal of interpreting the Bible for the faith, ethos and worship of the Church
generally, and of interpreting Hebrews, particularly, in order to build African
theology. This consideration will be followed, still in Chapter 2, by an examination
of different models of theological interpretations proposed, implicitly or explicitly,
by their leading proponents in the 20th century. Here, we shall critically discuss and
evaluate their models of theological interpretation and state the reasons for not
adopting any of them in the theological interpretation of Hebrews, but, rather,
proposing a new one (which will not be divorced entirely from theirs because it will
draw on some elements from them).
A typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology will highlight
two cardinal things: 1. the indispensability of the biblical text's historical contingency
for biblical interpretations that seek to build theologies and with them the faith, ethos
and worship ofChristian communities, and 2. the significance of the context in
which such biblical interpretations occur. This will necessitate, firstly (as will be
seen in Chapter 4), a historico-rhetorical study of Hebrews as a vital initial procedure
in the process of its theological interpretation. What this means, specifically, is that I
will carry out a rhetorico-critical study of Hebrews but in the service, ultimately, of
historical criticism of the same. This is because, as we shall explain fully in the
relevant section of this study, there is a sense in which historical critical
methodology can make use of the insights of rhetorical criticism to confirm if not
rebut the conjectures of historical criticism (which are plenty given the nature of
scholarship on Hebrews historical background). In other words, there is a sense in
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which certain kinds of rhetorical criticism can offer an alternative route to studying a
biblical text historically, especially where there is a dearth of precise historical
information available of the text's Sitz im Leben. Since Hebrews' historical
background, for lack of information, has never been conclusively demonstrated, it
qualifies to be studied this way en route to its theological interpretation.
Consequently, it is our rhetorico-critical study of Hebrews that will lead us into the
subsequent investigation of its Christology within the background of its wider
religio-historical context.
Secondly, my proposed theological interpretation will necessitate, in Chapter 5, a
comprehensive study of ancestors in Africa, as the context in which I envision
Hebrews' interpretation taking place in Africa. This study will largely draw from the
field and the insights of social anthropological studies, which marks a significant step
beyond all other works of African theologians seeking to articulate ancestor-
Christologies. This is on account of the fact that African theologians seeking to
engage ancestral traditions of Africa with some form of Christian tradition seem not
to take cognizance of the labours of social anthropologists who have taken time to
observe in some detail such phenomena. An illustration, again from theologians
seeking to articulate ancestor-Christologies, will suffice. In seeking to compare
given conceptions of Christ with ancestors in Africa, African theologians (Bediako
[1994], Bujo [1992], Kabasale [1991], Nyamiti [1984]) discuss the understandings of
ancestors in Africa, and it is here that this shortcoming is clearly evident. In their
proposals, they have numerous unsubstantiated statements and assertions (which they
subsequently interpret) about ancestors which have no basis in concrete data, such as
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are available from the studies of African societies and religions, especially by social
anthropologists amongst others.34 Nyamiti (1984) is a good example of this
observation. Throughout his Christ as our Ancestor, he details the African beliefs in
ancestors (15-17), without any recourse to concrete ethnographical data (even though
at the very beginning he refers his readers to several books whose usage in his study
is not clear).35 He is right, as I will show later in the course of this study, in calling
attention to the fact that there are different types of ancestors in Africa; but the
existence in Africa of the 'brother-ancestor' type he discusses is, apparently, dubious.
This is so because in all the data that I am aware of on African societies, there is no
ancestor relationship between members of the same generation, it is always inter-
generational. The neglect by African theologians of engaging available data on
African societies by social anthropologists is a serious omission, because it weakens
the case for the intended articulation of an African theology in dialogue with Africa's
vast ancestral traditions. So, by drawing on the work and insights of social
anthropologists on the ancestral phenomena in Africa, I will be trying to avoid this
problem.
The outcome ofChapter 5 will be an interpretation, in an African context, of Jesus
in Hebrews as the greatest ancestor. It will have been argued in Chapter 4 that
Hebrews' Christology is predominantly mediatorial and, therefore, can legitimately
be reconceived of in Africa along the lines of ancestors who play a mediatorial role
in Africa's religio-cultural cosmology. This interpretation I will pursue further in
34 For example: Fortes (1987) on the Tellensi ofWest Africa, Kyewalyanga (1976) on the Ganda of
Uganda East Africa, and Daneel (1970) on the Shona of Southern Africa.
35 At least he provides some references; the others in question do not, despite going ahead to discuss
ancestors in Africa.
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Chapter 6; qualifying it, and considering its significance for various relevant aspects
of the faith, ethos and worship of African Christians. Here we shall be able to see
how an African theology generated on the basis of a sustained and appropriate
interpretation of a biblical text could play a significant part in the life of Christian
communities in Africa, the very aim of African theology.
In Chapter 7, the final chapter (and the conclusion), we shall revisit this highly
defined form of theological interpretation for the reading of Hebrews theologically
and its relationship with general forms of theological interpretations (such as the
ones discussed in Chapter 2). We shall also consider what contribution African
theology arrived at in this way could make to other Christian theologies.
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CHAPTER 2
TOWARDS A THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF HEBREWS'
CHRISTOLOGY IN AFRICA
Broadly conceived, 'theological' interpretations of the Bible should be understood
as those that seek to make it accessible or actualize it in, and for, the Church, in a
given contemporary setting. A look at any comprehensive book on the subject of the
history of biblical interpretation will show that such interpretations were the norm
until the 1700s.1 Traditionally the Bible was viewed as the locus of divine
discourse, the Word of God to homo sapiens. The canon of the New Testament was
a result of its identification as the repository of the authentic words of Jesus and the
apostles (Metzger 1987, 1-8), expressing the original divinely-given truth, hence its
use by the Church as a provider of right teaching, confession and living. For all
practical purposes, the Bible was interpreted for the life and faith of Christian
communities. Consequently (with time) theological thinking was carried out largely
by way of citation and exposition of the Bible (Farley 1982, 108-117). The sense, or
meaning, of any portion of the Bible would in various ways be derived directly
(literally) or indirectly (spiritually) or through a combination of both to have it speak
to the life and faith of Christian communities. However, the onset of critical inquiry
into the Bible in the 1700s and the context that spawned and enabled it, i.e.,
1 See Grant and Tracy (1984) for example.
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2
'modernity', made this traditional way of interpreting the Bible problematic. It is
this situation that has led to calls for a recovery of interpretations of the Bible that are
fashioned for the identity, life and faith of Christian communities in their
contemporary setting, which are at the same time carried out in the light of critical
scholarship (both in its methods and fruits), i.e., calls for theological interpretations
of the Bible in the academy.3
Various ways have been proposed on how this might be conducted, and with them
different details on precisely what passes muster as a theological interpretation. This
prompts the question: Which of the proposed theological interpretations is the most
appropriate in reading the Bible? Further to this, since the Bible is not a
homogeneous whole, a second, equally important, question that we have to face at
the same time is whether a single model of theological interpretation can cater, and
thus be appropriate, for the reading of all the different genres of the Bible. It would
appear, for reasons that will be made clear, that what seems needful is the working
out, in an ad hoc manner, ofmodels for theological interpretation that are appropriate
for the reading of certain biblical writings and that are in relation, and specific, to
different socio-political and religio-cultural realities the Church might find itself in as
it reads the Bible. So, for example, if I am reading Hebrews for the Church in a
certain part ofAfrica, how do I proceed to interpret it theologically? I will begin to
offer an answer to this question in this chapter, which I complete in the next chapter
where I will propose a model of theological interpretation best suited for reading
2 A point well noted by Robinson's (1964) remarks in his comprehensive discussion of the history of
biblical hermeneutics.
1
Meyer (1994, 145-147) credits Peter Stuhlmacher's essay (see Stuhlmacher [1979]) as the harbinger
of the recovery of theological interpretations of the Bible in recent New Testament scholarship.
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Hebrews in Africa. To be more specific, I will seek in the chapter to map out, first,
the factors (alluded to above) that have led to the need for deliberately developed
theological interpretations in contemporary biblical scholarship. This will provide
clarity to the problem, against which I will, secondly, discuss some representative
writings on theological interpretation with the end purpose of evaluating their
adequacy for reading the New Testament, Hebrews in particular, theologically. Then
finally, in Chapter 3, I will proceed to argue, but in conversation with the preceding
discussion in Chapter 2, for a certain form of theological interpretation that I think is
most adequate for my intended reading of Hebrews' Christology in Africa. That
model, typology-based theological interpretation, will be the one I will use to
interpret Hebrews' Christology in Africa.
2.1 HISTORY OF THE PROBLEM
2.1.1. Vis-a-vis Historical Criticism
The philosophers of the 17lh century (such as Galileo, Descartes especially, and
Locke) ushered in a new way of looking at the world.4 'They committed the modern
world to thinking about nature in a new and "scientific" way, and to using "rational"
methods to deal with the problems of human life and society' (Toulmin 1990, 9).
The modern world's basic and fundamental assumption was that there was an
absolute world that could be known through scientific rationalism - the process of
observation, experimentation, deduction and value-free conclusion - which was
understood to be devoid of prejudice, the temporal, ignorance, superstition and
mythology. Since it was considered that knowledge acquired in this way was an
4 Thus the argument that the start ofmodernity should be pegged to these philosophers (Toulmin
1990, 10). For more on the formations ofmodernity see Hamilton (1992).
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accurate reflection of objective reality (thus 'the touchstone of truth'),5 universality
and certainty of knowledge was thus secured.6 Valid knowledge was consequently
restricted to the kind of objective (i.e., factual, value-free, and neutral) knowledge
which could be expressed via rationally validated methods by, 'on the one hand,
framing one's basic theories around ideas whose merits were clear, distinct and
certain' and 'on the other, using only demonstrable arguments, having the necessity of
geometrical proofs' (81).7
It is important to note this change in understanding the world because it affected
all fields of inquiry, not least historical inquiry, in validation of both historical fact
and meaning. What passed as acceptable historical testimony as well as historical
truth would have to be objective, which meant in concert with observed facts (or
known laws of nature) 'on the principle that the future will resemble the past and the
o
unknown the known' (Rubinoff 1996, 142). In turn, the way texts from antiquity
were read was affected, removed as they were by a broad span of time and language
from the coalescing assumptions of the modern world, and so was the reading of the
5 Phrase from Rorty (1980, 269) in his comment on what seemed to give science an edge over religion
and politics: the presumed contact with the real.
It should be understood, as Toulmin (1990) stresses, that Descartes (and company) were not
philosophizing in vacuo but in response to bloody conflicts occasioned by 'uncertainty, ambiguity and
the acceptance of pluralism' (55, also, 69-80); the quest for certainty was therefore critical in bringing
stability to society. This quest for securing the certainty of knowledge is sometimes known as
'Cartesian Anxiety'(see Bernstein 1983, 16-19).
7 One should not assume here that modernity's original formulations and metaphysics remained static
until the onset of postmodernity: the details and views on objectivity and scientific rationalism
evolved in the course of time. Post-17lh Century philosophers, such as David Hume (1711-1776) and
Immanuel Kant (1724-1804), for example, modified the initial thrusts of the claims of empiricism and
their bases (see Watson 1966). What is important to note is that such changes did not alter
modernity's basic premise, the premise of objectivity and scientific rationalism in shaping thinking,
inquiry and knowledge; they remain the legacy of modernity. Megill's (1994, 1-20) 'four senses of
objectivity' today is useful in making this clear.
8 Bleicher (1980, 14-26) offers a very brief introduction. For a useful discussion with reference to the
Bible, see Harvey (1967, 68-101).
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Bible,9 now stripped of its numinous intimations that were ruled out as fiction by
scientific rationalism (Krentz 1975, 10-30). While, formerly, readings of the Bible
had both grammatico-historical and aesthetico-rhetorical interpretations (more on
this later),10 the definitive interpretation was now limited to the sense the text had for
its writer and first audience (sensus literalis sive historicus).U This was understood
to objectify interpretations since meaning of an historical text was arrived at by
reference to critically ascertained (in the sense of reason for their occurrence
accounted for) historical events (or contexts).12 The flip side of this was that non-
literal meanings of texts were cast aside, as subjective. Kummel (1973) points out
that, 'This "historical method" of interpretation, based solely on the establishment of
actual facts and, so far as method was concerned, paying no attention to the canon of
Holy Scripture, not only found numerous practitioners in the field of hermeneutics,
but in particular was deliberately adopted in numerous commentaries' (110). We
should note that in the background of such presuppositions was the tacit assumption
that language refers, and gets its meaning by reference, to external realities, and/or
reflects and represents facts about those realities: in other words language mediates
knowledge of the world.13 When such a view was extended to the Bible, it was seen
9 See Sheppard (1998, 260-68).
10 Ocker (1998, 75-84), Muller (1998 123-152), and Grant and Tracy (1984, 83-99) offer helpful
introductory accounts of the kinds of interpretations employed then.
"See Kummel (1970) for a comprehensive look at the factors leading to, and ultimately privileging,
historical criticism as definitive in New Testament studies. See also Frei (1974).
12 This should be considered the classic presupposition of historical criticism and is the canon of
historico-critical readings, amid the dispersion of perspectives (including 'new historicism') and
variety of new and old critical systems (such as 'textual', 'source', 'form', 'author', 'audience', 'social'
etc) that would be found within the approach.
131 suppose that this assumption (which Putman [1995, 70] calls the 'traditional view' of language)
could be traced back to Locke (1690, 'II Of the Signification ofWords'); before then, it seems that at
least three views of language including the 'traditional view' prevailed (Stiver [1996, 14-35]). More of
'representational' or 'reference' view of language can be found in Devitt and Sterelney (1999, 17-38).
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chiefly in terms of its capacity to represent past history and derive its meaning from
the same.14
From the broad-brush perspective of theological interpretations of the Bible
alluded to, the cardinal problem that the situation just outlined precipitates is that, in
and of itself, historical criticism cannot provide interpretations of the Bible for today
generally, nor in particular interpretations that nourish the faith and life of the
Church in its contemporary setting.15 It is a hermeneutical problem that historical
criticism engenders and at the same time is ill equipped to meet. It may identify the
horizon of the New Testament but it cannot appropriate it. This is a state of affairs
that individuals and communities that hold the Bible as Scripture find highly
undesirable for reasons which include the following: 1. the Bible is perceived as
containing the gospel (centred on Jesus ofNazareth) which lies at the origin of the
Church, and consequently, 2. it has an absolute and universal character, and is of
permanent value that has to be identified in every culture and historical situation; 3.
the Bible is looked upon by Christian communities as absolutely essential for the
provision of an authentic Christian identity and faith, and for the ordering of their
lives; and for these reasons, 4. the writings of the Bible are seen as always having
something to say to the church today in its current context and experience.
14 This is why at times historical criticism is frequently viewed as using texts as windows to events
behind them (see Peterson [1978, 19]). On more on text as 'window' or 'mirror' see Krieger (1964, 3-
4).
This statement should not be taken to mean that historical criticism has no theological value in
theological interpretation. As noted by Murphy (1998, 113), 'Historical criticism may not in itself
capture precise nuances, but it can approximate the historical meaning at some level, and this cannot
be considered as theologically without value'. We cannot rule out here that historical criticism has a
foothold in biblical studies because of the historical nature of the Bible and the fact that the Christian
faith heavily invests itself in the location of God's epiphany at a point in human history. For a helpful
discussion on historical-critical theology, i.e., of historico-critical readings of the Bible that are not
purely empirical but grapple with the significance, meaning, intentions etc of the text, and ask the
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The shortcoming of historical readings so conceived was noted quite early as
historical criticism began to predominate in biblical studies. Again Kummel (113)
points out, for example, that C. F. Staudlin in 1807 protested against the exclusive
use of historical criticism in interpreting the Bible because,
the teaching of Jesus has to do with the unchangeable, divine truths that cannot
have merely temporal historical significance, and because the declarations of
the apostles convey deep religious perceptions, only he can understand the
New Testament who has this sort of impression of Jesus and a similar religious
perception. "Moral, religious, philosophical" interpretation, therefore, belongs
inseparably to the relevant interpretation of these writings...(113).
Indeed the reading of the Bible for the purposes of using it for the faith, life and
conduct of the Church or even individual has been a perennial struggle ever since
historical criticism emerged on the scene, precisely because historical readings could
not offer theological interpretations of the same.
2.1.2. Vis-a-vis Literary and Poststructural Approaches
Two shifts that moved historical criticism from the centre of authority in
hermeneutics, or at least disturbed its hegemony, occurred in succession in the last
century. 'Close reading' (similar to 'formalism' and 'New Criticism') emerged in the
1920s16 and shifted the reading of texts from their social and historical context, and
from the writer's mind and life, to the text itself. In interpreting a text, what mattered
was the text itself, its structure, architecture, intrinsic form and the internal
relationships of its parts. A literary reading of texts was called for (this is the so
texts questions in tandem with their religious content, i.e., theology of the Bible in its historical setting
(see Liebing [1967]).
16 The impact of this approach though was to be felt in biblical studies only from the 1960s. See
Detweiler and Robbins (1991) for more. Some of the hermeneutical approaches that they have
spawned include: Narrative criticism, Reader-Response criticism, Structural criticism, Rhetorical
criticism, and Literary criticism. See Malbon and McKnight (1994) and Porter (1997) for a broad look
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called 'textual paradigm')17. Then in the 1960s, the textual paradigm of reading was
itself challenged by the emergence of poststructural criticism, which shifted the
controlling principle in reading texts from the text itself to the reader. The reader
mattered most since s/he was the one understood to confer meaning to a text ('the
reader paradigm').
What should not escape our attention is that these approaches were themselves
enabled by changes in the understanding of the world. Firstly, with regard to
language, the text is now seen as a system of signs, and in itself it can function to
engage the reader and generate meaning quite apart from historical background.18
Secondly, Postmodernism (broadly conceived)19 assaults the outlined Cartesian
metaphysics of modernity. The assumption of an objective/absolute reality, known
through scientific rationalism and which consequently makes true objective
20
knowledge, fixed meaning and universal validity possible, is refuted." All
knowledge therefore is necessarily particular, historical, cultural and tainted with the
local/personal. The result of this is a philosophy that either rejects the notion of an
objective reality (and knowledge) altogether (as is the case with poststructuralism) or
at these new hermeneutical approaches in biblical studies, and Minor (1996) and Powell (1992) for
comprehensive bibliographies.
l7SeeSeldon (1989).
181 should think that the proper starting point of this understanding oflanguage is in the linguistics of
Saussure (1974) in which he divorces language from reference in favour of an autonomous, relational
and closed view of language. Language is viewed as a system of signs ('semiotics') without external
referent: the signifier is a sign as well as the signified (the sign signified, here a semantic object) so
that meaning is determined by a sign's differences from other signs and not by an external referent. (I
have relied on Devitt and Sterelny [1999, 259-272] for this short analysis).
19 Theories of postmodernism are not univocal; what is agreed on is the significant shift in the
Western ways of seeing, knowing and representing that is affecting all fields of inquiry.
20 For more see Kuhn (1996) and Lyotard (1994).
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one that sees this absolute reality (and knowledge thereof) as subjectively mediated
and interpreted (what we may call, following Hikins and Zagacki [1988, 219],
'perspective realism').21 Nowhere do we see the two alternatives more clearly than in
the respective views on the nature and significance of language that they subscribe
to. The first alternative contra the traditional view of language as representational
of, and referring to, objective realities, denies that language points to anything
outside itself, and in some cases even within itself by its internal linguistic
relations.22 The other alternative is less radical because it does not preclude a view
of language in positive terms, though it apprehends language as prior to reality
because (but by no means do we have an agreement how) language and life, or being
in the world, are intimately related.23 It views language as inextricably related to its
use by speakers and listeners in a specified context within a given linguistic tradition.
In effect, no aspect of a language's perceived relation to the world is privileged in
determining what a sentence means, a premise that opens up the number of possible
avenues that one may have recourse to in determining the meaning of an utterance.
Common to both of these views would be the notion that language is significant in
determining the world we know, meaning that reality is relative to language (only
that in the first alternative it is an illusory one, while in the second it is more or less a
subjective/perspectival one).
21 See Polanyi (1958).
22 Contra the understanding argued for by Saussure and company (see above), hence the Derridean
'there is nothing outside the text'. Thus, in the absence of an outside reference or the transcendentally
signified in language, what we have is an endless differential network of signs referring infinitely to
signs-and-more-signs (Derrida 1981, 280).
22
Heidegger (1962) in Being and Time and 'the later' Wittgenstein (1953) in Philosophical
Investigations are usually discussed as significant contributors to this philosophy of language.
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Whereas literary (and arguably poststructural) approaches may be said to recover
the contemporaneity of the Bible, and also something of its universal character and
value and voice, and are, in consequence, capable of availing it for use by the
Church, they have not so much solved the problems caused by exclusive historical
readings of the Bible as replaced them with a different kind of problem. The
historical dimension of the Bible together with its theological consequences is
absolutely important to Christianity, and in the first instance underpins its universal
and permanent value for the Church. Questions of'what did happen?', of the
theophany of God in Jesus, what he (Jesus) taught, why he was executed, his
resurrection, the Easter experiences, and others, are of too huge a theological
significance to Christian communities to be cast aside. The following should suffice
to make this clear.
In writing that 'Christianity started with a particular historical person, his works
and words, his life and death: Jesus ofNazareth. Creed and faith, symbol and dogma
are merely the expressions of response to this Jesus of history', Koester (1971, 205ff)
brings our attention to the place that Jesus has in the canon of the New Testament by
drawing out the point that, however conceived, and whatever the diversity, it seems
axiomatic that the New Testament writings are witnesses to, and deepening
reflections and interpretations of, Jesus, by communities that formed, in the first
place (directly and indirectly), on account of faith in him. Precisely because of their
historical referent (we may call it the 'Christ event'), which is understood as a once-
for-all phenomenal event, these writings assume fundamental theological importance
in, and have been privileged by, Christian communities as the primary, if not the only
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available, authentic witness and interpretations of the same. We are inevitably
dependent on those writings for any witness and interpretation of Jesus of Nazareth.
Thus, any comprehension of the nature of Christianity - its faith, life and order -
today, and of Jesus in particular, must have the canon as its point of departure to
have any legitimacy of being Christian. Consequently, approaches that ignore this
historical character of the Bible in attempting to hear its voice and to recover its
theological significance for the Church today undermine its voice in the end. In
short, interpretations of the Bible that look for its meaning via the contemporary
reader, and/or the text, cut off from all historical reference of the text are, from the
perspective of theological interpretations of the Bible, problematic. Textual readings
and reader-response readings in and of themselves (ahistoric, synchronic, textually
24
immanent) are ill-equipped to provide theological interpretations of the Bible."
They may provide aesthetic and edifying readings of the Bible that make it alive for
today (Brown 1988), but, in ignoring the historical references of the Bible, they
undercut the very theological significance that makes it important for today. So, they
too precipitate the need for theological interpretation.
Some scholars have sought to address these problems by arguing for certain forms
of theological interpretations or by reading the Bible in certain ways. On account of
the limitations of time and space, we shall limit our discussion to five such scholars
in the 20th century who seem to be leading, and representative, figures (or have led
and been representative), at least in the North-Atlantic region. We will begin by
24 Childs (1992) puts it thus: 'The threat lies in divorcing the Bible when seen as literature from its
theological reality to which scripture bears witness. When the focus of the analysis lies in the
"imaginative construal" of the reader, the text is robbed of all determinative meaning within various
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looking at the most recent forms of theological interpretations proposed in biblical
scholarship.
2.2 ELEMENTS DEFINITIVE OF THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
AND HEBREWS
2.2.1. Stephen Fowl: Goal and Context
Stephen Fowl (1998b) in Engaging Scripture has proposed a model of theological
interpretation where interpretations of the Bible are considered to be theological
when their religious goals serve the Christian communities in their pursuit to live
faithfully before God in the light of Jesus Christ.25 Discussing at some length the
relationship ofChristians with the Scripture (2-13), he argues that Christian
communities look to the Bible as 'the standard for their faith, practice and worship'
(2), which necessitates biblical interpretation and the embodying of the same, a
practice that he understands as multi-faceted, diverse, and ongoing. Consequently,
he proposes a model of theological interpretation that involves 'a complex interaction
in which Christian convictions, practices and concerns are brought to bear on the
scriptural interpretation in ways that both shape that interpretation and are shaped by
theories of reader response. The effect is to render the biblical text mute for theology and to
deconstruct its tradition in a way equally destructive as the nineteenth-century historicists' (723).
25 What Fowl argues for in this book is consistent with his previous works, which, for the purposes of
his argument, he seems to bring together here. For more see, 'The Ethics of Interpretation; or What's
Left Over After the Elimination ofMeaning' (Fowl 1990); Reading in Communion: Scripture and
Ethics in Christian Life (Fowl and Jones 1991); 'Making Stealing Possible: Criminal Reflections on
Building an Ecclesial Common Life' (Fowl 1993); 'Who Can Read Abraham's Story' (Fowl 1994);
'Texts Do Not Have Ideologies' (Fowl 1995a); 'How To Read the Spirit and How the Spirit Reads'
(Fowl 1995b); and 'Christology and Ethics in Phil 2:5-11' (Fowl 1998a). It should be noted that most
of his work cited above is, from different perspectives, composed of his arguments on the place that
Christian communities have in determining biblical interpretations, i.e., they are composed mainly of
writings about the way that Christian communities' convictions, concerns, and practices inform and
are informed by biblical interpretation. What is new in this, the 1998 book, is his theoretical
underpinning of such theological interpretations (see 'underdetermined interpretations' below) that
does not constrain the diverse and particular interpretative interests of Christians in interpreting the
Bible.
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it' (8). But what does this entail and what does Fowl exactly mean? A significant
element of his proposal is the prominence it gives to Christian communities as the
locus ofbiblical interpretation, both in terms of the context in which the
interpretation occurs, and in terms of the determination of the meaning and
significance of the Bible. This is seen clearly in his discussion of three accounts of
Biblical interpretation: 'determinate', 'anti-determinate', and 'underdetermined', of
which the 'underdetermined' is crucial in the theoretical underpinning of his model.
To him, determinate interpretations of the Bible (33-40) are those that view the
biblical text to have one meaning intrinsic to it, and therefore 'through the application
of some set of interpretative procedures' (34) that meaning can be uncovered.
(Implicitly, he has in mind here historical criticism and certain forms of literary
criticism which, respectively, understand meaning to be with the author of the text or
immanent in the text.) This meaning is then used as a basis for Christian doctrine
and practice so that stable determinate meanings amount to stable Christian doctrine
and practice. The main problem that he identifies in this is the assumption that
'matters of doctrine and practice are straightforwardly determined by biblical
interpretation and never the other way round' (34). Fowl disputes this and argues
that ecclesial practices and concerns play a significant role in biblical interpretation.
Another problem he points out is that views of the biblical text having a single, stable
determinate meaning engender difficulties with regard to the Old Testament (36-37),
on account of numerous sections in the Old Testament that, unless interpreted in
another sense other than what is directly in the text, will not be of any use to the
Christian community.
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Anti-determinate interpretations are the opposite of determinate ones. For Fowl's
purposes, he understands them to be those readings of the biblical text that challenge
the dominant readings of the same: 'a particular account of determinate interpretation
provides the foil against which to offer the view that interpretation is not determinate'
(41). Of course poststructuralist approaches to biblical interpretations are at issue
here (accordingly, he focuses on aspects of Derrida's writings in this section [41-54]
to illustrate anti-determinate interpretations). Fowl thinks they are more appropriate
than determinate interpretations because of the plurality ofmeanings they spawn,
making them consonant with 'the diverse and particular aims Christians bring to
biblical interpretation' (56). But, he is wary of the fact that they can 'result in
paralysis and instability in practice' (56).
In contradistinction to determinate and antideterminate interpretations, Fowl then
proposes his preferred approach to biblical interpretation, 'underdetermined' biblical
interpretation. Central to this approach of interpretation is the narrowing and indeed
substitution of what textual 'meaning' entails in order to guide theological
interpretations of the Bible that he argues for. Taking his cue from Jeffrey Stout,26
he argues that 'meaning' in biblical interpretation should be discarded because of
competing, if not confused, understandings of the term at a formal level (57). The
result is failure in interpretation:
If interpretation is a matter of discovering meaning, and is therefore bound to
run amuck when informed by mistaken assumptions about what meaning is,
then literary criticism, religious studies, classics, history - in short, all
disciplines involving the interpretation of texts - will consist largely in failure
to deliver the goods.27
26 In 'What is the Meaning of a Text' (Stout 1982).
27 Stout (1982, 1).
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So what should be sought for in replacement are precise terms that suit the
interpretative interests behind interpretations. He says; 'Explicating textual meaning
in terms of varied and diverse interpretive aims, interests and practices will provide
us with a more manageable way of addressing interpretive disputes' (58). This
narrowing down, or replacement, of textual meaning by interpretative aims, interests
and practices is what he calls an underdetermined account of interpretation. The
advantage of this, he notes, is that it allows Christians to engage the Bible in diverse
and particular ways 'without having to fit it all under a single determinate theory of
interpretation' (59) or, implicitly, recourse to any theory of interpretation. Thus his
advocacy for an underdetermined account of biblical interpretation, as he states it,
allows 'theological convictions, ecclesial practices, and communal and social
concerns' to 'shape and be shaped by biblical interpretation' (60). The focus is clearly
on the Christian community in its given context as the determinant of biblical
interpretation and not a particular approach, historical or literary, to the same.28
Indeed, the remainder of the book is an instance of this as he illustrates how this may
take place by focusing on some convictions and practices of Christian communities
(vigilance and virtue for example) and how they shape, or ought to shape,
interpretation, and are shaped by it.
28 These arguments are also found in two of his later writings. See '(Mis)reading the Face of God: the
Interpretation of the Bible in the Church (Ayres and Fowl 1999) and, especially, 'The Role of
Authorial Intention in Theological Interpretation of Scripture' (Fowl 2000), where he contends: '.. the
end for which Christians are called to interpret, debate and embody Scripture are found in such
manifestations as faithful life, worship and ever deeper communion with the Triune God and with
others, and that these ends neither necessitate any specific critical practice nor accord privilege to the
intentions of a scriptural text's human author' (73).
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Fowl's model is commendable to the extent that it accentuates the place of
Christian communities as the context of theological interpretation. Theological
interpretations of the Bible should be orientated to Christian communities which in
the first instance hold the Bible to be definitive for their faith, life and order. Here,
not only are biblical interpretations honed to serve the Church, but also, at the same
time, the Church acts as a theological parameter into which the interpretation of the
Bible is supposed to take place. The strength of his model lies in its isolating the
why or the goal of theological interpretation and arguing that this goal constitutes and
defines theological interpretations quite apart from hermeneutical procedures or the
content of the Bible. For this reason, his model of theological interpretation helps us
29
to understand that not every contemporaneous reading of the Bible is theological.
However, two interrelated problems attend his conception of theological
interpretation. The first is a theoretical contradiction. According to Fowl's
reasoning, underdetermined readings may use, but are not dependent or restricted to,
any single detenninate theory of interpretation. This frees Christians from the
restrictions of the logic of any critical approach to the Bible and allows them to
engage the Bible in diverse and particular ways pertinent to their struggles to live
faithfully before God. But a closer scrutiny of underdetermined interpretation
24
An important point that makes it clear that not every reading of the Bible, whether for aesthetic,
political or ethical purposes, or for purposes of raising questions of power, exclusion, emancipation,
domination etc in conjunction with the study of the Bible, or even one that relates it to the present in
whichever way, is a theological interpretation. It underlines the fact that implicating a reading for
today is not in itself definitive of theological interpretation, and may well rule out as non-theological
interpretations of the Bible numerous readings of the Bible - like liberation theologies (Siker 1996),
black theologies (Cone 1989), feminist theologies (Fiorenza 1988), and psychological readings
(Winks 1980) in vogue today and classify them as biblical interpretations of some other kind. This is
the reason why we hesitate to consider the interpretations of the Bible from such theologies here as
definitive for mapping out the most appropriate theological interpretation ofHebrews in Africa. See
also footnote 45.
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against the background of theories of general henneneutics suggests that it is itself
embedded in a theory of determinate interpretation, viz., reader-response criticism,
which is a critical approach. In arguing that it is the aims, interests, and practices of
Christian communities that determine, or ought to determine, biblical interpretations
and not the text nor authorial intentions, Fowl has not removed underdetermined
interpretations of the Bible from dependence on any theory of interpretation
altogether but, rather, has moved biblical interpretations to the sphere of theories of
interpretation that privilege the reader or the community of readers (in his case
ecclesial communities) as the determinants of what the text is all about. This indeed
is the hallmark of reader-response criticisms which are against the 'referential' and
'intentionalist' view that a text inscribes its author's purpose and ought to be
understood in its historical context, and against fonnalist views that meaning lies in
the text's structural signification.30
By thus placing his model of theological interpretation of the Bible in the sphere
of reader orientated approaches, Fowl's proposal gives way to the second problem,
which is theological. Precisely because of its reader-orientated basis, Fowl, in his
model, fails to deal adequately with the historical component and character of the
Bible, and its implications for any theological interpretation of the same. Yet, it
seems to me, that the theological interpretation of the Bible cannot ignore or do
without reference to the Bible and survive as a valid theological interpretation. For
(as we argued above) making the Bible contemporaneous by the rule that it is the
aims, concerns and practices of Christian communities which determine its meaning,
at the expense of divorcing it (the Bible) from the religious reality it refers to
30 For definitive writings on reader-response, see Fish (1980) and Iser (1980).
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removes, in the final analysis, the very basis of its importance to (hence
interpretation by) the Christian communities. Fowl does not discuss the all-
important issue of the nature ofBiblical texts3' as religious writings that were
formulated in the historical contingencies of the 1st century Middle-Eastern and
Mediterranean world, which is fundamental to any theological interpretation. Using
Adam,32 he cites, and then dismisses in passing, the theological arguments of
Kasemann and others that historical criticism is 'needed to repulse docetic
interpretive tendencies' (185), on the grounds that the issue in docetic Christological
controversy is 'about the nature of Christ's humanity and divinity not historical
details about the life of Jesus. Historical Criticism may in some cases provide the
latter; it cannot adjudicate the former' (186). However, the verdict that Kasemann, in
Fowl's judgement, may have picked the wrong turf to argue for the theological
importance of historical criticism does not invalidate its theological importance, viz.
that of all interpretative moves, it first and foremost honours (i.e., takes into account)
the historical contingencies of the beginnings and core ofChristianity and its sacred
writings in Palestine around Jesus ofNazareth; and, secondly, attempts to honour the
scenarios of the sacred writings' original readers so that what these original readers
believed they meant and said might come through. As I pointed out earlier in this
chapter this is theologically necessary for any theological interpretation that is to be
regarded as Christian. So we may conclude that reader-based biblical interpretations
11 Whether this is through the prism of inspiration, canon, credal or confessional identity, and thus
authoritative, universal and of permanent value. His discussion on Scripture (2-8) is not helpful for it
brackets out this discussion and simply considers the implications for interpretation of the Bible as the
scriptures of the Church.
12 See Adam (1996) for the refutation of Kasemann's his position.
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by themselves are not adequate as theological interpretations of the Bible and would
not be helpful if used alone in reading Hebrews.
2.2.2. Francis Watson: Configuration ofCanon, Church and World
Francis Watson, in Text, Church and World (1994), offers a highly sophisticated
and diffuse theological interpretation proposal. His summary of the position he
develops in the book that: 'Biblical interpretation should concern itselfprimarily with
the theological issues raised by the biblical text within our contemporary ecclesial,
cultural and socio-political contexts' (vii), only points to, but is not particularly
helpful in enabling us to grasp, his arguments. However, his introduction is slightly
more helpful. There, we are led to understand that biblical interpretation within the
configuration of text, Church and world, i.e., the text (specifically the canon as the
final form of the text), itself not autonomous but located in the Church which in turn
lives in the world, defines theological interpretation:
Text, Church and world are thus related to one another as three concentric
circles. The text, the innermost circle, is located within the Church, and the
Church is located within the world, the outermost circle. There seems to be no
reason in principle why biblical interpretation should not be practised within
this hermeneutical circle (11).
However, the delineation and the outworking of this theological hermeneutic as
presented in his book is rather complex. We will begin to make sense of it first by
looking at his argument on 'text' in the aforementioned configuration.
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Over and against a particular strain of historical-criticism which betrays a
'diachronic bias' (15), thus perceiving the Bible as a collection of (unrelated) bits and
pieces,33 Watson argues for an engagement with the final form of the Bible as
requisite for theological interpretation. This is on account of the genre of the biblical
text (which he understands largely to be narrative), the Bible's ecclesial form and
usage, and 'the theological judgement that the subject-matter or content of the
biblical texts is inseparable from their form' (17). He agrees (19-25) in principle with
Hans Frei,34 that the Bible's literary genre is narrative and as such (i.e., from a
literary perspective) is irreducible. He also agrees with Frei35 that, from a theological
perspective, form and content cannot be separated, so that, for example, the identity
of Christ cannot be separated from the Gospel narrative (24). However, unlike Frei,
he argues that the narrative of the Bible is not self-contained (a realism isolated from
reality or one that absorbs reality), but has relations to extratextual, historical, and
political reality (25-29). The claim of truth about the story of the Bible, he points
out, 'liberates it from self-containment and enables it to shed its light on worldly
realities - now, and not just in the parousia' (29).
On the Bible's ecclesial form and usage, he agrees (30-45) with Brevard Childs36
that: 'In the final, canonical form of the text, the redactors prepared it for an
authoritative role within a communal context. Phenomenological description of the
" I am careful to point out here that it is a particular strain he is against, not historical criticism en
bloc. This is because contrary to the charges of some (e.g. Rowland 1995), Watson is not against
historical approaches to the Bible in their entirety (see Watson 1995 for his own clarification). In this
particular book, he does not reject historico-critical approaches but simply attenuates and relativizes
their importance for theological interpretation.
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In The Eclipse ofBiblical Narrative (Frei 1974).
35 In The Doctrine ofChrist (Frei 1975).
36
Especially in his Introduction to the Old Testament as Canon (Childs 1979).
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sacred scriptures of the two religious communities [Jewish, Christian] can make this
fact visible, and it can also encompass the fact that these texts continue to fulfil that
communal role today' (43). For this reason, theological interpretation must engage
with the final text and not the pieces isolated by historical critical investigations.
However, he points out that the final form of the Bible as a basis for theological
interpretation so justified by communal contexts, i.e., canon, 'is not a sufficient
mediation between the "original texts" and the present' (43). The meaning of the
canon 'must be given and discovered in the midst and in the depths of the conflict-
ridden situations in which it is inevitably entangled' (45). We now turn to this aspect
of his perception of theological interpretation.
'Postmodernism' and 'feminist critique', which comprise a large section of
Watson's book, can be understood respectively to represent the world and the Church
in Watson's theological hermeneutic of text-in-Church-in-world. In consequence
they should be viewed as illustrations of his theological hermeneutic, or instances of
biblical interpretation 'concerned with theological issues raised by the biblical text
within our contemporary ecclesial, cultural and socio-political contexts' (vii).37 How
then does he relate them to the text to draw a contemporary meaning from it? Two
meanings are derived from the text through the use, in different ways, of two aspects
of postmodernism.
37 This assessment of course is debatable because Watson, in a way characteristic of his writing in this
book, does not say so. The signposts and summaries offered to help the reader follow the logic of his
writing are themselves ambiguous, if not confusing. For example, the purpose given for 'part I' (at the
end of p. 17) and the summary of that part which includes the purpose (on p.77) are apparently
different. One often must detennine for oneself the flow and coherence of his arguments!
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The first is through Derrida's" writings, whose theory of indeterminacy of
language he uses to read I Cor. 14 'deconstructively' (89-106). But then he counters
such a reading through what he calls a theological-exegetical point of the creation
story in Genesis which shows that language, relations and persons are integral to
humanity (107-108) as opposed to the subjective individualism which Derrida
critiques. Watson finds such a theological point brought out in the writing of Jtirgen
Habermas39 (108-114), which he uses to read I Cor. 14. He concludes by offering a
rationale of this way of theological interpretation of the Bible thus: 'Since the
problem deconstruction addresses is ultimately a theological one, theological and
exegetical resources were deployed to construct an alternative solution to this
problem which makes better conceptual sense in face of the socio-political realities
of the world outside the text' (123).
The second meaning is through a sustained look at the writings of Lyotard40 on the
inevitability of narrative to structuring life. This he contends has been 'a suitable
conceptual tool for theology' (131) and in consequence called into use by, for
example, Hauerwas41 and Lindbeck.42 However, the problem with this has been its
rejection of meta-narratives in favour of local ones, and its subscription to the view
of the Bible as non-referential to the real world. So, while holding on to the wisdom
of narrative (in this case that reality is mediated through an irreducible story in
textual form, the biblical text) he reads Gen. 1 in support of extra-textual reality
38
Especially OfGrammatology (Derrida 1976).
39 In The Philosophical Discourse ofModernity (Habermas 1987).
40
In The Postmodern Condition (1994).
41
In, amongst others, A community of Character (1981).
42 In The Nature ofDoctrine (1984).
57
(140-151). The important thing to note in both these readings is not so much the
material argument but the principle behind the interpretations: a contemporary
situation/theory judged as theological being used to read the text, and the text in turn
being used either independently, or propped up with a contemporary theory, to speak
to that/a contemporary situation. In both cases, a theological meaning is apparently
derived from the text, in conjunction with a contemporary issue.
Coming to the feminist critique of the Bible, Watson writes that 'through the
writings of feminists, there has gradually come to light a new dimension of the
oppressive law whose presence within these texts [the Bible] and the interpretative
traditions they have generated is such a crucially important henneneutical factor'
(155-6). Unlike strategies of containment (161-172) seeking to contain these
oppressive laws via contextualization (hence showing the limitation of their
application), as well as feminist readings of the Hebrew Bible (173-187) which resist
the texts' dominant ideological perspective and seek to rehabilitate marginalized
figures, Watson offers a way of understanding the Bible which, in his judgement,
effectively deals with the problem, viz., 'law' and 'gospel'. He argues that the Bible
internally critiques itself and accordingly he offers some readings of the Bible (e.g.
Gen. 2-3) to underscore this (191-201). We need, he writes, to 'distinguish biblical
witness to the liberating gospel from its entanglement in oppressive law' (155). What
we gather here is a theological hermeneutic, or a theological stance to the text that is
shaped by a contemporary situation, in this case women in the Church and Bible.
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In the last section of his work (219ff), Watson offers theological theses/stances
that go hand-in-hand with the approach to theological interpretation that he has
developed in his work. (This is almost an addendum insofar as he does not point out
where the theological proposals come from - whether from the text itself, the Church,
or even still his own convictions.) To him, this is important because 'theology may
itself constitute a hermeneutic' (241) and also, 'Hermeneutics, theology and exegesis
flow into and out of each other with no fixed dividing-line; on occasions they may be
practised simultaneously' (Ibid.). So for example: 'The actions of Jesus, as narrated
in the gospels, must be interpreted not as isolated events but against the background
of the soteriological, Christological and eschatological claims of the narratives as a
whole' (247), which he understands as a trinitarian hermeneutic; or, 'Insights
originating in the secular world outside the Christian community can have a positive
role in assisting the community's understanding of holy scripture' (237), because the
Spirit works in the society and the world; or even, 'Love of neighbour, as understood
by Jesus, is a necessary hermeneutical criterion for a Christian interpretation of the
Old Testament' (272).
Watson's most significant contribution to theological interpretation is that the
biblical text in its final form is at the centre of interpretation in the Church, itself in
the world.43 This is welcome, given the tendency of some strands of historical
criticism to atomize the Bible and incapacitate any engagement with it as a
43 The labours of B. Childs (1970), for instance, in pressing the case for the absolute importance of the
final text for theological interpretations come to mind here. However, unlike Fowl, the shortcoming
of Childs' studies lie in his failure to proceed on and show how the Bible in its final form can then be
mediated to (actualized in) today's Church situations; the very charge levelled against him by Fowl
(1994, 43). What this means is simply that canonical criticism on its own cannot suffice to act as a
theological interpretation of the Bible, nor should be confused with it. But the Bible in its final form
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meaningful whole, and as part of the canon of the Church. The other significant
contribution by Watson, I think, is his bringing to the fore contemporary theological
issues in which the interpretation of the Bible is done in conjunction with, or through
which the Bible is read. But, taken on its own terms, there are significant
shortcomings with his proposal, three that are particularly pertinent here.
The first problem lies in how to derive meaning from the final text in relation to
the Church and the world. His arrangement of text-in-Church-in-world would on the
face of it suggest that the text should be the starting point of theological
interpretation, but this is far from clear. How exactly are we to relate or arrange this
interdependent relationship of text-Church-world to effect theological
interpretations? (This question is prompted by the knowledge that different
arrangements will yield different results.) Should the Church primarily act as the
touchstone for the theological interpretation of the biblical text as Watson seems to
suggest, in asserting that it is the Church as the reading community that the Bible
derives its being and rationale? Or should the world, through its theories, ethical
sentiments and cultural sensibilities, be primarily the touchstone for the reading of
the text (as suggested by his biblical readings in large measure determined by
postmodernism and the 'feminist critique')? Or should the text be primarily read first
on its own terms ('... primarily with theological issues raised by the biblical text'
[vii]) by whatever critical approach before it is related to the Church and world (as he
seems to do in reading Gen. chapter 37 through literary-critical means)? Or are we to
ignore any critical approach to the Bible and let the Church and the world determine
is, as is the case in Fowl's model, an essential element in, or even basic to, theological interpretations
of the Bible.
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detennine readings of the text through whichever reading strategy that suits them (as
demonstrated by his work)? This fact of a loose undefined (or defined but not clearly
worked out) interrelationship of text-Church-world in Watson's theological
hermeneutic makes his proposal very fluid, indeed too vague, to be usefully applied
for the sake of theological interpretations. Because of this, for example, there is no
reason why his work should not be understood as a systematic theology, and not
theological interpretation of the Bible, both in its engagement with contemporary
issues theologically and in its theological proposals for interpreting the Bible, in
which the Bible is called upon in an ad hoc manner to (using Kelsey's analyses of the
use of the Bible in theology)44 provide data, a warrant, and backing for his theology,
or theological position 45
The second problem is the place given to the Church in his configuration of text-
Church-world for theological interpretation purposes. Despite Watson's affirmation
that 'The primary reading community within which the biblical text is located is the
Christian Church' (3), and as such, of critical hermeneutical significance 'as the
location from which the text derives its being and its rationale' (Ibid.), the
44
Kelsey (1975, 122-134).
45 It is interesting to note that Fowl (1998, 23) perceives his work more as a systematic theology than a
theological interpretation of the Bible. It is worth pointing out this distinction for there are differences
between theologies using the Bible for theologizing, and theological interpretations of the Bible.
Ogden (1996), for example, points out that theological interpretation of the Bible 'is a special case of
interpreting the biblical writings that at the same time is also a special case not only of theology in
general, in the sense of critical reflection on Christian witness, as distinct from the critical validation
of its aim to validity, but also of historical theology in particular, understood as critical interpretation
of the meaning of Christian witness, as distinct from the critical validation of its claims to validity that
is the proper business, in their different way, of systematic and practical theology. Specifically, it is
the case of such critical interpretation in which the interpretanda, the meaning of whose Christian
witness is to be understood and explained, are the biblical writings' (184-85). For our purposes, it
suffices to note that the use of the Bible in and for theology (except in some strands of biblical
theology) does not amount to theological interpretations even in cases where the Bible is interpreted in
the cause of the theologies being formulated, as seems to be the case in Watson's proposal. Of course,
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outworking of his proposal marginalizes the Church. The only place in the book
directly given to the Church in playing a part in theological interpretations is in
establishing the final form of the text. He is reticent toward the Church, its
convictions of the text, its goals in reading them and the like, and how that might
affect theological interpretation of the Bible.46
The third and, from the perspective of theological interpretation, most important
problem is that, apparently, Watson does not honour the historical horizon (ifwe
may borrow from Hans-Georg Gadamer)47 of the text as crucial for theological
interpretation. At best, he relegates it to the periphery in his theological hermeneutic
(see also footnote '33'). Even though he criticizes the narrative approach of Hans
Frei as bracketing out extra-textual reality, which is important in correlating text to
Church and world, and in addressing 'the Church's proper concern with the
fundamental truth of the biblical story of salvation' (29), he is reluctant in letting
historical reality contemporaneous with the text be an integral part of the process of
identifying the meaning of the text for Church and world today. Indeed at certain
points he deliberately distances his work from historical approaches which honour
the horizon of the biblical text. For example, in reading I Cor. 14 deconstructively,
he writes:
this does not mean that theological interpretations cannot be of service to biblical theologies or even
for that matter, theology (the point of our study!).
4<> Bockmuehl (1998) remarks that 'Watson's conception of the "Church" remains remarkably abstract
and detached from the life and worship of any particular ecclesial polity' (290), and more importantly,
that his theological interpretations are not related to 'present-day experiences of real Churches' (291).
47 In Truth andMethod {Gadamar 1975).
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The deconstructive reading of the Pauline text has already secured for us a
certain distance from the 1st century contingencies that preoccupy the scholarly
literature, thus helping to open up the further possibility of a theological
reflection on the primary text in which a simultaneous, coinhering engagement
with contemporary theological issues excludes a narrow biblicism in both its
conservative and its historical-critical forms (103).
Like all other approaches that downplay the historical contingencies of the text,
the result of this is to undermine the text's theological import, which is anchored in
the historical contingencies without which the text would not have come to being.
Theological interpretations of the Bible must, while acknowledging its permanent
and universal value, give credit to its distance and historical contingencies precisely
on account ofwhich efforts are made to identify its permanent and universal value
48
for every culture and historical situation. So whereas reading Hebrews, as part of
the canon, in the Church and for the Church may avail it for use in the life and faith
of the Church, to do so in isolation from its historical horizon (as Watson's and
Fowl's theological approaches suggest) is to undercut the very theological
significance that we are trying to recover in it for the Church today. The same would
apply in dealing with theological issues raised by Hebrews (as Watson's proposal
points to) or in trying to read meaning from it through contemporary theological
issues (as Watson illustrates) without dialogue with its historical horizon. We
therefore need to pay attention to theological interpretations that take cognisance of
the historical contingencies of the Bible as integral to theological interpretations
before pressing our case for the form of theological interpretation most suitable for
reading Hebrews.
48 It is interesting to note that Watson (1997, 66) has elsewhere made it clear that he does not consider
this as a concern of theological interpretations of the Bible.
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2.2.3. Robert Morgan: Theories ofReligion
First we must note that Robert Morgan in Biblical Interpretation (Barton and
Morgan, 1988) does not set out to propose theological interpretations of the Bible per
se but chiefly to relate or bridge critical scholarship and religious faith. In his own
words: 'The constructive aim of this book is to make explicit a model for bridging the
gulf between critical scholarship and religious faith' (25). (Religious faith here
having to do with religious communities' beliefs and practices.) Two reasons make
his book highly relevant to our discussion at this point. The first is that the critical
scholarship he chiefly has in mind is historical criticism. Because of the mentioned
significance and implications of historical approaches to the Bible, what Morgan has
to say about bridging historical approaches or readings of the Bible and the beliefs
and practices of religious communities is important. (His concerns though with the
importance of historical criticism as an instance of critical scholarship lie in factors
other than the theological ones we have mentioned, but they will not concern us
here.) Relating historical approaches to the Bible and faith for today is, writ large, of
fundamental importance to theological interpretation. This brings us to the second
reason for the relevance of his book: his attempts to hold reason (i.e., historical
criticism) and faith (religious beliefs and practices) together. It is significant to note
that Morgan himself identifies the linking and holding together of scholarship and
faith as the task of theological interpretation (174). With this in mind we may
proceed now to examine Morgan's proposed theological interpretation.
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The theological interpretation proposed by Morgan is to be found in his model for
bridging the gulf between critical scholarship and religious faith, a model he points
out that, 'has been present throughout the 150-year triumphal march of historical
study in modern biblical interpretation' (25). His proposal, in other words, is more of
a recovery of theological interpretation, which he discerns to have been in operation
in the work of some key biblical interpreters in the past (here especially D. F. Strauss
[1808-1874], F. C. Baur [1792-1860], W. Vatke, and R. Bultmann [1884-1976]) who
combined their New Testament research with theological interests. This theological
interpretation present in the biblical interpretation of these scholars, as he discerns it,
is a philosophy that they used to relate history to faith. His discussion ofD. F.
Strauss is a good illustration. Morgan points out that Strauss49 judged the gospels to
be unhistorical (due to inconsistencies between them and to their stories ofmiracles)
but used their narrative 'for fermenting and distilling into a philosophical-theological
truth acceptable to modern (Hegelian) educated people' (49-50). In other words,
Straus re-interpreted the Bible in a way that suited contemporary sensibilities. He
did this, as Morgan argues (45-52), through a critical destruction of the gospels'
history, which made way for Hegelian philosophy and a theological illumination of
the Gospels' stories understood now as 'Myth'. The use ofHegelian philosophy (a
vision of God and the world) for theological interpretation of the Bible is also
present, albeit in different ways (historical reconstruction especially), in the
interpretations of the Bible by Baur and Vatke (62-76).50 However, their philosophies
49 'Who 'more than anyone else' Morgan (Barton and Morgan [1988]) writes, 'drew explicit attention to
the task of theological interpretation' (50).
50 For example, Baur unlike Strauss did not 'destroy' the historicity of the Gospels so much as use
Hegel for an ontological ground for his understanding of that history and in consequence a
reconstruction of that history which he interpreted, again, using Hegel, for his contemporaries.
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could not hold for long, nor, with them, their syntheses ofNew Testament
understandings and theological meanings derived from them. This situation, in
Morgan's judgement, led to the drifting apart of biblical scholarship and theological
interpretation. ('Historical scholarship became more and more positivistic, and
normative [i.e., believing] talk ofGod [as opposed to merely historical description of
the biblical writers' beliefs] disappeared from biblical as from other historical
scholarship' [69].) It was Bultmann (but on the predicate of a different philosophy)
and his school who was to take up this trail blazed by the mentioned three, but, like
these three, their efforts, Morgan bemoans, are widely ignored today (76).
Therefore Morgan, contra the two-stage model of theological interpretation
involving a dynamic from historical description (biblical scholarship) to theological
judgement (systematic theology), which offers no account of how the movement
from the historical to the theological should be done (185), proposes a theory of
religion and reality as key to theological interpretation. A theory of religion would
act as a crucial theological pre-understanding on the part of the reader to the Bible,
making way for, or enabling, a theological interpretation. It would also act as the
wider context that 'links reason (rational methods like historical criticism) and faith
(religious understandings of the Bible)' (187, italics mine). Such is the strategy
present in all the aforementioned biblical scholars of the past who combined
historical scholarship with theological interests: 'Schleiermacher and Hegel proposed
different theories of religion and reality, but both theories elicited critical historical
study of the Bible and Christianity, and related this to the Christian's sense of God.
Strauss destroyed history to make room for his kind of theology; his proposal too,
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involved a theory of religion and reality' (188). Morgan argues that the advantage of
this strategy is that it uses 'the rational methods on their own terms, but sets them in a
wider context that embraces both the witness of the texts and the modern theological
interpreter's own understanding of the subject-matter - which alone makes possible a
theological understanding of the texts'( 187). In summary, a theory of religion
brought to the biblical text by an interpreter makes 'a rational theological
interpretation' (188) of the Bible possible. As Morgan himself puts it: 'The special
feature of theological interpretation is that a theological belief and theory of religion
is brought into the act of interpretation' (189). This granted, it would seem that the
task of those concerned with theological interpretation would be to choose which
theory of religion is best suited for the job (presumably one that is compatible with
Christian truth claims).
The strength of his proposal is in deliberately letting theological belief (also theory
of religion) have a role in effecting theological interpretations of the Bible. As we
have already seen through Watson's model, theological beliefs can themselves act as
a hermeneutic for theological interpretations of the Bible. This (as we shall argue) is
crucial in the theological interpretation of Hebrews. Two problems, however, attend
the articulation ofMorgan's proposal. First, Morgan gives no precision or direction
to the kinds of theological beliefs that would be determinative for interpretations of
the Bible. The fact that he talks of theories of religion and theological beliefs in one
breath epitomizes this, for the two may amount to two mutually exclusive notions.
Accordingly, he is also reticent on the source of such theological beliefs (or even
theories of religion). This vagueness in his proposal makes its application for
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theological interpretation difficult, and may in the end counter efforts towards
theological interpretations. Together with this, we are not sure whether Morgan is
advocating a comprehensive theological belief to be brought to the Bible in every
instance to enable theological interpretation of it, or whether he has in mind ad hoc
theological beliefs such as the ones suggested by Watson.
One of the values ofMorgan's proposal is in pointing us to the labours of the past
as resourceful in our efforts towards theological interpretations of the Bible. This is
a distinct contribution because he points us back to the period ofmodern critical
studies of the Bible, which is perceived to have drowned out theological
interpretations of the Bible in favour of historical studies.51 However, there is more
during this period in terms of understanding the problem that necessitates theological
interpretations, and consequently, in developing appropriate theological
interpretations today, than what he brings to our attention through the key biblical
scholars he looks at as having theologically interpreted the Bible. In what follows,
we want to pursue this briefly before we propose subsequently the elements of an
appropriate theological hermeneutic for the reading of Hebrews in Africa as shall be
demonstrated in this thesis. We will argue that Bultmann's theological
interpretations reiterate why theological interpretations are needed and in
consequence show a way that the abiding significance of the New Testament could
be accessed, while Barth's theological interpretations help in making us realize the
51 The others who point us to the past for a recovery of theological interpretations point to earlier
periods. See for example Wall (2000) who points to the Church Fathers, Yeago (1994) who points to
the patristic period and Steinmetz (1980) who points to the medieval period.
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fundamental place of the subject matter of the Bible (i.e., theology) in theological
interpretations.
2.2.4. Rudolph Bultmann: Access to the New Testament's Abiding Significance
Rudolph Bultmann is one of those featured in Morgan's book as employing a
theory of religion to link critical studies of the Bible and faith. It seems to me that,
of those featured, he is the one who most clearly grasped the problem brought about
by historical critical studies of the Bible; a point that is not the focus, as such, of
Morgan's study, but which we turn to now. As Poland (1985), (most of what follows
depends on his analysis of Bultmann vis-a-vis biblical interpretation) puts it:
The task of Hermeneutical reflection, in Bultmann's view, is to chart a conflict:
while the Christian Church professes the New Testament writings, as Scripture,
to be of abiding religious significance, modern exegetes necessarily view the
New Testament texts as documents originating in, and addressed to, an
autonomous world, culturally and temporally alien from our own. The
problem ofmyth and truth, and of the meaning of the New Testament writings,
are thus now irrevocably annexed to, and transformed by, the question of the
nature of historical understanding. Bultmann's hermeneutical program is an
attempt to reckon with this network of issues precisely in their interrelation
(11).
Of course, as pointed out earlier, historical criticism was enabled by scientific
rationalism. Emerging as part of a modem world view, it could not be reconciled to
the mythological picture of the world painted in the biblical writings. Bultmann
recognized this when he wrote, 'modern thought as we have inherited it brings with it
criticism of the New Testament view of the world' (Bultmann 1955, 256). He,
therefore, grasped the Bible as 'originating in, and addressed to, an autonomous
world, culturally and temporally alien from our own' (Poland 1985, 11), and
understood this as a cardinal problem to be reckoned with in theological
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interpretations of the Bible. Understanding this problem was in turn critical to his
development of a theological interpretation of the Bible, since, although the Bible
was historically and culturally distant, it still had an abiding religious significance to
the Christian Church.52 The central question for Bultmann was how to access the
abiding significance of the New Testament (the Kerygma) expressed within the alien
and historically contingent (mythology) without compromising that significance:
'Can the Kerygma be interpreted apart from mythology? Can we recover the truth of
the Kerygma for men who do not think in mythological terms without forfeiting its
character as Kerygma?' (Bultmann 1961, 3). Poland (1985) identifies Bultmann's
fourfold response (all interrelated and hinging on the category of existentiell).
At the risk of oversimplification,53 the first and second responses are through a
general hermeneutic of understanding a text, which is distant from one's world. Here
Bultmann, using Schleiermacher and Dilthey, and Heidegger and Jonas respectively,
argues for an access to alien and distant historical texts enabled by an existential
understanding of history (39-40, 43-45) and language (41). If history is understood
as an arena of possibilities and not a chronology of facts, then cultural and historical
distance of historical texts can be circumvented when we are caught up in the texts'
inquiries, and claims of human beings, that beguile us as well. Texts here are
understood accordingly as expressions of life, possible ways of understanding
52 Cahill (1977) summarizes the objectives of the work and life of Bultmann thus: 'the mediation of
the Christian tradition, the attempt to make a particular religious vision and its theological
interpretation fruitful for the present and future' (231, emphasis mine).
53 The complexity of Bultmann's writings is well noted (Cahil 1977, 231 and Riches 1993, 70-78), but
still some general and succinct analyses with regard to his contribution to theological interpretations
of the Bible is possible. Poland (1985) on whom we base our discussion of Bultmann (see 'Bultmann
in Retrospect', 11-63), has done a good job by looking at Bultmann's work strictly in relation to
biblical interpretation. Other helpful looks at Bultmann with respect to biblical interpretation can be
found in Robinson (1964, 29-77) and Riches (1993, 50-88).
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existence, and summoning us to decide 'whether or not one will make that possibility
one's own' (40), speaking out of, and to matters of, human existence. And if
language is understood not as a literal correspondence of word to meaning but as an
expression of an author's intention (thus subject to distortion), interpretation of a
historically distant text would be to uncover 'the possibility of existence the author
intends to express through language's objective formulas and symbols' (41). Here we
encounter a polysemic view of language through which 'Bultmann moves beyond the
surface or literal level of the writings to expose a deeper, hidden meaning there' (37).
This way, as Poland points out, 'biblical texts, as texts among other texts, can have
meaning for the present despite their mythological world view' (36).
The third response is through demythologizing or existential interpretations.
Mythology is for Bultmann 'the use of imagery to express the other-worldly in terms
of this world, and the divine in terms of human life, the other side in terms of this
side' (Bultmann 1961, 10); crucially, it is the '"objectifying" mode of thought'
(Poland 1985, 30). However, when it comes to the New Testament, myths'
intentions are not to objectify the transcendent, who cannot be objectified, but to
express 'an existence as it is grounded and limited by the transcendent' (36). This
which myth intends to express is not limited to the forms in which it is
communicated; other forms can be called upon where appropriate. Indeed, Bultmann
finds that 'the conceptual categories of existential philosophy provide a means to
express the intentions of New Testament myth in a form intelligible to modern
readers' (36). Here we see Heidegger's existential philosophy providing the entry
point to the New Testament both in terms of understanding it and in providing an
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idiom for explicating it for today. In some sense, this is one aspect of Bultmann's
demythologizing, concerned with the form ofNew Testament writings.
The other is 'to remove the false "stumbling block" that mythological statements
present for modern thought, so that the true and permanent skandalon, the Kerygma
can come to view' (47). In Bultmann's view, this is a requirement of faith itself
which demands freedom 'from its association with every world view expressed in
objective tenns, whether it be a mythical or scientific one' (Bultmann 1951-55, 131).
Such demythologizing is already at work in the New Testament in the case, for
example, of Paul's and John's rebuttals of some gnostic views' (48), and in Luther's
'Christ against Scripture' principle.
It is this aspect of demythologizing that Bultmann calls Sachkritik, content
criticism (238). Through the Kerygma (which is the very intention of the New
Testament, to proclaim Christ understood in the tension between law and faith and
best explicated by Paul and John) theological judgements can be made on the
faithfulness of chosen portions ofNew Testament. Although here demythologizing
moves beyond concerns with form, to the content of the New Testament.
The fourth response is through a particular understanding of the way in which the
religious significance of the New Testament is actualized. In Bultmann's view, as
Poland simply puts it, the New Testament 'is actualized in the present as a
proclamation that is appropriated by faith through grace' (32). Poland goes on to
point out:
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Bultmann thus upholds Luther's distinction between the proclaimed Word and
the words of Scripture: while the latter may be understood in the present
through existential interpretation, Bultmann argues, the New Testament
becomes Word of God only in the present event in which it is appropriated by
faith (Ibid.).
This distinction means that whereas demythologized, or existentially interpreted,
biblical texts can tell us about Christian self-understanding, faith occurs only 'within
the event of individual decision, as the "eschatological event" which the Kerygma
proclaims is "reactualized" in the concrete experience of the believer' (50). In other
words, to understand the text as a possibility of existence that it communicates is one
thing, to actualize it is another.
So, we may conclude, what was principally at issue in Bultmann's theological
interpretation, what it sought to achieve, was a mode of access to the Bible for
modern people which was precipitated by both the Bible's abiding significance to the
Church and, at one and the same time, its historical and cultural distance. His use of
existential philosophy, as pointed out by Morgan, provided such an access.54
Moreover, the value of Bultmann for theological interpretations of the Bible is not
only in his offer of a theory of religion for such an access, but in his underlining of
the problem that precipitates the need for such an access: cultural and historical
distance of the Bible (which must be respected in the first place to be at all an issue).
His respect for the horizon of the Bible may have lacked the theological importance
attached to truth concerning the Bible's extra-textual reference (especially Jesus of
54 We may here mention Meyer (1994, 151-74), a New Testament scholar, who has offered recently
another a mode of access to the horizon of the New Testament for modern people, viz., of 'the
phenomenon or fact of evil' (158), by appropriating Bernard Lonergan's philosophy. 'If evil is a
problem, and if the problem must have a solution, the question arises; what is the solution? What has
God done and what is God doing about human evil?' (159). Edward Schilleebeeckx's theological
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Nazareth)55 but nonetheless, Bultmann points out with sufficient clarity what must be
grappled with in any theological interpretation.56 He therefore echoes the problem as
identified in our introduction, minus the theological import of the Bible's historical
references (especially with respect to Jesus). It is not clear that Strauss and Baur
understood the issue at the heart of theological interpretation to be this, nor even if
they understood their interpretative work in this way. Perhaps this is the reason why
they are not looked at by others as those who engaged in theological interpretations
of the Bible but rather as those who transmuted the Bible into secular analogues
(Baur) or paid no attention to the Bible in its historical contingencies (Strauss).57
2.2.5. Karl Barth: SubjectMatter
Unlike Bultmann, Karl Barth had very little to offer directly in the way of a
concerted reflection on theological interpretations. (We have therefore a number of
attempts both by systematic theologians and biblical scholars to sketch his
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hermeneutics on the basis of his interpretations of different biblical texts.) As
hermeneutic is also considered as offering a mode access to the New Testament through the category
of 'experience'; see Rochford (2002) for a helpful summary.
55 Bultmann's perception of the theological importance of the veracity of Bible's historical reference is
at best ambiguous. For Bultmann, the importance of reckoning with the Bible in its historicity to find
its abiding significance for today was not based on the life of Jesus of Nazareth but on the Kerygma
which, ironically, must have pre-supposed the life of Jesus (Poland 1985, 33-34).
56 There could be more contributions from his theological interpretations in attempts at formulating
theological interpretations, but his work is largely dated especially, as Morgan (1988, 192) points out,
with the debunking of existential philosophy which his mode of access to the New Testament was
dependent on.
57 Kiimmel (1973), for example, does not in any way consider the New Testament studies of Baur and
Strauss to be an exercise in theological interpretation; this he reserves for Barth and Bultmann (363-
406). As for Baird (1992), Baur is understood more as one who used Hegelian philosophy to
reconstruct the history of the early Church and not one involved in the task of theological
interpretations of the Bible (258-269), whilst Strauss is understood as one who seems to 'destroy' and
dispose the Bible to give way to a constructive theology based on Hegelian philosophy (246-258) -
hardly a theological inteipretation of the Bible.
58 For example, Sherman (2000) from his interpretation of Job, Colwell (1997) from his reflections on
Judas, and Jeanrond (1988) and Ford (1979) from Barth's interpretations of various biblical texts,
especially in his Church Dogmatics.
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Robinson (1964) points out, Barth provides only the beginnings of reflection: 'With a
few swift strokes of the brush he sketched its direction in the preface to the first
edition ofRomans' (22).59 For this reason we shall follow closely McCormack's
(1991) analysis of Barth's theological interpretation that is almost exclusively
gathered from Romans. McCormack points out that the second edition ofRomans
(where Barth had to defend himself against the charge of enmity to historical
criticism) is significant for understanding Barth's hermeneutics, for therein emerges
his hermeneutical edifice, which he maintains 'did not change after the writing of the
second edition ofDer Romerbrief (325). The first stage in this theological
interpretation is the establishment of the historical sense of the text; what stands in
the text? This would properly be seen as an arena for historical criticism which
Barth himself understood as a 'prolegomenon to the understanding of the Epistle'
(Barth 1933, 7). However, McCormack (1991) points out, because Barth understood
the biblical writers to be witnesses, theological interpretation presses on to a second
stage which aims at 'penetrating through the text to the mystery which lies concealed
within' (327), with the result that they (interpreters of the Bible) too are confronted
by the same object/subject which confronted Paul. Thus:
So far as possible, the blocks ofmerely historical, merely given, merely
accidental conceptions should fade into the background; so far as possible, the
relation of the words to the Word in the words must be discovered. As the one
who seeks to understand, I must be thrust forward to the point where I almost
stand only before the mystery of the subject matter, where I almost no longer
stand before the mystery of the document as such, where I almost forget that I
am not the author, where I have understood him so well that I allow him to
speak in my name and can myself speak in his name (Barth [1984, xii] in
McCormack [1991, 328]).
59 Declared a 'hermeneutical manifesto' by Hans-Georg Gadamer (1975, 463).
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It is possible then to understand this second stage as rendering the historical sense
redundant since the interpreter has penetrated the subject matter. This leads to the
third and last stage where 'theological exegesis becomes truly critical' (McCormack
1991, 328). At this stage one returns to the text to understand it anew in light of the
subject matter.
For my money, the historical critics must become more critical. For how "what
stands there" is to be grasped is not decided by the occasional valuation of the
words and word-groups, a valuation which is determined by the exegetical
standpoints of the exegete. Rather, it is decided through participation in the
inner tension of the concepts which are presented more or less clearly by the
text, a participation that is as relaxed and willing as possible. Krinein vis-a-vis
a historical document means for me the meaning of all the words and word-
groups contained in it by the subject-matter of which, if I am not completely
deceived, they are clearly speaking; the relating back of all answers given in it
to the questions which stand unmistakably over against them and the latter
once again to the cardinal question which contains all questions in itself; the
interpretation of everything which it says in the light of that which alone can be
said and therefore also really must be said (Barth 1984, xii in McCormack
1991,328).
The goal of this stage is 'to give expression to the exegete's understanding of the text
in the light of its subject matter in his or her own words' (McCormack 1991, 329).
So in Romans, we may conclude with Kiimmel (1973), Barth demanded that 'we
endeavour to see "through and beyond history into the spirit of the Bible" and then
offered an interpretation that did not inquire about Paul's message to his original
readers, but related the biblical text directly to the situation in which modern man
finds himself (363).
Barth's theological interpretation of Romans, however, was methodologically
problematic, especially in its relationship to critical studies of the Bible.
McCormack (1991) himself concedes that Barth failed to show the relationship
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between the first and the last stage, i.e., he did not account for movement from the
first stage to the second (330): how does one get from the first to the second and even
to the third? This is why 'New Testament scholars of Harnack's generation'60
dismissed his work as of no interest to scholarship (Kummel 1973, 363ff). The result
was a theological interpretation whose value was to point to engagement with the
subject matter of the Bible as necessary in theological interpretation but which
unfortunately did not equip interested parties with precisely how to go about it and to
do so in light of critical scholarship. Jeanrond (1988) puts it well: 'Barth's greatest
achievement was undoubtedly to have drawn our attention to the theological message
of the biblical texts. But he did not help us see how we can disclose this message
today, how we can read the texts ..." (92). Perhaps this is what has led some, such as
Wood (2002), to understand the theological interpretation of Barth as a theological
hermeneutic in its entirety and not situated in any special or general hermeneutics. In
other words, it is a theological interpretation of the Bible that is situated in theology.
Indeed, we encounter in the theological hermeneutic of Barth a theological
interpretation of the Bible that is driven (or defined) by certain theological
convictions about God, the world, human beings (and their interrelationship), and on
the nature and identity of the Biblical text. Wood in fact sees Barth's theological
interpretation as offering an alternative to the approaches offered today (106).
Jeanrond (1988) thinks otherwise, and sees it as constrictive for 'through his (Barth's)
own reading of the Scriptures, his own observations, reflections and appropriations,
he reached the theological and ontological axioms for his interpretation. While he
still recommends these dimensions of interpretation to us, his axioms would already
determine too much of the outcome of our own reading' (96, in brackets mine).
60 Phrase from Robinson (1964, 28).
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Still, Barth's theological interpretations understood in this way help in bringing to the
fore the significance of theology in theological interpretations of the Bible.
3.1 NEED FOR AD HOC THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
We may now ask where this discussion of representative writings on theological
interpretation leads us with regard to a theological interpretation of Hebrews in
Africa. For one thing, it seems to me that by themselves, none of the proposed
theological hermeneutics is sufficient for the theological interpretation of Hebrews.
This is for the following reasons. 1. Fowl's emphasis on Church as definitive of
theological inteipretation so that any reading of the Bible is a theological
interpretation if it promotes faithful lives before God in the light of Christ, lacks
consideration of the place and importance of the historical imperative of the Bible in
its theological interpretations. 2. Watson's insistence, depending on how we
understand him, on concerns with theological issues raised by the final (canonical)
text (in-Church-and-in-world) as definitive of theological interpretation has a variety
of insights but which altogether make it quite nebulous for use in theological
interpretations and, at the same time, his model for theological interpretation sits
lightly on the historical imperative of the Bible as in part definitive of theological
interpretations. 3. Morgan's proposal that theories of religion (or theological belief)
could make theological interpretations conducted in conjunction with critical
scholarship, as illustrated by Strauss, Baur and Bultmann, possible, whilst honouring
the historical imperative of the Bible, seems too vague to be productively used. 4.
Barth's theological interpretation which is defined by certain key theological
convictions brings about a certain understanding of the subject matter of the Bible,
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but it seems ambivalent to the historical imperative of the Bible, and also seems, for
lack of hermeneutical instructions, hard to follow in practice unless one is Barth
himself.
However, each has some vital element(s) to contribute to the enterprise of
theological interpretations of the Bible.61 So, one possible way to proceed from here
in arriving at a theological interpretation best suited for Hebrews in Africa would be
to attempt a synthesis of the definitive elements in the identified theological
interpretations. The result would be a theological hermeneutic that is unitary and
totalizing. This would be permissible if 1. the writings of the Bible were a
homogenous whole, i.e., composed of only one genre, a single subject matter, and
originally written under similar historical and cultural circumstances, and 2. if the
theological interpretations themselves were to be carried out in the same cultural and
historical situations. However, because of the heterogeneity of the biblical writings
in genre, subject matter and cultural and historical circumstances and the
heterogeneity of their contexts, the case for theological interpretations that are
sensitive to the same is obvious.
This brings us to the second possible procedure, that of choosing from the
proposed the one most suitable for theologically interpreting Hebrews in Africa. But
this is hardly an option for two reasons. Firstly, none of the theological
interpretations is particularly concerned to articulate a theological hermeneutic that is
61 Such an observtion has also been made by Cummins (2004) in his look at representative advocates
of theological interpretation (Fowl and Watson are among the three he looks at). He writes,
'...advocates of theological interpretation conceive of and pursue this task in particular ways, each
emphasizing certain integral elements' (180).
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sensitive to different genres or any single genre of the Bible; some in fact see this (in
ignoring or rejecting historical criticism) as inconsequential!
Then, secondly, none is sensitive enough to the currently different cultural and
historical contexts of the Bible (with the exception of perhaps Fowl who is concerned
with a North American context); they all assume a homogenous cultural and
historical context.
We are left, then, with a third and, it seems, final possibility of taking a different
route to the ones discussed in articulating a theological hermeneutic fit for Hebrews
in Africa, while, where possible, drawing from vital elements in the theological
interpretations discussed. Such a theological hermeneutic will be specific to the
genre of Hebrews and specific to aspects of the religio-cultural cosmos that the
Church in certain parts ofAfrica finds itself in, i.e., it will be local, ad hoc





3.1 TYPOLOGY AND THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE OLD
TESTAMENT1
In the last chapter, we pointed out that a definitive element of the theological
hermeneutic proposed by Watson (1994) is in the form of theological theses/stances
that in themselves constitute a hermeneutic. Also we noted Barth's theological
interpretations were situated in theology, i.e., informed by certain theological
convictions. The importance of theological convictions girding, informing and
directing interpretations of the Bible, thereby enabling theological interpretations,
cannot be overstated for reasons already given in the arguments ofWatson and in the
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analyses of Barth's theological interpretation. Indeed, our proposed model of the
theological interpretation of Hebrews in Africa is informed and constituted by, has its
starting point, and is anchored in, a certain theological conviction encapsulated in a
particular theology of history, i.e., in a particular understanding of history as
numinous and divinely ordered for specific purposes and goals. We turn to this now.
' No offence is intended here to those who feel the term 'Old Testament' is not a fair description to that
body of sacred literature that belongs to Jews as well. Since the nature of this discourse concerns
itself with theological interpretations of the Bible for, and in, Christian communities, it is appropriate
that the term be used throughout this study.
2 With reference to this discussion we call attention to Webster (1998) and Stell (1993) whose studies
thought having different purposes show in different ways the importance and place of theological
commitments for hermeneutics.
81
It is axiomatic that most, if not all, of the earliest Christian communities took the
Old Testament to be the word of God. Farley (1982) puts it thus: 'As an originally
Jewish movement, the Christian sect always had Scripture, a collection of
authoritative writings regarded as being of divine origin' (65). But the Old
Testament as the word of God was not readily applicable to the faith, life and order
of the early Christian communities for much of it would not have made sense
literally. As it were, the early Christian communities had to deal with the problem of
the historical and cultural distance of the Old Testament. This problem must have
been present even in the face of the view - which apparently characterizes the
interpretation of Old Testament in the New Testament - that the relevance and
meaning of Jewish scriptures is in their pointing to, and therefore, their fulfilment in,
Christ. Apostolic preaching (as crystallized in the New Testament) which
interpreted the early Church's encounters with Christ as the fulfilment of the
promises made to Israel in the Old Testament, were not self-evidential, to be simply
read off from the surface of the text: they required interpretative, highly selective and
creative readings, i.e., theological hermeneutics proper, to be achieved.3 In
consequence, as far as its reading of the Old Testament as the word ofGod is
concerned, the New Testament should be understood to evince a wrestling with the
meaning of the Old Testament for the New Testament Church, i.e., with the
theological interpretation of the Old Testament. Indeed, studies conducted on the use
or interpretation of the Old Testament in the New isolate a variety of theological
hermeneutics that are in operation to access the Old Testament for the early Church.4
3 Indeed there are studies galore on the use of the Old Testament in the New Testament. See, for
example, Dodd (1952), Efird (1972), Ellis (1991), Evans and Stegner (1994) and Moyise (2000).
4
Fitzmyer's (1961) study is a good illustration of this; he points out three ways that can be understood
as tackling the problems caused by the historical distance of the Old Testament thus providing
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Of these, our interest lies in 'typology' as the theological interpretation employed in
the New Testament for reading the Old Testament because, above all, it is based on
the presupposition that God is involved with the history of Israel, which leads to his
manifestation in Christ. It is in order then to consider, in what follows, how typology
works as a way of interpreting the Old Testament.
3.1.1. The Workings of Typology
Several characteristics of typology provide a good beginning for appreciating its
workings as a theological hermeneutic.5 The first, which would be considered
constitutive of typology, is a correspondence between an Old Testament personage,
event or institution (the type) and a particular element (the antitype) of the Christian
faith, mostly Christ. Since the correspondence is not absolute, so as to form an exact
copy, it may issue out as an analogy, or a contrast or even in an 'objectified
prophecy', or as a combination of two or all of these. When the correspondence
issues out in an analogy, a likeness is emphasized, bringing about a parallelism
between the personage, event or institution in question and the element it is likened
to in the Christian faith. The result is that the type can be understood to be analogous
to the element it corresponds to in the Christian faith. So here we encounter
somewhat the prefiguring proper of a New Testament personage, event or institution
theological interpretation: 1. 'Modernization', 'in which the Old Testament text, which originally had a
reference to some event on the contemporary scene at the time it was written, nevertheless was vague
enough to be applied to some new event' (Ibid.); 2. 'Accommodation', 'in which the Old Testament
text was obviously wrested from its original context, modified or deliberately changed by the new
writer in order to adapt it to a new situation or purpose'(Ibid.); and 3. 'Eschatological', 'in which the
Old Testament quotation expressed promise or threat about something to be accomplished in the
eschaton and which the Qumran (or Christian) writer cited as something still to be accomplished in
the new eschaton of which he wrote' (305-06 in brackets mine). It is no wonder that some, (see
Lindars 1976, 66), have come to the conclusion that what takes place in the New Testament is not so
much an interpretation of the Old Testament in the New but rather its use in the New.
5
A caveat needs to be given here that these characteristics, though distinct, overlap considerably.
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in the Old Testament. Unlike correspondences that issue out as analogies, those that
issue out as contrasts highlight differences between the Old Testament antitype and
the type in the early Church. Examples ofNew Testament pericopes exhibiting this
characteristic, either in one aspect or through a combination of sorts, include Rom.
5.12-21 where Adam corresponds to Christ primarily through a contrast; and 2 Cor.
3.7ff where Moses and the implications of his ministry correspond to Christ and the
implications of his ministry through a similarity, which allows for contrasts. As
Eichrodt (1963, 225) puts it,
the comparability of the two is indeed based upon the determinative
significance of each for humanity in the period introduced by himself; but this
is worked out in detail as a wholly contrasting correspondence, with the sin of
Adam and its fruit in guilt and corruption standing opposed to justification
through Christ with its fruit in righteousness and life.'6
In the third kind of correspondence, what Eichrodt calls 'objectified prophecy' (229),
the type corresponds to the antitype by pointing beyond itself'independently of any
human medium and purely through its objective factual reality' (Ibid.) to an element
that is understood to occur in the New Testament times. In other words, the Old
Testament narratives, persons and events, are the content of the literal meaning
which the author responsible sought to convey and thus, on the basis of the events
they describe and interpret, are complete and meaningful in themselves. However,
now, in the New Testament, those narratives are perceived to point to Christ and are
subsequently fulfilled in him. In actual fact, this is a case where retrospective
interpretation demonstrates the past to be a prophecy of subsequent events, revealing
rather than predicting. The interpretation of the past becomes prophecy in reverse,
demonstrating the past as a preparation for the future. There is, therefore, a duality
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ofmeanings: the Old Testament meaning (type), and the New Testament one
(antitype, which in retrospect happens to be a fulfilment). Hence, for example, the
redemption wrought by God in Christ being understood as a new Exodus, or Christ
being understood as a second Adam, or even the Lamb of God.
The second characteristic of typology is the intensification, escalation or
heightening in the antitype, of an aspect of the type, casting the antitype in greater
light in comparison to the type in question. Hebrews seems to exemplify this best
with a typology so strong on intensification that it has been judged by Hays (1989) to
be, unlike the typology employed by Paul, 'relentlessly supersessionist' (98).7 Indeed
it is possible to conceive ofHebrews' textual structure as a typology characterized by
intensification. Since a theological interpretation of Hebrews is central to this study,
a brief look at it here to illustrate this point is appropriate.
Certainly, some rhetorico-critical approaches to the structure ofHebrews8 see the
book as being based on the synkrisis (comparison) between Jesus on the one hand
and, on the other hand, Angels (Heb. 1.1-2.18), Moses (Heb. 3.1-6), Aaron (Heb.
5.1-10) and, therefore, with Melchizedek (Heb. 7.1-25), and the old covenant (8.4-
10.18); and between these comparisons would be the relevant paraenetic sections
(Heb. 2.1-4, 3.7-4.16 and so forth). The exegetical underpinning of the said
comparisons structuring Hebrews is in actual fact, as argued at length by Sowers
6 See also John 3.14, 6. 31-33, 49-51; Acts 7. 2-60 which should be singled out as a passage rich in
typology, and Acts 3.22; 1 Cor. 10.1-11, 15.45-49; 2 Cor. 15.17; Rom. 3.24 and 8.28-32.
7 Smith (1972, 60) remarks: 'Although Hebrews has a forerunner in Paul (cf. Romans 4; Galatians 3),
the author is certainly the master of typology among New Testament writers'.
8 Best exemplified by Seid (1999, 326), but see also Evans (1988).
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(1965, 89-132), typology, and specifically, a typology characterized by heightening.9
This seems to be fortified by synkrisis as a rhetorical device present in Hebrews,
which in the words of Zuntz (1953), 'is a traditional device of encomiastic Greek and
Latin rhetoric: the person or object, to be praised is placed beside outstanding
specimens of a comparable kind and his, or its, superiority (hmepoxfO urged' (286).
The third and last characteristic we note is what we may call, following Cahill
(1982), the 'christocentric dimension' (274) of typologies. Cahill seems to
exaggerate what constitutes this characteristic by writing that it means: 'All the
figures or types in the OT coalesce into the one antitype, the person of Christ' (Ibid).
It would be better, I suggest, to understand this christocentric characteristic of
typology as one predominated by Christ: the anti-type of the Old Testament's types
and, also, the figure providing the basis for the other anti-types (in the New
Testament) of the types in the Old Testament in cases where Christ is not the direct
antitype. Of the mentioned characteristics of typology, the christocentric one ought
to be distinguished because, in a sense, it is present in all of the other characteristics,
i.e., every instance of typology in the New Testament would have a christocentric
premise directly or indirectly. The reasons for this are crucial but because they are
bound up with the presuppositions of typology we will look at them in the relevant
section of this study below.
9 See also Buchanan (1972, 249-251).
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To reiterate here what we have already touched on above, it is not hard to gather
that in these instances, the Old Testament as the word ofGod is made sense of in the
context of the experience of the early Christian communities, and subsequently made
to speak to them. (A detached historical-critical reading of the Old Testament by the
early Christians would have failed to make such typological interpretations of the
same.) This means that whatever else that may have taken place in the interpretation
of the Old Testament in the New, typology is used as a theological hermeneutic for
the Old Testament. How else, we may ask, was Paul in the light of Christ to engage
with the Pentateuch, Jeremiah, or Isaiah? To put it differently, if the readings of the
Old Testament were to be exclusively historical ones, they, by and large, would have
been meaningless to the New Testament Christian communities. But via typology,
we see historical and cultural distance bridged, resulting in meaning being conferred
to the Old Testament in such a way that it is made to speak to a new context, i.e., to
Christian, rather than Jewish, communities. Through typology, the Old Testament
texts that would perhaps be meaningless or irrelevant to Christian readers are brought
to bear on the life, faith and order of the Christian communities by illuminating and,
at the same time, by being illuminated by, the faith experiences of the Christian
communities.10 But in what theological presuppositions is typology anchored?
10 Here lies a complexity with typology: whilst it clearly is a theological hermeneutic through which
the Old Testament texts were accessed by the early Christian communities, it can at the same time be
understood to shed light on the faith of the Christian community. Our concern in this study is first
with the former.
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3.1.2. The Integrality ofa Theology ofHistory: 'Heilsgeschichte' of Israel.
On the presuppositions of typology, Frye (1982) makes the salient observation:
'What typology really is, is a mode of thought, what it both assumes and leads to, is a
theory of history, or more accurately of historical process: an assumption that there is
some meaning and point to history, and that sooner or later some event or events will
occur that will indicate what that meaning or point is, and so become an antitype of
what has happened previously' (80-81). Despite the limitations of his observation to
literary perspectives, Frye brings to focus a crucial presupposition of typology: rather
than being a haphazard, chaotic arena of actions and events, history has a meaning
and a point. Under the scrutiny of theology, what this means is that typology is
grounded in the view that God is at work in history, ordering it according to his own
goals and purposes, hence the invariable interconnectedness between past and
present, type and antitype. Such a view is to be seen in light of the wider canvas of
the conviction about the existence of a God who rules the world. It seems to me that
all who look at typology isolate this presupposition," with Cahill (1982) doing so
perhaps most clearly. While looking at Acts 7.2-60 as an instance of typology, he
remarks: 'Animating the entire text is the hermeneutical conviction that God has and
does intervene in history, a perspective that begins with the creation narratives in
Genesis' (267-68). Cahill (and others)12 perceives this so strongly to be the case that,
in the final analysis, he opines that history is transformed into theophany (and/or,
epiphany we may add) whose apex is in the assumptio carnis ofGod in Christ within
the historical contingencies of Palestine (268-69). He roundly summarizes it thus:
" For example Braaten (1968, 127), Cullmann (1965, 132-33), Danielou (1960, 32), Von Rad (1960,
226), Lampe (1957, 29) and Markus (1957, 447).
12 Eliade (1961, 168-72) is a good example.
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The imposition of order onto history then transforms the very nature of history,
making history into theophany. This vision of horizontal historical process
always involves a vertical connection to providence or the God of history,
essentially an act of faith and hope, as its legitimation. Typology, therefore, is
basically an imaginative vision of history and historical process ultimately
grounded on the conviction of the creative power of a God who speaks and acts
(275).
It is precisely for this reason that exponents of typology as a theological hermeneutic
make objection to its confusion with allegory whose presuppositions are deemed to
lie elsewhere. Typology is understood to take history seriously; the past it grapples
with is considered as a concrete historical reality, else the legitimacy and logic of
relating the past (the type) to the historically present (the antitype) is rendered void
(Eichrodt 1963, 226). As for allegory, it is perceived as not necessarily bound to
concrete historical realities in its interpretative procedures (Lampe 1957, 31).13 It is
also on account of the mentioned presuppositions of typology that, despite some
similarities, it should not be confused with being merely a trope or, more
specifically, a metaphor/analogy as Hays (1989, 100-101) seems to suggest,14 for
typology certainly transcends tropes. One of the reasons for this is simply in the
logic ofmetaphors and analogies as communication methods especially in
It is a matter of debate whether typology can be distinguished from allegory on the basis of how
much they invest, or how each of them invests, in history in their respective hermeneutics. Barr
(1982, 103-148), for example, marshalled forcefully arguments against any such distinction by
insisting that such distinctions were artificial since their uses are mixed up, they could be used in the
same 'historical' text for example (115). Barr's argument may help clarify the complexity ofOld
Testament inteipretation in the New but it is not enough to invalidate the hermeneutical
presupposition mentioned as distinctive of typology because typology seems to apply only to events,
institutions and personages whose past historical reality is taken for granted in the New Testament,
while allegory is more encompassing, and primarily concerned with the deeper (spiritual) meaning,
historical and otherwise, of texts. Goldingay's (1981, 103-109) discussion on the understanding of
typology and allegory in relation to each other is helpful in making this clear.
14
Hays here is representative of scholars who argue for a literary apprehension of the typology found
in the Bible; other examples include Marks (1984) and Young (1994). Young puts it particularly
forcefully thus: 'Typology, then, is a "figure of speech" which configures or reads texts to bring out
significant correspondences so as to invest them with meaning beyond themselves ... Typology
belongs to the literary phenomenon of intertextuality, to the genre of liturgy and sacred story. The
sacred text is no mere pretext of something else, as in allegory; rather, story and symbol carry a
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communicating something new and whose knowledge cannot be attained directly.
That is, metaphors and analogies work on the presupposition that there is some
similarity between the 'known' and the 'unknown' so that the unknown is made
known through its similarity with the 'known'.15 But typology is quite different; it
does not ride so much on the crest of communicating knowledge of one through the
other (nor even creating meaning through intertextual relations [see footnote 76]) as
on creating 'meaning that links the present to the past' (Cahill 1982, 274) because,
providentially, the past is related to the present in a meaningful way. Further still,
the mentioned presuppositions of typology resist interpretations of history as
cyclical, for this contravenes the very hermeneutical procedure of typology.16
We have just mentioned that typology is grounded on the conviction of the
existence of a God who fashions human existence and history. There is, therefore, a
design, purpose and direction in the contingencies of history. This explains why it is
particularly around the figure of Jesus that a whole multitude of Old Testament types
are clustered: he is, for example, the second Adam, the Lamb ofGod, the suffering
servant, and the eternal High Priest. In the New Testament, there seems to be the
overriding conviction that history (at least of Israel), is directed by God, to lead it to
Christ, and that God is at work in history today directing it towards its final goal,
until the fullness ofChrist is reached. (Of course this is seen in salvific terms:
salvation had taken place in the end-time through Jesus Christ, and the Old
surplus of significance. Fulfilment is to do with the plenitude of meaning uncovered by relationship
with previous text or narrative' (48).
151 find Davidson (2001, 245-64) and Martinich (1996) helpful readings on this.
16 See Eichrodt's (1963, 233-34) criticism of this view as espoused by Bultmann (1950).
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Testament was pointing to this since God had directed its history accordingly).17
Cullmann's (1967) study of the New Testament underscores this view. He argues
that salvation-history is basic to the New Testament thinking and is the essence ot
the New Testament message. Put differently, the biblical view of history, so to
speak, is delineated as a history of salvation, progressing from promise to fulfilment
in, and focused on, Jesus Christ. It is this convergence ofhistory on the figure of
Christ that makes way for the ubiquity of christocentric typologies in the typology of
the New Testament, for in various ways and instances, Christ is then understood to
18
be prefigured, and related to the history depicted, in the Old Testament. ' This is
why 'Christianity in a sense creates the types to which it appeals, by seeing the
Scriptures through Christ' (Barton 1976, 261).
3.1.3. Typological Interpretations of the Old Testament
What has been said so far justifies and accounts for typology as a model for
theological interpretation of the Old Testament. Indeed this approach to the Old
Testament has its advocates and practitioners in the guild of Old Testament
scholarship. In his Old Testament Theology I Von Rad (1975) wrote in precise
tenns:
17 Within the context of a study of the 'Testimonia' and modern hermeneutics, Grech (1972) states it
quite aptly: 'The primary purpose of the testimonies [the 'Testimonia'] is that of demonstrating the
continuity ofGod's saving deed in Christ with his saving actions in the Old Testament. In Christ
salvation reaches its fulfilment, i.e., its culmination. The testimonies, therefore, presuppose salvation
history ... (323).
18
Pannenberg's (1969b, 125-158) muse on 'revelation as history' seems particularly cogent in bringing
out this relationship of Christ as the end of history and, therefore, christocentric typology. In this
respect, his main line of argument (131-135) has to do with revelation being found at the end of
history (which he understands Jesus, not totally but in a sense, to be [135]); an end 'which presupposes
the course of history, because it is a perfection of it' (133). If this be the case, then naturally, the past
(the Old Testament) would be understood through the end (Jesus Christ). According to Pannenberg,
the end will then manifest the secrets of the present (and past), that is of history, the very
'presupposition of primitive Christianity' (133). So, 'In the fate of Jesus Christ, as the anticipation of
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... the Old Testament writings confine themselves to representing Jahweh's
relationship to Israel and the world in one aspect only, namely as a continuing
divine activity in history. This implies that in principle Israel's faith is
grounded in a theology of history. It regards itself as based upon historical act,
and as shaped and re-shaped by factors in which it saw the hand of Jahweh at
work. The oracles of the prophets also speak of events, though there is a
definite difference, that in general they stand in point of time not after but prior
to, the events to which they bear witness. Even where this reference to divine
facts in history is not immediately apparent, as for example in some of the
Psalms, it is, however, present by implication: and where it is actually absent,
as for example in the book of Job and Ecclesiastes, this very lack is closely
connected with the grave affliction which is the theme of both these works
(106).
This perception of the Old Testament (often referred to as Heilsgeschichte)19 by a
leading Old Testament theologian seems perpetually present, if not (depending of
course on which period of scholarship one refers to) pervasive in Old Testament
scholarship.20 The implications of such an apprehension of the Old Testament are
multifarious, ranging from the meaning and direction of the history of God's
21involvement in Israel as depicted in the Old Testament, to its purpose and end. For
Von Rad, this history, as understood by the Israelites themselves and not by
historico-critical means, ought to be the subject for a theology of the Old Testament
(105-128). Indeed, as alluded to by Braaten (1968, 127), common terms like
the end of all history, God is revealed as the one God of all mankind who has been expected since the
times of the prophets' (134).
19 I find Richardson's (1961, 122-41) treatment of this term a helpful introduction to it.
20 It is abundantly clear that this was the case with pre-critical/enlightenment biblical scholarship (see
Danielou 1960 and Hall 1998). But the emergence in the 19th-century of the scientific writing of the
history of ancient Israel did not debunk Heilsgeschichte; as pointed out in Goldingay's (1981, 66)
study, it can still be traced (in that very Century) in writings of the Old Testament's theologians.
Coming to the 20th-century, Heilsgeschichte suffered a set-back due to, but in no way limited to, the
influence of Barth and Bultmann (Richardson 1964, 125-53), two most influential theologians whose
theology devalued history by failing to give it a central role in their theological articulations.
However, this set back has been countered by a return to theologies of history as critical to
understanding the Old Testament. For some representative works, see Wright (1952), Wright and
Fuller (1957) and Pannenberg (1969a and 1969b), Reventlow (1992) for a thorough bibliography on
Heilsgeschichte.
21 Of course, this approach to the Old Testament does not with meet universal countenance. Barr
(1963 and 1982) 'the critic of biblical theologians' (Gnuse 2001,4) would provide a good example of
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'elective', 'revelatory', 'redemptive', 'sacred', 'holy' etc. seeking to evaluate or even
describe the Old Testament, are indicative of attempts to interpret that history and its
possible meanings. Inevitably, the result of such perceptions of the Old Testament is
the spawning of typological approaches to the Old Testament, as theological
interpretations of the same.22 But can typological interpretations of the Old
Testament as instances of theological interpretations of it provide a model for
theological interpretation for the New Testament generally and Hebrews in
particular?
3.2 TYPOLOGY AND THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATION OF THE NEW
TESTAMENT
3.2.1. Suggestions: Herbert Marks and Richard Hays
To my knowledge, two significant discussions of Pauline hermeneutics, insofar as
typology forms an integral part of it, seem to suggest that typological interpretations
can provide models for the theological interpretation of the New Testament. Both
Herbert Marks (1984) and Richard Hays (1989) suggest that Pauline typological
hermeneutics is a way of reading the scriptures which is not limited to the Old
Testament. For Marks, the study ofPauline hermeneutics should not be limited to
the apprehension and vindication of his reading but should also be for the emulation
those opposed to such a view, especially if held at the exclusion of other approaches to the Old
Testament. For an overview of the debate see Gnuse (1989).
22 Von Rad(1961 and 1975 for example) and Eichrodt (1960 and 1963 for example), as conceded in
the assessment of scholars such as Hasel (1970) and Brueggemann (1985a and 1985b), who did so in
the context of proposing a new approach to Old Testament Theology, stand out in this - especially von
Rad. For time and space, I am not in a position to comment on the current state ofOld Testament
scholarship vis-a-vis typological interpretations although my reading, hitherto, indicates a petering out
of the influence of Von Rad's approach; there seems to be a dearth of Old Testament scholarship
(theological and otherwise) on typology from the 1990s. However, this is not so important, given that
my primary concern here has been simply to draw attention to the fact that typological interpretations,
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of his method. He is not clear on exactly what this method for emulation is, but he
does give something of Paul's approach to scripture that ought to provide a way of
reading the scriptures. Contra the synoptic tradition which Marks argues are
apologetic and expository interpretations of the Old Testament (73-76), he is of the
view that Pauline hermeneutic is revisionary. Revisionary because it usurps the
authority of scripture in the sense that it is 'the special understanding of the
interpreter [i.e., Paul's] that determines the significance of the text, which only
assumes its exemplary or prescriptive role by virtue of that understanding' (77). This
he sees to be abundantly the case with Pauline typology. He states it this way: 'In
Paul's reading, there is a radical actualization, a drastic evacuation of the past into the
present, which "strikes" indirectly at the priority, and hence the authority, of the
scriptural text' (79). I Cor 10.1-11 is a good example, where the rock ofMassah is
identified with Christ. The motivation for such a hermeneutic, Marks argues, is
exousia: 'Paul's impulse towards spiritual autonomy' (80), whilst its capacity is
founded on, and granted by, the dynamics of typology understood solely in literary
terms (86ff). Otherwise stated, for Marks, Pauline typology is a hermeneutical
approach to scripture that evidences freedom against 'one's own patrimony' (88) - the
religion of revelation - 'recognizing that the content of the gospel is never fixed'
(Ibid.). It, therefore, calls for new insights (interpretations of the Bible) in this
'dispensation of the Spirit'. He proposes that we should proceed this way in reading
the Bible.
as theological interpretations of the Old Testament, are present in critical scholarship of the Old
Testament on account of the presuppositions of typology just discussed.
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Two factors render Marks' discussion on Pauline typology unsuitable for the
provision of theological interpretations of the New Testament. The first is that his
discussion of Pauline typology is oblivious of theological underpinnings of typology;
the kind that allow for the henneneutical moves that Paul makes in reading the Old
Testament. This permits Marks to explain the typological interpretative readings of
Paul literarily, and within a framework of exousia, the desire for autonomy. In
consequence, he sees Paul's understanding to be key in giving meaning and even
authority to scripture, and not a theology of history with which Paul engages the Old
Testament. Secondly, typology, in the final analysis, does not provide a theological
hermeneutic that we can use to read the New Testament but is rather an occasion to
dissect Paul's henneneutical motivations which he recommends we should in turn
embrace and use accordingly in our interpretation of the Bible. The results of such
an understanding of Pauline typology as an approach to reading the New Testament
are twofold: firstly, we have an open New Testament to be read according to the
dictates of the interpreter's understandings and yearnings for exousia, and, secondly,
we have, in consequence, a subversion of the very texts we wish to interpret
theologically. This is hardly the provision for a typology-based theological
interpretation of the New Testament.
Hays (1989) has a lot in common with Marks: like him, Paul's 'interpretative
methods are paradigmatic for Christian hermeneutics' (183) and, like him, he
understands Paul's hermeneutic as providing freedom to read scripture in new ways
(189). The difference in his discussion of Paul's exemplary hermeneutic for reading
the scriptures is, firstly, that he views it under the lenses of'a certain imaginative
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vision of the relationship between scripture and God's eschatological activity in the
present time' (183). For his (Paul's) hermeneutics, therefore, to make sense and
accordingly be used by us, we need to share in his eschatological vision, and see
ourselves as people of the end-time, locating 'our present time in relation to the story
of God's dealing with human kind' (185). Secondly, and more importantly, he casts
typological interpretations as part of Paul's hermeneutic strategy in the light of
metaphors, precipitating an appreciation of'the metaphorical relation between the
text and our own reading of it' (186). This would allow space, in our reading of
scripture, for 'the play of echo and allusion, for figurative intertextual conjunctions,
and even - if our communities are sufficiently rooted in Scripture's symbolic soil - for
metalepsis. The troping of the text would be the natural consequence of locating
lives within its story' (Ibid.).
Hays' analysis of Pauline typology as an exemplary hermeneutic (his neglect of the
theological underpinnings of typology notwithstanding) could provide a typology-
based interpretation of the New Testament except for two shortcomings. Whereas
his analyses of Paul's typological interpretations may be readily applicable to Old
Testament readings which we could perceive as metalepsis and thus alluding to,
echoing, and prefiguring our times, they are not clear when it comes to the reading of
the New Testament itself. Paul's readings may be used in creating new typological
interpretations of the Old Testament (187), but what of reading typologically his own
readings? How are we to interpret the New Testament texts (not the Old Testament
ones) on the basis ofmetalepsis?
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We may take it that Hays' musing on Paul's eschatological vision may grant an
orientation and a way to interpret the New Testament, but this is not pursued as such
23
by Hays, leaving it to the reader to figure out how this can be done. The other
crucial shortcoming with Hays' argument is his neglect of the place of a theology of
history in enabling the interpretative moves he envisages we could make through
imitating Paul's hermeneutics. The literary understandings of typology as
metaphorical or metalepsis, which he argues needs to be used in interpretations of the
Bible as an emulation of Paul's own typological interpretations, and the conviction,
therefore, that the symbolic soil of scripture ifwell inhabited can enable the
identification of echoes, allusions and figurations in the Bible (186) will not suffice.
For reasons already discussed, a theology of history, indeed a form of
Heilsgeschichte, is imperative to any attempt to follow Paul's typological
hermeneutics. Ironically, Hays' discussion of God's eschatological activity, and of
communities living within the story of the Bible is ipso facto a concession, which he
seems to ignore, to the importance of such a theology in Pauline hermeneutics. This
is because any perception of the eschatological activity of God presupposes his
earlier workings in history, which the story of the Bible can be understood to portray.
So, for appropriate typology-based theological interpretations of the New Testament,
we first need a carefully defined theology of history as our basis, and then,
subsequently, we need to show how such a theology can provide readings of the New
Testament that are themselves typological readings of the Old Testament in the New.
We now address ourselves to this.
23 In fact, his three proposals for the use of Paul's hermeneutics in reading the Bible (Hays 1989, 83-
92) have more to do with what needs to be done than how it can be done.
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3.2.2. The Requisite Theology ofHistory: 'Heilsgeschichte' Expanded
Reflecting on the relation of God to history, Gilkey (1963) remarked, 'almost
everything produced since 1918 has been on this subject' (174). (Indeed theological
perspectives on history abound.)24 At the time ofhis writing, Gilkey was dissatisfied
that the literature on God's relation to history had ignored discussions on Providence.
But Providence is not the only subject to be ignored: a cursory glance at most of this
literature shows that discussions on the relationship ofHeilsgeschichte to other
histories has also been ignored, which, it can be argued, is the result of, and a
corollary to, the ignoring of Providence. This means that much of the literature on
theologies of history per se will not concern us much here, for our primary interest in
looking at history as theology is, quite narrowly, the relationship of Heilsgeschichte
to wider history. If anything, most of the literature we shall engage with for relevant
theologies of history will be from the discipline of theology of religion, which
amongst theologians of Christianity, normally crosses over into theologies ofhistory
in evaluating claims that God is at work in other religious traditions.25 It is only after
we have argued that, on the basis ofHeilsgeschichte, it is possible, indeed called for,
to perceive other histories as related to, or included in, Heilsgeschichte and thus
highly significant, that we shall be in a position to advance our proposal on how this
could become a theological hermeneutic for a certain genre ofNew Testament texts.
24 The anthology compiled by Mclntire (1977) confirms this. He provides a good survey of the
literature together with the reasons for the upsurge of theologies of history starting from the first
world war. We need to note however that the interval between the late 1970s and 2003 is a long time,
and systematic theological scholarship, if the result ofmy search of relevant literature is anything to
go by, seems to have moved on to other concerns.
25 Indeed it is mostly within the context of'theology of religion' that theologies of history reside, with
varying degrees of modification. More specifically, and in addition, theologies of religion are usually
conjoined with discourses on revelation and redemption, which in turn have a direct relationship to
theologies of history that either see Heilsgeschichte as exclusive to Israel's history or see it related to
other histories. So, all of the theologians whose work is discussed below have it articulated mostly in
the sub-discipline of 'theology of religion' (see Veitch [ 1971 ] for more on this) or, if not, then they
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We may begin our discussion by posing the question: is Heilsgeschichte exclusive
to Israel so that only its history as depicted in the Old Testament is the one with
which God is involved; ordering and directing it to its goal and finality in Christ as
understood by New Testament interpreters? Langford (1981), the subject of whose
work is 'Providence', suggests a variety of responses to this question in remarking:
One view denies that there is any radical gulf between biblical and non-biblical
history, because God is equally Lord of all historical events. At the opposite
extreme we find a complete separation of biblical and non-biblical history,
based on the claim that biblical history is providentially ordained, whereas the
rest of history is a directionless and chaotic movement reflecting material and
personal forces that have no ultimate meaning (130).26
However, the possibility of a spectrum of responses along a 'yes' and 'no' continuum
is, it seems to me, untenable. God is either involved with the histories of peoples
other than Israel or not: if he is, then, of necessity, these histories must have a certain
correlation with Heilsgeschichte (precisely on account of its claims); and if he is not,
then there is no relationship whatsoever. With this in mind, we may attend to the
possibility of a 'no' response. Few theologians, if any,27 who embrace
Heilsgeschichte as depicted in the Old Testament would hold the view that the rest of
history is a haphazard movement devoid of God's involvement. Barth, the eminent
20lh century theologian, has often been cited as holding this view, albeit in the
have it articulated under the subject matter of 'revelation' or 'redemption' as is the case respectively in
the case of Pannenberg (1969a and 1969b) and Cullmann (1965).
2(1
Perhaps we may say, as a qualification, not really 'directionless and chaotic', since they can be
interpreted on basis other than providence, i.e., minus the numinous, in the sense that God is not
understood to be involved with them (thereby making them of 'no ultimate value').
271 have not come across, any example except the suggestion, by Connolly (1965, 113-14), of Lowith.
However, any consideration of Lowith, as one refining Barth's theology of History, which sees other
histories as devoid of God's involvement (see below), is a misrepresentation of his position. Lowith
(1949) clearly held that other histories (he calls them profane) had significance insofar as they were a
reflection of Heilsgeschichte (185-87), otherwise they are a realm of pain and suffering, and of sin; 'a
realm of sin and death and therefore in need of redemption' (193).
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context of theology of religion.28 Barth indeed discussed religion as an antithesis to
revelation in his famous paragraph 17 of Church Dogmatics 2/1 (1956). But we
must acknowledge the limitations of his discourse as representative of scholars who
give a negative response with regard to God's involvement with histories outside
HeiIsgeschichte. This is because, even though it is possible to extract from his
discourse a theology of history,29 he carries out this discourse on religion narrowly -
as an antithesis to revelation. In such a frame of reference, the articulation and
evaluation of the nature of religion is conducted on no other basis than on the
touchstone of his understanding of revelation. His concerns are not with the
involvement ofGod, whether in the sphere of religion or elsewhere, in the history of
Israel as such, nor in wider history. We, therefore, can proceed to isolate Barth's
theology of history as extrapolated from his theology of religion only ifwe make the
crucial assumption that, for Barth, 'revelation' is the indicator of, or synonymous
with, God's involvement with history, of which we could understand religion to be a
component. Such an assumption helps us to assess Barth's position and comment on
it because it simply means that the presence, or the possibility, of God's revelation in
religions points to his involvement with wider history and vice-versa.30 It is very
clear from paragraph 17 of Church Dogmatics that for Barth, all 'religion'
28 See Knitter (2002, 23-32), Race (1983, 11), Davis (1970,45), and Bleeker (1965, 91-98) to cite a
few examples.
29 This is amply demonstrated by Connolly (1965, 1 10-13).
30 One may wonder here why we should look to Barth's narrow discussion of religion this way to
arrive at his theology of history. Why should we not instead look at his views on history in order to
do so? The reason is that our interest in Barth as a representative of theologians who respond
negatively to the view that God is involved with the histories outside the Heilsgeschichte of Israel is
on account ofTheology ofReligion scholars who cite him as such normally on conclusions drawn
from paragraph 17 of Church Dogmatics (Barth 1956) and not on the basis of their assessment of his
entire works (also see following footnote). Indeed if this was the case, perhaps they would have to
grapple with his view on history which is not a straight-forward one. As remarked by Veitch (1971);
'The way in which Barth interprets history is as sophisticated as it is subtle' (11), and 1 would hasten to
add, open to varied interpretations (see for examples the different ways Ogletree [1965, 117-154] and
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represented the futility of human effort to reach God and human attempts at self-
3 1
justification, and was therefore under God's judgement. From the stand-point of
'revelation', 'religion' was unbelief, the attempts of people to know God by their own
means (30Iff). 'Religion' was therefore the opposite of 'revelation', for in it, Barth
would argue, 'man bolts and bars himself against revelation by providing a substitute,
by taking in advance the very thing which has to be given by God' (303). In seeing
religions as substitutes of revelation, and thus characterized by idolatry and self-
righteousness, Barth could be said to have perceived the histories of peoples
(religions residing within them), as histories without God's involvement whatsoever
but rather against God's involvement - quite a negative theology of history.
So, Barth's theology of history so gleaned from his theology of religion in
paragraph 17 of Church Dogmatics 2/1, which would insist that God has worked in
history, directing and ordering it, but only with regard to Israel as attested to in the
Old Testament and related to the eschatological event of Christ, leaves us faced with
a telling irony. The irony, as will become apparent, is that any notion of a
Heilsgeschichte of Israel and especially when viewed from its eschatological
impulse, i.e., its telos in Christ, absolutely necessitates the view that God's working
Bakker [2000, 222-268] interpret it). This then makes us limit our look at Barth, for the purposes of
our discussion, to 'paragraph 17' in isolating Barth's theology of history.
31 I am aware that there are those who question whether this indeed is the position of Barth on
religions. If we take 'paragraph 17' as definitive of Barth's position, then it is. But if we are to
consider other writings of Barth, then it is debatable. As demonstrated, for example, in the studies of
Veitch (1971) and Harrison (1986), it is possible for one to read other sections of Barth's work and
conclude the opposite. Indeed, both of these scholars try to account for this apparent ambiguity of
Barth's theology of religion by invoking his theological method of paradoxical counter statements,
correctiveness etc (Veitch 1971, 213ff and Harrison 1986, 2011). Others, of course, would view this
ambiguity as a change that befell Barth's position later on (Brunner 1951). As mentioned already, I
have not attempted to isolate Barth's position against the canvas of the totality of his works here
because my interest in his work is limited to only an aspect of it: 'paragraph 17' of Church Dogmatics,
on whose basis theology of religion scholars cite Barth as denying God's involvement in other
religions and, depending on how we understand him, even the Christian religion.
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transcends the salvation history of Israel as reflected in the Bible. Salvation history
has a claim on other histories, so to speak. We turn to this in the following.
As alluded to above, scholars who embrace Heilsgeschichte understand, one way
or the other and for a variety of reasons, that God is involved in other histories as
well, and subsequently seek to relate the two. It is here then that we have a spectrum
of responses along an indirect-direct continuum of God's involvement with other
histories other than that of Israel. We will examine here, in a general and
abbreviated way, three theologians representative of views residing, as it were, on the
left, centre and finally to the right of the mentioned indirect-direct continuum.
Danielou is representative of theologians who perceive an indirect involvement of
God in other histories. In Dupuis' (2001) summary, he
draws a sharp distinction between nature and the supernatural, or equivalently
between religion and revelation. "Non-Christian religions belong to the order
of natural reason, the Judeo-Christian revelation to the order of supernatural
faith. Both constitute different orders. To this distinction of the two
corresponds that between two God-given covenants: the cosmic and the
historical. The cosmic covenant is equivalent to God's manifestation through
nature ... It manifests God's abiding presence in creation and is symbolized, in
Noah's episode in Genesis, by the rainbow ... (134).
From the perspective of theologies of history, what this means is that history outside
the one depicted in the Old Testament is devoid of God's direct involvement with it;
it enjoys an indirect involvement through its encounters with creation/nature. At
best, it is a pre-history, a preparation of sorts, to God's personal revelation (and with
his direct involvement with history) starting with Abraham and culminating in
Christ.
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However, in a move to the right of the mentioned continuum, contra Danielou,
von Balthasar (1968, 155-177), on the basis of a theology of history of the Old
Testament, points to a visible 'working of God through the whole of history, which in
the sense of the Bible certainly cannot be described as a "natural providence" (if
those words have any meaning). God works and guides events in relation to ultimate
salvation, which has its centre in Israel, but concerns the whole world' (160). This
Old Testament theology of history, he argues, is evident at its beginning (he calls it
protology), where God is involved not with Israel but with the human race resulting
in his choice and covenant with Noah. In Noah, von Balthasar argues (156-58), 'a
divine covenant is made with the whole of mankind and the whole of creation, a
covenant which stands in relation to the covenant with Abraham as the all-embracing
universal to the particular. This particular, on the basis of the covenant with Noah,
must have a dynamic openness to the universal' (156).
This Old Testament theology of history, Balthasar continues to argue, is also
encountered at its end (eschatology), via the prophets and the apocalyptic visions.
According to Von Balthasar, it is for this reason that Daniel, as an apocalyptic
literature, has spawned attempts to draw up theologies of world history where, 'the
whole time is stirred up in relation to the final time' (160). It certainly shows 'the
consciousness of the relevance of secular history for salvation history' (Ibid.).
Cullmann (1965) seems to have a similar outlook to von Balthasar.
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For him (160-66) Heilsgeschichte touches all humanity and its history but,
specifically, with regard to its salvation. That is, the divine plan, from creation
through to the election of Israel (the remnant) to the one man (Jesus) has all
humanity in view as displayed in the return to multiplicity through 'apostles, first
community, Church made up of Jews and Gentiles, world' (160). He writes, 'Israel is
elected for the salvation of humanity. Because mankind is envisaged from the outset
through the concept of the election of Israel, humanity remains in the salvation-
historical perspective throughout its entire extent' (160). In addition to this, wider
history is, according to Cullmann, not an arena of sustained divine revelation as the
Heilsgeschichte of Israel is, so as to be conceived of as leading directly to salvation
history. Thus his remark: 'Apart from these indirect points of contact, the New
Testament does not, of course, draw any direct lines leading from the history of the
peoples of antiquity to salvation history' (163). However, he concedes that there is a
sense in which they converge on the one man (Jesus) for their salvation, on account
ofwhich there is 'a merging of secular history to salvation history' (166). In his own
words:
The material relationship between salvation history and history, theologically
speaking, is that salvation history in essence rests upon election, on reduction
to a narrow line, and that this line continues on for the salvation of all mankind,
leading ultimately to a funnelling of all history into this line, in other words, a
merging of secular history with salvation history (166).
Then to the far right of this continuum we have Pannenberg, one of the most
elaborate theologians of history.32 More than any other theologian in recent history, it
may be said, Pannenberg (1969a) understands the whole of history as the arena of
12 Which is no surprise given that his career has addressed 'the cluster of issues concerning Christian
faith, theology, and history' (Colombo 1990, 1).
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God's activity, through which, therefore, he reveals himself; an understanding that
has huge ramifications for the relationship of the Heilsgeschichte of Israel to other
histories.33 His main thesis is that 'the totality of his (God's) speech and activity, the
history brought about by God, shows who he is in an indirect way' (13). This means
that no single activity in history, but rather the totality of history, is an absolute
indirect self-revelation of God, itself a chain or series of related events (14ff). This is
the reason why, Pannenberg (1969b) argues: 'Whenever the historical self-
demonstration of YHWH in his acts was viewed as being definitive, and lasting, this
demonstration still retained a provisional character. It was always surpassed with
new events, new historical activity in which YHWH presents himself in new ways'
(140).
Given that it is in the totality of history that God absolutely reveals himself
indirectly, then the end of all history assumes pivotal significance as definitive in
knowing God, and, crucially for our purposes, understanding his revelation in his
past activities in history. This end in Pannenberg's thought is in Jesus, and more so
in his resurrection. In his own words:
Now the history of the whole is only visible when one stands at its end. Until
then, the future always remains as something beyond calculation. And only in
the sense that the perfection of history has been inaugurated in Jesus Christ is
God finally and fully revealed in the fate of Jesus. With the resurrection of
Jesus, the end of history has already occurred ... (142).
'3
Strictly speaking, Pannenberg's work is concerned with revelation, and how revelation is
accomplished through history. But to do so, he of necessity espouses an elaborate theology of history,
through which the relationship of the Heilsgeschichte of Israel to other histories is evidently clear as
we show below.
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From the vantage point of the view of the end of history, 'the history that
demonstrates the deity of God is broadened to include the totality of all events' (133),
and not just limited to the Heilsgeschichte of Israel. Again in his own words:
The history that demonstrates the deity of God is broadened to include the
totality of all events. This corresponds completely to the universality of Israel's
God, who is not only the God of Israel, but will be the God of all men. This
broadening ofHeilsgeschichte to a universal history is in essence already
accomplished in the major prophets of Israel in that they treat the kingdoms of
the world as responsible to God's commands ... Correspondingly, the
apocalyptic viewpoint conceived of Jahweh's Law as the ground of the totality
ofworld events. It is at the end of this chain ofworld events that God can for
the first time be revealed with finality as the one true God (133).
The implications of such a theology of history for the relationship of Israel's
Heilsgeschichte to other histories is obvious, some of which Pannenberg himself
begins to touch on in the above quote. Heilsgeschichte is now expanded to include
all other histories, or simply collapsed into all (universal?) history. In consequence,
God is perceived to be at work in other histories directing them to their finality in
Christ just as he was in the history of Israel. In other words, the life-event of Jesus
has revealed, and thus transformed, all history into Heilsgeschichte. As it were, God
has been active in all histories directing them to, hence their convergence in, the
person of Jesus Christ, the end of history.
This demands the question ofwhat then would be the purpose or even uniqueness
of Israel's history, for in a sense, even though biblical history provides a pre-history
to Christ the definitive end of history, on account of that very end, it is superseded
(or transcended) by eschatological history. I think the only logical answer is that the
Heilsgeschichte of Israel is paradigmatic rather than exclusive. Paradigmatic in
showing that we could view ethnic histories as arenas ofHeilsgeschichte in similar
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ways to Israel's history. In other words, what we perceive to have transpired in the
history of Israel as reflected in the Old Testament, i.e., the Heilsgeschichte of Israel
(which is fulfilled in Christ as reflected in the New Testament), we could perceive
precisely on account of Israel's Heilsgeschichte, to have occurred (or to be
occurring), in varying degrees, in histories of other peoples as well.
So, in different ways these theologians perceive God to be involved with other
histories in addition to the Heilsgeschichte of Israel. Whereas all of them at different
points on the spectrum of those who see God involved in history outside Israel's
espouse an important facet of the reasons for perceiving God to be at work in other
histories, it is Pannenberg's espousal that is most consistent and comprehensive.
Therefore, this study will assume and proceed from his position.
Ifwe may conclude this section then by recapitulating the contours of our
argument, it is hard to envisage a Heilsgeschichte that is cut off from other histories
on two highly significant counts elaborated by Pannenberg. The first is with the
universality inherent in the Heilsgeschichte of Israel that God is Lord of all and not
just a localized deity of Israel, a conviction which necessitates a view of his
involvement with other histories. The second is with Heilsgeschichte's
eschatological claims of God's absolute revelation to all in Jesus Christ, and, we may
add, his redemption of all peoples (and not just of Israel). What is more, this
eschatological claim stretches back to the beginning with the creation. Such a claim
precipitates a re-reading of other histories as products and manifestations of God's
active involvement with them, and also the very re-reading of Israel's history as not
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the exclusive arena of God's active involvement in histories of human societies and
cultures. In the end, eschatological history as the pinnacle of Israel's Heilsgeschichte
transcends it, thrusting it into a paradigmatic role. It would seem possible to
understand that such a theology of history was operative in the logos-theologies of
Justin, Irenaeus, and Clement. They understood with consistency, but in various
ways,34 that God had been at work through his Word revealing himself right from the
creation, and had definitively revealed himself in the incarnation of the very Word.
Thus the incarnation was not viewed as discontinuous with everything that had gone
before, but part of divine activity in history. This enabled them to approach Greek
philosophy positively but at the same time critically; the truth found in, and the best
of, Greek philosophy was indeed revealed by that Word. In consequence, Greek
philosophy was taken as containing partial revelations whose fullness was found or
realized in Christ, and was a praeparatio for the reception of Christ; it had now to
give way to Christ.35 However, theirs was not so much a theological interpretation of
what would become the New Testament36 but rather a relating of their perception of
Christ and the working of God to Greek heritage. Indeed our theology of history so
far has not provided a typological theological interpretation of the New Testament,
but only its basis. We now turn to the typology-based theological interpretation that
it provides for the New Testament.
34 To borrow from Dupuis (2001, 70), 'logos-spermatikos in Justin, Logos-emphutos in Irenaeus and
Logos-propetrikos in Clement'. For more on these theologies in relation to the workings of God in
history, see Dupuis (2001,53-77), Danielou (1973, 39-74, 345-74) and especially Chadwick (1966,
1-65) and Holte (1958).
351 have drawn our attention to these theologies from early Christian theologians due to their
proximity to the apostolic Church, to show that from the outset, i.e., right from the inception of
Christianity, Heilsgeschichte was widened to include other histories on the convictions enumerated.
36 'Not so much' is an important phrase because, as pointed out by Chadwick (1965), Justin's Second
Apology, for instance, 'may be taken as a commentary on Romans i-ii and Acts xvii' (295).
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3.2.3. Typology-based Interpretations of the New Testament
Within the framework of the theology of history argued for above, the key to
typology-based theological interpretations of the New Testament, as we argue below,
is in correspondences between the original context in which a New Testament text
was written or heard (we will refer to this as simply the 'initial context' from here
on), and a contemporary context in which it is being read or heard ('contemporary
context' from here on). The emergence ofContexualism has brought to the fore the
point that a text's context plays a significant role in determining the meaning ascribed
to it. This is of cardinal importance to typology-based theological interpretations of
the New Testament. Certainly, the context of a biblical text is itself subject to a
variety of differentiation, ranging, for example, from concerns, questions, interests
and reading habits of the context to the experiences, perspectives, conceptions,
knowledge, history, culture, and religious consciousness of the same. Furthermore
any aspect highlighted in characterizing or even defining a context can be variously
differentiated, multiplied and nuanced. Further still is the fact that just how much the
context of a text determines its meaning is up for grabs.37 Our interest here is not to
argue for any shade of contextualism, but, simply, to point out that the context of a
text plays an integral part in determining its meaning, and not least in typology-based
theological interpretations of the New Testament, thereby making it a necessary
object of critical investigation and interpretation. What follows should make more
clear exactly what part contexts play in achieving typology-based theological
interpretations of the New Testament.
37 See Goldstein and Machor (2001) for a recent survey of the discussions.
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As it happens, if the initial context of a New Testament text - whose genre is
typology (i.e., the New Testament text is a typological interpretation of a portion of
38
the Old Testament [see below for more])' - has similarities with a given
contemporary context, then, mutatis mutandis, its meaning can be transferred
directly from its initial context into its contemporary one. This is because the
similarities in the initial and contemporary contexts of a New Testament's text
eliminate considerably its message's cultural and historical distance, with the result
that what can be determined to have been heard by the text's initial audience is, with
few necessary qualifications, the same message being heard (hence transferred) by
the text's contemporary audience.
We could illustrate this, again, by the use of Hebrews. Supposing that the initial
context of Hebrews was one replete with mediators in its religious cosmology (in this
case, angels, Moses, and high priests), we could say that the meaning of Hebrews'
Christology to this context is that Jesus is the definitive mediator, who, therefore,
surpasses Moses, Angels and High Priests. In a contemporary context of Hebrews,
say, Africa, which is replete with ancestors as key mediators in its religious
cosmology, we could transfer this Christology of Hebrews from its initial context
directly onto it, so that Jesus too is understood in Africa as the definitive mediator
but, now, surpassing ancestors. As can be seen, it is precisely because of the
similarities in the two contexts of Hebrews, i.e., the presence of mediators in both,
that its meaning to its 1st century audience is readily comprehensible to its
contemporary audience in Africa.
38 Since the texts in view here are typological in nature, their initial context should be taken, in part, to
be provided for by an audience which either shared in Israel's history or was familiar with it.
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The case for direct transference ofmeanings from initial to contemporary contexts
ofNew Testament typological texts does not lie solely in similarity of contexts but,
crucially, is also grounded and reinforced in the conviction that God works in all
history (which is, incidentally, illustrated in the similarity of contexts). And herein
lies my thesis: 1. if God has been involved with the Heilsgeschichte of Israel in a
way that is recognized and, subsequently, interpreted in the New Testament to
prefigure Christ, and, 2. if this involvement is perceived to have similarities with a
particular aspect of the religious heritage of another group of people who are part of
a contemporary context of the given New Testament text, then 3. this aspect of the
religious heritage of this group of people can be interpreted to prefigure Christ in the
same manner as the identified part in Israel's history is interpreted to prefigure him
by the New Testament text.
The basis for this thesis lies in the convictions of the theology of history delineated
above, i.e., if God is involved with histories other than Israel's, then they too should
be understood and interpreted in the same ways as the history of Israel is by the New
Testament. It is this conviction that leads to the conclusion that, where similarities
exist between Israel's religious heritage and that of another group of people, it is the
same God who has been at work in the two histories, and, for the same purposes. So
going back to Hebrews, if angels, Moses and high priests are interpreted therein to
prefigure Christ, ancestors too are then interpreted to prefigure him as well on
account of their similarity as mediatorial figures to angels, Moses and high priests,
and on account of the conviction that it is the same God at work in the two traditions.
Consequently, New Testament texts that are typological interpretations of the Old
in
Testament are used to interpret typologically similar aspects of other histories in the
same manner that they interpret Israel's Heilsgeschichte. The result of such an
interpretation is that we have aspects of the religious heritage of people which, when
interpreted by New Testament typological texts, are interpreted as types of Christ.
Coming to the concerns of theological interpretations, what this means is that
similarity of initial and contemporary contexts, or at least similarity of aspects in
both contexts, viewed through the aforementioned theology of history, eliminates
considerably the problem of historical distance and enables a direct transfer of the
historical meaning to be made from the initial audience to the contemporary one. It
is this biblical interpretation, characterized by the direct transfer of a New Testament
typological text's historical meaning, from its initial context into a contemporary
Christian context, on the basis that the similarities in these contexts are there because
God is at work in all history, that we are calling typology-based theological
interpretations of the New Testament.
As alluded to previously, we then have a theological interpretation that is genre
and context specific. That is, we have a model of theological interpretation that can
be used to read, not all, but only certain New Testament texts depending on their
genre and in which context those texts are heard or read. Going by Wellek and
Waren's (1962, in De Bruyn 1993, 81) criteria of'outer form' (having to do with
meter or structure) and 'inner form' (attitude, tone, purpose and the like) for
determining genre, the New Testament genres that would offer the possibility to be
1 12
theologically interpreted thus would be those whose inner form"9 includes a
typological interpretation of the Old Testament. This would be the case for it is only
such texts that would have an interpretation of a 'type' in Israel's Heilsgeschichte
thereby offering the possibility of comparisons, later, with a parallel aspect (a 'type')
existing in a contemporary context of the text. Without such a comparison, a direct
transfer of a text's historical meaning onto a contemporary audience would be
impossible. Conversely, the contemporary context of the New Testament typological
text would have to have certain aspects ('types') that are similar to the 'type' of the
Old Testament being interpreted as such in the New Testament text; otherwise
transference ofmeaning would be nullified. The similarity would not have to be a
carbon copy, but would have to be significant enough to warrant seeing a
correspondence. For these reasons, investigating and interpreting, on the one hand,
the 'type' in Israel's history as would have been understood by the initial context of a
given New Testament typological text, and doing the same, on the other hand, with a
similar 'type' in the religious heritage of a contemporary context of the same text,
would be an integral hermeneutical procedure in typology-based theological
interpretations of the New Testament.
In view ofwhat we have just argued, I propose that typology-based theological
interpretation is best suited for the theological interpretation of Hebrews and,
particularly, its Christology in Africa. This is because the set of criteria for
typology-based theological interpretations with regards to genre and context as just
outlined, are met, respectively, in Hebrews and in its contemporary context in Africa.
Specifically: 1. as alluded to above, and will be shown in detail later, Hebrews' genre
,9 The 'outer form' is not critical for determining the genre we have in mind here.
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is typological; it is in large measure a typological interpretation of aspects of Israel's
Heilsgeschichte or religious heritage as portrayed in the Old Testament; and 2. as 1
shall argue later, an aspect of Africa's religious heritage can be shown to mirror the
types of Israel's religious heritage as found in Hebrews' initial context. If this indeed
is the case, then, in keeping with typology-based theological interpretations as argued
above, the meaning of Hebrews' Christology for its initial context can be transferred
directly to its contemporary context in Africa. More precisely, it would then follow,
as I shall argue in my theological interpretation (kicked off by my historical-
rhetorical study of Hebrews), that the signification of Jesus, for the original hearers
of Hebrews, as a definitive mediator, greater than those who had been there before
him, and, in consequence, superseding them and calling the audience of Hebrews to
faith and loyalty to him as the definitive and, in this eschatological aeon, the only
mediator, would be the same signification of Christ according to Hebrews in
contemporary Africa's Christian communities. Only that in this case, the mediators
in question would be ancestors and not angels, Moses, or the high priest.40 So, the
first procedure in our proposed typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews
in Africa is to present the case for Hebrews as containing typological interpretations
of the Old Testament, to probe the types being interpreted in Hebrews as would have
been understood in its initial context, and then to compare this with the aspect in
Africa's religious heritage which, I contend, mirrors them. We will begin this task in
our fourth chapter.
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JESUS, MEDIATOR PAR EXCELLENCE: HEBREWS' CHRISTOLOGY
We are concerned in this chapter with the Christology of Hebrews which we shall
begin, in the following chapter, to seek to re-interpret in an African setting. However,
an overview of the book is required before we can specifically look at its Christology,
since its Christology is both an aspect and an integral part of its content. By this I mean
that the Christology of Hebrews, as a part of its content, is related inextricably to the
rest of its content and, therefore, can only be understood properly within the overall
content of the book rather than in isolation. An overview of the book preceding an
examination of its Christology would thus serve to clarify that Christology. Normally,
it would be reasonable to expect that if a New Testament scholar looks at any New
Testament text, he would do so through a full historical-critical reading; but we shall not
do so in this thesis. It is necessary, therefore, in looking at Hebrews to begin by
explaining why we are not going to do precisely that and, at the same time, argue for the
suitability of the alternative approach we choose in the place of a comprehensive
historical-critical reading.
4.1 READING HEBREWS
4.11 Problems ofHistorical-Critical Readings ofHebrews
When it comes to its historical context, Hebrews is shrouded in mystery: who wrote
the book and when, to whom it was addressed, where these addressees were, what are
its sources and tradition, and its Sitz iin Leben are still unknown. This state of affairs is
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witnessed from the earliest of times in church history where the inclusion of Hebrews
among the Pauline corpus was not without qualification, nor was its acceptance in the
canon without dispute (Metzger 1987, 191-206). In the end the tradition prevailed that
Hebrews was written by Paul to some Jews to counter the threat of their falling back to
Judaism.
The rise of historical criticism in the systematic study of the New Testament from the
1700s onwards, challenged the tradition on Hebrews' historical context and revived the
problem of reading Hebrews. By no mere coincidence E.M. Roeth in 1636 (in Manson
1951, 16) argued for a Gentile readership of the letter, marking the beginning of a
plethora of proposals on the historical context of Hebrews that still pervades scholarship
on Hebrews. The discovery of the Qumran scrolls in the middle of the last century
raised the prospect of reading Hebrews by way of historical criticism, leading to a
renewed interest in the book. Yadin (1959) set it offwith the thesis that 'the addressees
of the Epistle must have been a group of Jews originally belonging to the Dead Sea Sect
who were converted to Christianity carrying with them some of their previous beliefs'
(38). However, the scrolls have so far not offered any solution to the problem of
reading Hebrews but rather fostered various reconstructions of its historical background
that on the whole have tended to be more detailed than the previous ones. It appears that
the achievement of historical criticism on Hebrews has been limited to the
establishment of three things (at least beyond considerable doubt): 1. the almost
universal acknowledgement that Paul was not the author of Hebrews; 2. that Hebrews
genre is ambiguous, i.e., it seems to be both a sermon and a letter; and 3. that the author
1 Some Hebrews scholars contend that this has jeopardized the task of reading Hebrews. Hurst (1990), as
one of them, aptly writes 'the interpretation ofHebrews is in disarray because scholarly opinion vacillates
from background to background as each new publication appears' (2).
2 For more on the effect ofQumran studies on Hebrews scholarship, see Buchanan (1975, 1, 308-313) and
McCullough (1981, 32-35).
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was responding to a crisis (whose nature is highly contested). Beyond this, scholarship
on the background of Hebrews has not in any qualitative way superseded that of the
second century (we are still as uncertain of it as they were), making the problem of
reading Hebrews its most enduring characteristic.
Why precisely has this problem persisted? The problem of the historical context in
reading Hebrews is forced upon the reader by the paradox of a rich book matched with
incomparably thin external and indeterminate internal evidence for its historical setting,
the result ofwhich is a multiplicity of proposals put forward by Hebrews scholars. We
have two main competing views on its historical situation, which are both related to its
original audience.3 In the first, scholars of Hebrews view it to have been written to
Christian Jews in Jerusalem faced with the threat of falling back to Judaism. Recent
scholars who hold this view, with some differences in the details, are Buchanan (1972),
Bruce (1990), and Ellingworth (1993). They put forward a number of reasons to
support their view. For Bruce, the writer's 'insistence that the last covenant was
antiquated ... is driven home repeatedly in a manner which would be pointless if his
readers were not specially disposed to live under that covenant' (xxvi). This manner to
him includes the bulk of the argument being conducted against 'a background ofOld
Testament allusions' (5), and an intimacy with Levitical ritual. Also, the 'foundation'
(OepeAiov) mentioned in 6. Iff and the description ofChrist's 'death' (Bavcxxou) in 9.15,
Bruce notes, 'implies the Jewish antecedents of the readers' (6) because they (Heb. 9.15
in particular) refer to 'redemption of the transgressions that were under the first
covenant' (Ibid.). While Ellingworth (1993) cites the expectations of the author that his
readers 'be thoroughly acquainted with Old Testament persons, institutions (especially
3 This is primarily because decisions on other components of Hebrews' historical context (such as
destination, date of writing, and even authorship) not only hinge on the decision taken on the original
readers but are also made to correlate with it.
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cultic institutions, e.g. 9.1-10) and texts and Mosaic law' (23), the author's use of
rabbinic procedures in his arguments, and the presupposition of 7.1 Iff that the Levitical
priesthood was God ordained even though now superseded by Christ. Accordingly, the
central purpose of Hebrews is perceived as an attempt to pre-empt a falling back to
Judaism through severe warnings of the consequences of such an action and a forceful
argument that shows the superiority of Christ over Old Testament figures and cultus,
and of his finality.
In the second, scholars of Hebrews such as Scott (1922), Moffat (1924), Attridge
(1989) and Lane (1991) among others, contra the first view, view Hebrews to have been
written to either a mixed ethnic audience or to a predominantly Gentile one. For Scott,
the reasons are because Hebrews' use of the Old Testament, and its confinement therein
to 'Levitical ordinance' (16) does not signify a Jewish readership, since the Old
Testament was an authority both in the church and the synagogue, and any section in it
was as much a part of scripture as any other. He adds weight to his position by calling
attention to the use of the Old Testament in a similar manner by Apologists in the
second century. Moreover, he argues that apostasy to Judaism was not a concern of the
author because the epistle has no word about it. Its concern is with the mythical
tabernacle and not the Temple: if a slide into to Judaism was a concern, the writer
should at least have fixed his attention on the Torah, fidelity to it being a characteristic
of first-century Judaism. On his part, Attridge (1989) especially emphasizes that the
danger the readership was facing was a moral one, brought about by external and
internal factors, and not by apostasy to Judaism, that threatened their initial commitment
to Christ. In any case, he argues, the 'falling away' (Traparteoovxaq, 6.6) from God
could not be understood to mean turning back to Judaism, since Judaism could not be
equated to unbelief, or to paganism. Hebrews, then, is read as a document set to
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encourage Christians waning in zeal and succumbing to persecution. The writer is seen
to do this through warnings and exhortations (paraenesis), and through an argument
(thesis) hammered out of scripture intended to deepen his audience's understanding of
the faith. The thesis of Hebrews is meant to serve its paraenetic aims; its substance
should not be construed as having been determined by any of the circumstances of the
original readers.
As mentioned, the reasons behind this problem have been the paucity of external and
indeterminate internal evidence, which have rendered the arrival at any conclusive
historical background to the book impossible. This results in historical-critical readings
of Hebrews (limited as they are by the very methodology of the approach) that are, in
practice, exercises in 'conjectural criticism',4 where the reading depends on the
background presupposed by the reader. A hermeneutical inconsistency is then created;
that is, we have a reading of Hebrews that has the hermeneutical aims of historical
criticism5 as its point of departure but diverts from them by presupposing a historical
context that is inevitably conjectural because of the lack of sufficient historical data.
Such a situation makes the case for an alternative critical reading of Hebrews, one that
does not depend directly on a precise historical context to assign the book to in order to
make sense of it, but at the same time honours the fact that the book is a result of
concrete historical contingencies. Of course, it is a complex matter to have a critical
reading that apparently proceeds differently from historical criticism but, yet again,
upholds the historical contingencies of a text (at the least that the text is a historical
4 Delobel (1994) in an article concerned with textual criticism coins this term to mean a textual correction
not based on the original text (which is no longer available) but 'inspired by exegetical concerns for a
meaningful text' (112). It seems appropriate here to borrow it from him since the assumed historical
background ofHebrews by historical critical scholars is not based on clear historical data available but is
conjectural and inspired by exegetical concerns.
5
Namely that a text's meaning should be made sense ofby means of its background, i.e., its historical
context - author, audience, Sitz im Leben etc.
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document addressing real people in real particular circumstances). But this, for the sake
of theological interpretations of the Bible, is extremely important since - in line with
arguments we set out in the last chapter - theological interpretations of the Bible must of
necessity reckon with the historical contingencies of the biblical texts being interpreted
if they are to pass muster as theological interpretations of the same. For our purposes, if
we could be more specific, to have an alternative reading of Hebrews that would do
away entirely with its concrete historical circumstances would not be in the interests of
a typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews in Africa since the theology of
typology is anchored in the view that God is at work in history; a view that would be
negated by an alternative reading that ignores history. To this alternative critical
reading we turn now.
4.1.2. A Rhetorical-CriticalReading ofHebrews
Hebrews has impressed itself on its critics as a rhetorical discourse.6 This has meant
that it is perceived as persuasive discourse, geared to provoke action and to do this
beyond its initial audience and context. As such, attempts have been made to read the
book via rhetoric.7 In principle, the critical reading of a text rhetorically is in part
carried out by detennining its effects on its audience; in part, too, by examining the
strategies (inventio), such as discursive techniques, argument structures, use of
evidence, treatment of subject, control of emotion etc., that a rhetor marshals to create
those effects; and, not least of all, by considering the exigencies that occasion a text's
emergence in the first place. The amalgam of these three components of rhetoric, but
especially, if not primarily, exigence, is at times known as the 'rhetorical situation'8 of a
6
See, for example, Attridge (1989), Black II (1988) and Buchanan (1972).
7
For a comprehensive bibliography see Hauser and Watson (1994) and, also, Watson (1997).
8 This concept in rhetorical scholarship was brought to prominence by Bitzer (1968) and has been judged
as an attempt to 'bring a renewed sense of order into our understanding of the nature, purpose, and
function of rhetoric' (Patton 1979, 38).
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text. It is this rhetorical situation that allows the rhetorical critic to make sense of a
given text. Three observations concerning the rhetorical situation should especially be
noted here.9 The first is that, unlike concrete historical situations of a text, rhetorical
situations are not limited to their immediate or first audience in determining the effects
of a text's rhetoric, since the text's rhetoric is understood to outlive its initial speaker and
listener context. Olbrechts-Perelman and Tyteca (1969, 30-45) seem to have been the
first to present an understanding of rhetoric that was not tied to an empirical audience of
the rhetoric when they proposed that the concept of'universal' and 'particular' audiences
are both constructs of the rhetor. A particular audience (not to be confused with the real
empirical audience) consists of the audience of a piece of rhetoric when the rhetoric
appeals to such an audience on account of the audience's historical circumstances; while
a universal audience is composed potentially of all humanity, irrespective of
geographical and historical circumstances, since rhetoric contains elements that have
universal appeal irrespective of audience's particularities. Olbrechts-Tyteca and
Perelman point at rationality as one such element because they understand it to be an
intrinsic quality of all human beings.10
The second observation is that the rhetorical situation is not limited to Greco-Roman
rhetoric in the analysis of its inventio. In other words, other communication theories of
rhetoric not addressed by Greco-Roman rhetorical theory can be employed to illumine
the way a text works to produce the effects it is thought to bring about.11 As a
'
Bitzer's (1968) contribution does not embrace the three observations we bring to attention since he
seems to have limited rhetorical situations to the initial exigence (both in terms of causing the rhetoric,
and the situation that the rhetoric aims to change) of any piece of rhetoric (6). But his position was
challenged (see Amador [1999b, 28-3] for a brief survey of the debate), and the concept of rhetorical
situations broadened beyond the descriptive and causalist.
10 See Gross (1999) for a recent clarification of their contribution. Also see Wuellner (1987, 455-6), who
points out that rhetorical contexts (audiences) should not be confused with historical audiences even when
apparently identical because the way they are arrived at is fundamentally different.
" See Wuellner (1995, 920-22), Brodkey and Cooper (1993), Eagleton (1983, 205-206), and especially
Olbrechts-Tyteca and Perelman (1969, 163-7) who are viewed as instrumental in refocusing rhetoric
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consequence of such an understanding, rhetorical criticism includes, but is not tied to, a
historically-based rhetorical criticism which, as Stamps (1995) points out, is 'interested
in reconstructing the rhetorical form and function of the biblical text in its historically
reconstructed situation' (136). This means that 'the text is analyzed as a piece of ancient
Hellenistic rhetoric according to the historical-rhetorical categories gleaned from
ancient rhetorical handbooks and ancient rhetorical compositions' (ibid.), to which, we
are pointing out, rhetorical criticism is not limited when looking at a text.
The third observation is that the rhetorical situation is not limited to the rhetoric's
immediate historical situation in determining its exigence, for the rhetoric of a text can
generate its own exigence or find later situations that respond to the rhetoric. Amador's
(1999b, 209-10) summary explicating this is worth quoting here:
...while it is an important part of the study of rhetoric to consider the
intentionalities and (reconstructed) effects of the argumentative discourse at the
time of its original utterance and in the context of its immediate audience, this
focus is only one part of a larger spectrum of the function of the "text" as
argumentation in time and through space. An approach to the Bible as
argumentation must also confront the multiplicities of intentionalities (implied
author, implied audience, actual audience, critics and so on) and the text's
materiality as an act confronted every time the Bible is picked up and read,
performed, depicted. Argumentation does not cease to be relevant once the
original rhetorical situation has decayed, nor does its impact thereupon cease. An
argumentation theory approach to the text can just as legitimately function to
ponder the resonating "contexts" that are generated by and through argument, as
well as the continuing argumentative use of the biblical texts and traditions in
other argument-acts (209-10).
away from the legacy and dominance of Aristotelian precepts towards concrete argumentation and
persuasion (Gilbert 1997, 5-8). The legacy and dominance of Aristotelian precepts on effective
communication (especially in his classification of rhetorical genres into the 'forensic', 'epideictic', and
'deliberative') is well known. But this, as brought out by Nelson et al (1987, 5-6) should not blind us to
other perspectives on rhetoric in the ancient and classical period.
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As a result, rhetorical situations of a text are not limited to a text's initial effects,
exigence and inventio but transcend the historical situation of a text. With this in mind,
beginning with Hebrews' inventio, I will utilize these three components as the foci of the
rhetorical inquiry and analyses of Hebrews, thus reading it rhetorically.12
The identification of a text's rhetorical genre is critical in helping the rhetorical critic
to understand and unlock its inventio, since rhetorical analysis presumes that rhetoric
follows the logic of its genre (Meynet 1998, 169-172). Several rhetorical genres have
13been proposed in relation to the genre of Hebrews. Of these, the most compelling is
synkrisis, for it can be said to characterize the whole of Hebrews. Zuntz (1953) was the
first to draw attention to the recurrence of synkrisis in Hebrews when he wrote:
... one of the reasons, with me, for regarding Hebrews as originally a homily is
the excessive use which it makes of the rhetorical method of synkrisis. This is a
traditional device of encomiastic Greek and Latin rhetoric: the person or object, to
be praised is placed beside outstanding specimens of a comparable kind and his or
its superiority ('uTtepoxfi') urged ...And so does Hebrews, in contrasting Jesus,
and his Church, with angels, Moses, Melchizedeck, high-priests, the synagogue,
the heroes of faith, &c. (286).
12
This way of approaching and understanding Hebrews' rhetoric may seem at odds with Kennedy's
'watershed manual in New Testament rhetorical criticism' (Stamps 1995, 133). His methodology offers
four carefully defined stages in rhetorical criticism of a text (Kennedy 1984, 33- 38): The 'rhetorical unit'
constitutes a whole in the discourse, having a beginning, a middle and an end; the 'rhetorical situation', the
'conditions that invite utterance' (34); the 'rhetorical problem', the over-riding problem; and the
'arrangement of the material in the text' which includes sub-divisions and their persuasive effects, and
how they work together. At the end of the fourth stage, the critic is expected to review what he has come
up with and judge whether the unit succeeds in meeting the exigence and whether his analysis is
'consistent with the overall impact of the rhetorical unit' (38). What should be borne in mind is that
whichever rhetorical methodology one chooses, one will, ultimately, be dealing - wholly or partly and in
all sorts of interrelations - with the three components that we identified (thanks to Bitzer) as constituting a
rhetorical situation and this applies to Kennedy's methodology as well. So, for example, in his model, the
'rhetorical unit' would be part of the inventio; the 'rhetorical situation' would be part of the exigence etc.
Bitzer deserves credit for offering a broad framework of reading texts rhetorically rather than providing a
highly defined methodology. Unfortunately, as well noted by Amador (1999a, 30), Bitzer's contribution
to rhetorical criticism and the debate thereof has not appeared at all in the discourse of biblical rhetorical
criticism.
13 Such as 'paranomosia' (Jobes 1992), 'amplification' (Olbricht 1993), and 'homily' (Attridge 1990), or, in
the case of Koester (2002, 106), Hebrews as a whole is seen as a standard form of a classical rhetorical
speech consisting of an introduction (exordium), a statement of the case (narratio), supporting arguments
(confirmatio), and a conclusion (conclusio).
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Building on Zuntz, Evans (1988) elaborates that synkrisis was a Greek rhetorical term
for comparison that was to be found in Hellenistic rhetoric's encomiastic tradition. Its
'speciality was that it arrived at praise or blame by means of a comparison' (5-6). The
comparison could be of opposites or of similar things with the intention of finding out,
by demonstrating, which was the superior. He points out that Hebrews' vocabulary and
style (for example, its twenty-seven instances of the comparative, and its series of
antithetical statements serving to show the superiority of one over another that are
introduced by pev and 8e ['on the one hand ... and on the other']) show that the theme
of superiority by comparison orders its argument. It is also important to note here that
typology is embedded in Hebrews' synkrisis so that, it could be said, typology orders the
argument of Hebrews. To this point we must return later since our theological
interpretation of Hebrews is based ultimately on typology. For the moment we pursue
the rhetorical structure of Hebrews using synkrisis as detailed by Seid (1999, 326)
(326):
Angels (1.1-2.18): Synkrisis of Son and Angels (1.1-14)
Paraenesis (2.1-18)
Moses (3.1-4.16): Synkrisis of Moses and Christ the Son (3.1-6)
Paraenesis (3.7-4.16)
Aaron (5.1-6.20): Synkrisis of Aaron and Christ (5.1-10)
Paraenesis (5.11-6.20)
Melchizedek (7.1-8.3): Synkrisis of Melchizedek/Christ and Levitical
Priesthood (7.1-25)
Paraenesis (7.26-8.3)




We will use this structure to consider briefly Hebrews' subject matter, first with
respect to the synkrisis sections, and, later, with respect to the paraenesis section when
we attempt to determine the exigence and effects of Hebrews.
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4.1.3. Hebrews' Rhetoric
The rhetor (Hebrews' writer) introduces Jesus as the Son of God through whom he
has spoken in 'these last days' (en' eo%dcrov xcov fipepoov, Heb. 1.1-2). As God's Son,
the world was created through him, and he was appointed heir (KATipogovov) of all
things. He then turns his attention to angels from Hebrews 1.4ff to show that although
they are both mediators Jesus is superior to angels because he is God's Son, who
temporarily became a human being, while they are ministering spirits. The seven
scriptural quotations (Heb. 1.5-1.14) underscore this superiority on the basis of his
divinity, while Hebrews 2.5ff underscores this on the basis of the results of his
incarnation (more on this later).14 Synkrisis with Moses comes next in chapter 3 where
the rhetor shows that although they were both faithful (jugtov) to the one who
appointed them, Jesus is superior for, unlike Moses who is faithful as a servant
(Gepdneov) in the house of God, Jesus is faithful as a Son (moq) over his house.
Next is the synkrisis with Aaron the high priest. Even though both are called by God
(Heb. 5.4), Jesus is superior because he is a high priest according to the order of
Melchizedek (Korea xf|v xa^iv MeA^ioebeK), as expounded in Hebrews 7.1-28. This
priesthood is permanent and precedes that of Aaron. In addition, Jesus' priesthood is
superior by virtue of the efficacy of his sacrifice; hence its once-for-all (etjtdrcal;) status
that does away with the need for further sacrifices. The comparison with the Aaronic
priesthood leads the rhetor to compare the new covenant, which Jesus mediates, and the
old covenant (Heb. 8.1 -10.18). The comparison, which draws out the superiority of the
new covenant, is focused on the place of worship (the tabernacle) and the main activity
therein (sacrifice). The old covenant had an earthly tabernacle which was a copy and
14 What this means is that Hebrews 2.1-18 contains a paraenetic section (2.1-4) and a synkrisis as well.
This is not quite identified in Seid's (see above) rhetorical structure that we are using for an overview of
Hebrews' rhetoric.
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shadow of the heavenly one (Heb. 8.5). Sacrifices of the goats, bulls and other animals
offered there were not able to take away sin (Heb. 4.4), hence the need to offer
sacrifices again and again (Heb. 9.9). In contrast, the new covenant has Jesus who, as
its high priest, entered the heavenly tabernacle with his own blood, which effectively
took away all sin for all time (Heb. 10). Consequently not only is the new covenant
superior to the old one, it replaces it as well (Heb. 10.15-18).
We may now consider the subject matter of the paraenesis from which we acquire,
subsequently (against the background of the synkrisis) the exigence and effects of
Hebrews. The first paraenetic section (Heb. 2.1 -4) comes after the demonstration that
Jesus is superior to the angels. It is a warning to the audience not to slip away
(mpapucopev) from the word of Jesus, for such an action would carry a greater penalty
than the one given those who disobeyed the message spoken to them by angels. We
again encounter in the second section (Heb. 3.7-4.16) another warning from the rhetor
just after the synkrisis of Jesus with Moses: 'See to it brothers, that there is not in any of
you a wicked (icovripa), unbelieving (ootiotkx^) heart that turns away (arcoarnvai) from
the living God' (Heb. 3.12). This warning is dwelt on by a lesson from the generation
that Moses led, which failed to enter God's rest because of unbelief (Heb. 3.16-4.5). In
the third paraenetic section (Heb. 5.11-6.20), the rhetor bemoans his audience's
slowness of learning (Heb. 5.11-7) which prevents him from explaining more of his
theme of Jesus as a high priest in the order ofMelchizedek. He then warns them again
of the dangers of falling away (Heb. 6.4-7) and of laxity, before exhorting them to be
imitators of those, who through faith and perseverance (paKpoOupiaq), inherit what has
been promised' (Heb. 6.12). Most of the last paraenetic section (Heb. 10.19-12.29) is a
reiteration of what the rhetor has previously said: in his exhorting them, for example, to
hold fast (Kare^opev) to their hope (Heb. 10.23); to watch out against sin (Heb. 10.26-
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31); to persevere in their previous confidence (Heb. 10.35-39) and to endure struggles
that are occasioned by their faith (Heb. 12.2-14); and not to turn away from God (Heb.
12.25-27). However, he now shows a concern for worship (he tells his audience to
draw near to God in assurance of sins forgiven [Heb. 10.19-22] and with reverence and
awe [Heb. 12.29]), and for his audience's ecclesial life when he gives them general
pastoral advice (Heb. 12.12-17). Pastoral advice also predominates in the 'epistolary
appendix'.
From these we could conclude that the exigence that spawns the rhetoric of Hebrews
is that of a Christian community in imminent danger of drifting away from God through
a combination of disobedience/sin and a crisis of confidence in their faith. Thus the
rhetor seeks to pre-empt this by numerous warnings of the consequences of such an
action, by motivation through examples, by reminding them of their past ways etc. The
desired effects of Hebrews on its audience are to motivate them to obedience, faith and
perseverance, the kind they had before this crisis (Heb. 10.32-35). The synkrisis in
Hebrews, in keeping with the general aim of the rhetorical genre it belongs to, functions
to help the audience see the superiority of Jesus (we will argue as a mediator) over
angels, Moses, the Aaronic priesthood and its cultus. The rhetor then, in his paraenesis,
uses this established superiority to motivate the community of faith to right action (in
this case to obedience, faith and worship, and perseverance).
One may question here the validity of such a rhetorical reading as an alternative to a
historical-critical reading, since this overview of Hebrews' message may be arrived at
through historical criticism. The difference is that rhetorical inquiry arrives at such an
overview via the rhetoric of the text and not through critically ascertained history to the
background of Hebrews, which, as mentioned, is inconclusive. This, then, means that
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the problems encountered in historical-critical readings of Hebrews are avoided while
allowing the text to be made sense of in a way that does not do away with its historical
contingencies. The import of this deserves further elucidation.
We mentioned that the inventio, exigence and effects of a work are not limited to its
historical situation. There is a sense in which, as shown by Olbricht (1999,108-124 ),
Watson (1999, 125-151), Meynet (1998, 337-350) and others, historical criticism
makes, or can make, use of the insights of rhetorical criticism in order to confirm, or
reject, its conjectures. When this happens, the historical contingencies of the text are
arrived at via its rhetoric. Indeed, going by the literature available (Hauser and Watson
1994), the predominant form of rhetorical criticism is in the service of historical
criticism in this precise way (though this is only useful in cases of lack of precise
information on the contexts of biblical texts). When rhetorical criticism is used by
historical criticism in this way, then, in seeking effects of a text (to recall section 3.12),
the initial recipients of the rhetoric will be the rhetorical critic's chiefobject of attention;
in seeking the inventio of a biblical text, rhetorical critics will seek to reconstruct and
understand the genres that may have been available at the time of the rhetoric; and in
seeking the exigence of a biblical rhetoric, the modern rhetorical critic will limit his
reconstruction to its initial or first exigence. This, precisely, is what we have done in
our rhetorical criticism of Hebrews as seen, especially, in our choice ofsynkrisis as the
rhetorical genre to unlock Hebrews' rhetoric. (As noted, this rhetorical device would
have been available at the time of Hebrews' rhetoric as a piece of ancient Hellenistic
rhetoric.) What this means is that our rhetorical criticism of Hebrews takes its historical
circumstances seriously, albeit arrived at rhetorically. Thus, our rhetorical criticism of
Hebrews serves the interests of a theological interpretations of the Bible, not least en
route to a typology-based theological interpretation of the Bible in Africa.
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With this overview on Hebrews given via a rhetorical reading of Hebrews, we may
now consider its Christology. Any attempt to comprehend the Christology of the book
must of necessity also understand the figures with whom Jesus is compared and
contrasted, and to whom he is shown to be superior. The understanding of those figures
is key to establishing the Christology of Hebrews because it provides the religio-
historical context to comprehend the same. But this should not be divorced from the
workings of typology. As mentioned already, typology is embedded in Hebrews'
synkrisis, so much so that, it could be said, typology orders the argument ofHebrews.
In this respect, it will be seen that these figures to whom Jesus is compared and
contrasted in Hebrews are types of Christ. And in each case, one or the other
characteristic, or working, of typology is operative. So, we may say, there is synkrisis,
and, with it, typology, with the result that to understand the figures with whom Jesus is
compared and contrasted is to understand the types which, in keeping with typology,
shed light on him, their antitype. Also, because the figures are taken from the Old
Testament, it means a typological interpretation of the same is taking place. With this
in mind, we now consider the Christology of Hebrews.
4.2 THE CHRISTOLOGY OF HEBREWS
4.2.1. Mediators: Middle Figures and Entities
As will become clear in the following, we will be arguing in our thesis that the
predominant Christology in Hebrews is mediatorial, i.e., that on account of the synkrisis
in Hebrews, Jesus is best understood in Hebrews chiefly as a definitive mediator.
Consequently, it is necessary for us at this stage of our thesis to establish a definite
understanding ofwhat we mean by, and how we use the term, 'mediator' in our
discourse on the Christology of Hebrews. This understanding will apply in what
follows immediately from here and throughout this thesis. In our understanding of the
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term, we shall rely heavily on the work of Oepke simply because he seems to be the
only scholar who has looked at the term in detail and, more importantly, done so with
special reference to its use in the Old and New Testament.
In TDNT, Oepke (1967) comprehensively looks at the Greek term pearTrig, which is
usually translated into English as 'mediator'. He isolates three notions that the term
stood for in Hellenistic usage. The first is a 'neutral' 'whom both sides can trust' (599).
In this sense a mediator could be an 'umpire', a 'negotiator of peace', or even a
'guarantor'; in which case, Oepke points out, the term could be a synonym of
(pexjeyyuog. Concerning this first notion, Oepke writes that it 'became one of the most
varied technical terms in the vocabulary of Hellenistic law' (Ibid.). Accordingly, its
usage range from a 'witness' to a legal transaction, to a 'sequestrator' as 'a neutral with
whom a disputed object or sum is temporarily left' (600).
This first usage represents the term as understood in its technical sense. However,
Oepke goes on to point out two more notions (the second and the third) which have a
less precise meaning relative to what the term stood for technically. These are, 1.
"'intermediary in the general spatial sense' (Ibid.), and 2. '"mediator" or "negotiator" in
the sense of 'the one who establishes a relation which would not otherwise exist' (Ibid.).
Turning to the Old Testament, Oekpe points out that peaixrig occurs only once in the
LXX, and that is in Job 9.33 where it reads: 'Would that he our mediator were present,
and a reprover, and one who should hear the cause between both' (Ei0e tjv o pecnxrig
ljpoov kai ekeyxoov, kou SiaKobeov avapeaov ap<j)oxepov). As Old Testament
commentators observe, Job here seems to wish for some impartial judge (Gordis 1978,
111), or, for others, an arbiter (Hartley 1988, 181) or umpire (Pope 1965, 74) to settle
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his complaint with God. In this case what is in focus is clearly the first of the three
notions of mediator looked at above. But does this therefore mean that this is an
isolated case, that is, that the concept and, consequently, mediatorial figures, are lacking
in the Old Testament? Clearly not. As, Oepke (1967) shows, the concept is there but
with no single term for it and that in fact, 'mediatorship is at the heart of Old Testament
religion' (614). Indeed he puts it to us that Yahweh has his mediators. Of these, he
points out, first, the non-human mediators (he calls them 'intermediary hypostases'
[611 ]) on the grounds that in the Old Testament some of 'God's dealings with the world
are through intermediary hypostases' (Ibid.). To him, three intermediary hypostases are
especially important. In his own words:
There are three of these in particular. First, from the earliest to the latest times,
there is the mrr "[Xbo, the visible and for most part helpful messenger of Yahweh;
then the mrr mr, known by its operations, which were at first merely ecstatic and
later also moral; and finally the hypostatised divine neon, corresponding to the
Greek logos concept' (61 1).
However this is not all there is of mediation in the Old Testament; Oepke also
examines the human mediators found in the Old Testament. These are priests and
prophets (of which Moses is especially singled out). Concerning Moses, he argues that
even though the word 'mediator' is not used in the story of God's deliverance of Israel
from Egyptian bondage using Moses (Ex. 3ff), 'the mediator concept is twice given
classical formulation in this context' (612). The first is when Aaron becomes the mouth
of Moses speaking to the people, and Moses becomes God speaking through him (Ex.
14.16, 7.11). Here the mediatorial function of Aaron and Moses is that of
commissioned spokesmen of God to the people. The second is in Moses 'as a mediator
giving the law' (612, Ex. 19.3ff, 9ff, 2Iff; 20.18ff. etc.). Here he points out that Moses
alone stands before Yahweh, and between Yahweh and the people, i.e., 'he receives the
directions of Yahweh and passes them on to the people' (Ibid.). In addition, Oepke
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points out the other side of this mediation, which is that Moses intercedes with Yahweh
on behalf of the people (Ex. 20.19).
Our point, of course, is not to show or argue that mediation is at the heart of the Old
Testament but, rather, to have a concrete basis for our understanding and use of the term
in this thesis. So, from what we gather from the preceding, what/who would we say is a
mediator? The following observation could be made. The term 'mediator' seems to
have no one fixed meaning to it, but rather a single core, and integral, notion fixed to it.
This core notion is that in one way or the other, and for one purpose or another, persons
or entities (we may call them 'middle figures') are employed or used to facilitate a
relationship of two persons or groups, or between a person and a group of people. More
specifically (and perhaps importantly for our purpose) with reference to the Old
Testament, we see that Yahweh often uses middle figures in dealing with the world and
human beings, and, conversely, humans use middle figures in approaching, or relating
to, God. Therefore, these middle figures, in whatever fonn or capacity they function,
are what we are going to understand in this thesis as mediators. In other words, in this
thesis, we shall understand a 'mediator' as any person who, or entity which, is perceived
to be used by God in his dealing and relating with the world and human beings, or any
person who, or entity which, human societies use in approaching, or relating to, God.
Given such an understanding, it is clear that, although Oepke omits them, angels in
the Old Testament would feature as non-human mediators. This is because angels in the
Old Testament are referred to as superhuman beings who perform some function in the
world of human beings under the direction or will ofYahweh. For example, they
announce births (e.g. Gen. 16.11-12), communicate Yahweh's word to the prophets (e.g.
lKgs 13.18), and are Yahweh's agents of protection (e.g. Gen. 24.40, Ex. 14.19-20).
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It is a well observed phenomenon in discourse on mediators in the religious tradition
of Israel,15 and in the literature of the time, that in the 2nd Temple period, belief in
angels and certain prophets (but especially Moses) became more elaborate. This is an
important point to note because in our discussion of Hebrews' Christology, we shall be
comparing Jesus to mediatorial figures in the Old Testament albeit as understood in the
various Jewish groups in existence at the time of Hebrews' writing. This means that we
will have to reckon with a mediatorial Christology that is forged in dialogue with beliefs
in mediators as understood then. We shall revisit this point and look at some of the
elaborate beliefs in these mediatorial figures (found in Hebrews) in the 2nd Temple
period in the relevant section of our thesis.
4.2.2. Preliminary Considerations
We may begin with some preliminary considerations. In attempting to account for
the language of Hebrews (i.e., its couching or idiom), Hurst (1990) discusses not less
than eight possible backgrounds of Hebrews. These are: Platonism, Qumran, pre-
Christian Gnosticism, the Samaritans, Merkabah Mysticism (these he calls non-
Christian background), and the Stephen tradition, Pauline theology, and first Peter
(which he calls Christian backgrounds). He scrutinizes the strengths and weaknesses of
each background, with specific attention to its points of contact with, and divergences
from, Hebrews. Though clearly in favour of Christian backgrounds (and he has a
proposal to that effect) as those that best account for the language of Hebrews, Hurst
concludes that all the other backgrounds can be posited with some basis in Hebrews.
This, he argues, is because the parallels between Hebrews and the mentioned
backgrounds proposed as candidates for the historical background of Hebrews are there
not on account of exchanges between them of material, but, rather, because they
15 See for example, Oepke (1967, 617-18) himself, Yates (1971, 166-67), De Lacey (1987) and Chester
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represent 'independent work on the same material' (132). The material in question is the
Old Testament, and the candidates for Hebrews' historical background represent its
application to different circumstances.16 Hurst's study points us in the right direction:
Hebrews background must be located in the general 'late 2nd Temple Israelite religion' (a
religion that at the time is quite diffuse but held together by its roots in pre-exilic Jewish
heritage ['Old Testament']17 and its Hellenistic environment)18 and not, for want of
relevant information as earlier mentioned, in any specific historical situation. Indeed,
Jewish writings of the time attach significance to angelic figures, Moses, high priests
and kindred figures who are at the heart of the rhetoric of Hebrews. It is necessary,
therefore, that the Christology of Hebrews should be understood in the context of these
figures as portrayed in the complex Jewish religious writings of the 2nd Temple period
and in related material.19
We may inquire now into the precise significance of these figures, and what they
have in common. As pointed out already in our discussion on mediators, angels, Moses
and high priests are in one way or another mediators between God and human beings.
We also pointed out that the mediation they carry out is found in the Old Testament but
(1991).
16 A case in point here is 'Melchizedek'. As demonstrated amongst others by Delcor (1971), Horton
(1976, 12-83), Hurst (1990, 53-60), and Gieschen (1997), Melchizedek is a figure in pre-exilic Israelite
writings (Gen. 14.17-20 and Ps. 110) on the basis of which are developed, by several Jewish communities
in the 2nd Temple period, different understandings of his function and significance.
17
It cannot be overstated that the Old Testament is crucial to all Jewish communities in the 2nd Temple
period, only that the understanding of it is not uniform as portrayed in the 'fluidity of the Hebrew text in
the 1st cent., i.e., the existence of families of texts differing from the MT' (Miller 1971, 55) and in the
different exegetical traditions in existence then. Concerning the latter, Bowker (1969) sums it up well
thus; 'to a great extent the common ground of Judaism lay in the past, and the diversity of Judaism at the
time of Jesus was a consequence (and at times rival) attempts to apply the Torah, and other pre-exilic Old
Testament literature, in life' (8).
18
Hengel's (1974) Judaism and Hellenism is notable for indicating the telling influence of Hellenism on
Jewish communities.
19
Here I have in mind, though not exclusively, tannaitic rabbinic literature. This is so because for a
variety of reasons (see Neusner 1998, 8-11), some ideas encapsulted in tannaitic rabbinic material can be
identified in the 2" Temple period; and so that literature can act as a legitimate window to the beliefs and
practices of that period. This is important to note because we shall consider a portion of tannaitic rabbinic
literature in elucidating the mediation ofMoses in our section on Moses-Christology.
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beliefs in their mediation become more elaborate in the 2nd Temple period. For this
reason we shall be examining, where relevant, the depiction of angels, Moses and high
priest in some of the writings, and related material, in this period to gain more insight
into their mediation. This will help us subsequently in perceiving the mediation of
Jesus Christ more clearly, which, according to Hebrews, is superior to that by angels,
Moses and high priests chiefly on the grounds of Jesus' ontology which results in his
superior execution of the mediatorial functions in view. For want of space our
discussion will be sketchy and will focus very selectively on the material that serves to
illuminate the pertinent content of Hebrews.
4.2.3. Angelomorphic Christology
In coming to grips here with the angelomorphic Christology in Hebrews 1.4-2.18 we
contend that the synkrisis between Jesus and angels is pre-eminently mediatorial. This
is to say that predominant in this pericope is the superiority of Jesus as a mediator over
angelic mediators. In what follows, we will argue that Hebrews 1.4 not only introduces
the synkrisis of Jesus with angels, but at the same time acts, as a counterpart to
prophetic mediation in Hebrews 1.1-2, to introduce the subject of the synkrisis, viz.,
angelic mediation. We will show that this angelic mediation is alluded to in Hebrews
1.4 itself but made explicit in Hebrews 2.2-4 and, then, consider how the sections that
follow these two, i.e., Hebrews 1.5-14 and 2.5-18, clarify this superiority of Jesus'
mediation over angelic mediation. When this is done, the angelomorphic Christology of
Hebrews will be thrown into sharp relief.
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Prima facie, and given what precedes it, Hebrews 1,4ff (xoocruxcp Kpuixxeov
yevopovot; xcov dyyeA.cov oaco SiacjjoTieproxepov nap' abxouq K£KA,£pov6pr|K£v ovopa)
appears to be a sudden inexplicable introduction of angels in the discourse. This is on
account of the subject of Hebrews 1.1-3 which seems to have nothing to do with angels
but, rather, with God and his Son: he has spoken (eArxiknaev) now by his Son, unlike in
the past where he spoke (^aikfiGac;) through the prophets. Also, God's Son, unlike the
prophets, is his exact representation (Heb. 1.3) and is seated now at the right hand of his
majesty (peyXcoabvriq). But on closer scrutiny this is not really the case; the movement
of content from Jesus' comparison with prophets to his comparison with angels can be
accounted for in one of three ways.
The first, proposed by some scholars of Hebrews such as Ellingworth and Nida
(1983, 12), and Ellingworth himself (1993, 103), is that Hebrews 1.4 links together the
introductory statement of Hebrews 1.1-3 and the extended comparison between the Son
and angels. Ellingworth (1993) seems to suggest that this transition in Hebrews 1.4 is
not arbitrary but is related to what precedes by a word association, and by a hook-word.
The associated words (which have in common the notion of 'inheritance') are
K^ripovopov in Hebrews 1.2b and K£K?i£pov6|xr|K£v in Hebrews 1.4b. However,
Ellingworth is quick to point out that though the words are associated, their meaning is
not exactly the same thus: '...the "inheritance" [as used in the two instances] is different,
and the use of the perfect tense [in Hebrews 1.4b] introduces a change of viewpoint'
(Ibid.). As concerns the use of a hook-word, Ellingworth is of the view that 'the mention
of angels acts as a typical "hook-word"' (Ibid.) because it introduces the comparison
between Jesus and angels whereas Hebrews 1.1 -2b compares the prophets and the Son.
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However, accounting for the introduction of angels in Hebrews 1.4 in this way seems
to me unsatisfactory (especially with regard to angels acting as a hook-word). The
argument of word association is a fair one in accounting for Hebrews 1.4 since word
associations can be responsible for linking together and structuring a text. But then,
Ellingworth does not tell us how this specific word association links the two together
apart from recognizing that they could be linked. In fact, he concedes that their
meaning is not even the same. So, it is not a satisfactory answer to the seeming abrupt
introduction of Hebrews 1.4. As for angels as hook-word, we find one outstanding
problem: it fails to account for what seems, on the face of it, the difference between the
subjects of comparison with Jesus, i.e., prophets (in the content of the first comparison)
and angels (in the second). For the introduction of angels not to appear abrupt and
inexplicable, one must surely explain what holds prophets and angels together because
explicitly they do not seem to have anything in common; hence what seems to be the
abrupt introduction of angels in the first place. For these reasons we need to consider
Ellingworth's account for the introduction of angels in Hebrews 1.4 as incomplete.
The second explanation for the introduction of angels in Hebrews 1.4 is that it is the
mention of the Son seated at the right hand of the majesty, in Hebrews 1.3, that leads to
the mention of angels. Because angels are understood in Hebrews 1.4 as part of the
world of heaven, it is argued that there a possibility in the mind of the author that Jesus
could be confused with them. Consequently, Hebrews 1,4ff is intended to pre-empt
such a confusion of persons. Montefiori (1964, 40), for example, argues that the
mention of Jesus at the right hand of the majesty in heaven would have likely led to
Jesus being mistaken for one of the angels since they were commonly believed to wait
upon the throne ofGod in heaven (Is. 6.2). This made it necessary for the author of
Hebrews to show that Jesus is superior to the angels.
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The main problem with this explanation is the implicit suggestion that the synkrisis
between Christ and angels is one forced upon the author by his mention of Christ at
God's right hand, and not being a deliberate part of his message to the Hebrews, fitting
in with what comes before, and after, it, i.e., within Hebrews' overall structure. Yet it
seems to me that Hebrews 1.4-2.18 is a forceful argument by the author on the
superiority of Jesus to angels, that fits well in Hebrews' overall structure merely to be an
argument forced upon the author by his mention of Jesus seated at the right hand of
God's majesty. This makes the third explanation below to be preferred for it not only
accounts for angels being a deliberate part of Hebrews' structure but also shows what
holds together the comparison of Jesus with prophets, on one hand, and angels, on the
other. In the final analysis, this explanation not only shows that the introduction of
angels in Hebrews 1.4 is not abrupt, or inexplicable, as it may seem, but also throws
light on the mediatorial nature of the synkrisis between Jesus and angels, thus tying
neatly with Hebrews overall structure of Jesus' synkrisis with Jewish mediatorial
figures. Let us turn to it now.
The third explanation is that the comparison of Jesus with angels provides a
counterpart to his comparison with prophets in Hebrews 1.1-2 and, therefore, has
angelic mediation in the background. As Lane (1991) explains: 'It provides a parallel to
[Hebrews 1 ] vv 1 -2a, where revelation through the prophets is contrasted with the
ultimate word spoken through the Son' (17). Although not explicit, but alluded to, in
Hebrews 1.4, angels were understood too in Jewish religious tradition (see section
4.2.1.) to be mediators of the Law and were, therefore, in some respects like the
prophets. We can safely presume that this was the understanding of the author of
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Hebrews on the basis of Hebrews 2.2 where he says that God's message was declared by
20
the angels (more on this later). Lane, comes to this conclusion thus:"
In the Old Testament angels were ascribed a broad role in revelation and
redemption (e.g., Exod 3.2; Isa 63.9). It was commonly understood that the law
had been mediated to Moses, the greatest of the prophets, through angels (cf. Jub.
1.29; Acts 7.38-39, 53; Gal 3.19; Jos.,Hnt. 15.5.3; Mek. on Exod 20.18; Siphre
102 on Num 12.5; Pesiq. R. 21). This conception was shared by the writer and his
readers (2:2). The description of the Jewish law as "the message declared by
angels" in 2:2 is determinative for the interpretation of the reference to the angels
in v. 4 (Ibid.).
If this is the case, then the purpose of the introduction of angels in Hebrews 1.4 is to
begin to show that Christ's mediation of God's word or revelation is superior not just to
that of the prophets but also to the angelic one. In other words, Jesus is a superior
mediator to angels and prophets. This should be understood as what links together the
two comparisons. As a result Hebrews 1.5-14, and indeed 2.5-18, should be understood
as clarifications of the superiority ofChrist's mediation over the angelic ones. But
before we look at this, and thus articulate the angelomorphic Christology in Hebrews, a
look at Hebrews 1.4 by itself is in order. This is because we need to show that there
exists an allusion to the mediation of angels in Hebrews 1.4. When such an allusion is
established, credence can be given to the view that Hebrews 1.4 gives perspective to
Hebrews 1.5-14 as a clarification of the superiority of Christ as a mediator over angelic
mediators.21 Furthermore, showing the existence of such an allusion would support the
view that Hebrews 2.2-4 makes explicit, or is determinative of our understanding, of
Hebrews 1.4. Finally, demonstrating this allusion would show indeed that Hebrews 1.4-
2.18 is: 1. a single unit in the synkrisis of Jesus and angels in their role as mediators and
20 See Westcot (1889, 16) as well.
21 This is all the more important because one could read Hebrews 1.5-14 as demonstrating the superiority
ofChrist to angels quite apart from the issue ofmediation. On the grounds, for example, that deference to
angels is being objected to (see Goulder 2003).
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not just angelic beings per se, and 2. a deliberate part of the overall structure of
Hebrews which concerns itself with comparing Jesus to mediatorial figures and showing
him to be superior to them. In other words, demonstrating this allusion would show that
the predominant thought in this section ofHebrews is that Christ's mediation is superior
to that ofangels which suits well with Hebrews' overall structure of synkrisis between
Jesus and Jewish mediatorial figures.
From my survey of commentaries on Hebrews 1.4, scholars have largely been of the
view that the name (ovopa) Jesus has inherited (K£KAr|pov6pr|K£v) which is more
excellent (Sta^ocoTEpov) than that of angels is 'Son'.22 Although this may in all
probability be the case, it is not a foregone conclusion since the author of Hebrews does
not spell out what he means precisely by ovopa in this verse. Of course, the immediate
context, i.e., Hebrews 1.2,3, and especially, Hebrews 1.5, suggests that 'Son' is the
name, but, as Ellingworth (1993) points out, in Hebrews 1.2, 3.6 and 5.8, 'sonship is
spoken of as a permanent attribute of Christ, not as a title which is given or acquired at
the time of his exaltation' (105). This is important to note for it leaves room for the
possibility of another name.
This inheritance of a name by Jesus is in the context of a comparison with angels: he
has inherited a more excellent name than theirs (nap' auxouc;). But what does this mean
exactly, particularly with reference to angels? All Hebrews scholars agree that this
verse means that Jesus' name is superior to that of angels, but, apparently, with one
exception: Attridge (1989) is of the view that the name of Jesus is not merely superior
to that of angels, but that it is more excellent 'than angels themselves' (48)."' We may
22 For example see Bruce (1990, 50), Lane (1991, 17) and Kistemaker (1984, 32).
23 This he asserts on the basis of nap' autoix; which literally would read 'to them' not 'to theirs'.
140
presume that what Attridge may be arguing for here is that Jesus, i.e., his status and
identity ('name'), is more excellent than angels. The problem is that Attridge does not
tell us what this means and if it would in consequence change, in real terms, the
meaning of the verse as understood by the majority, that Jesus has a name that is
superior to the name of angels. To the contrary, Attridge has left his own interpretation
of the verse, that Jesus has a superior name to the name of angels (and not to angels
themselves [his suggested understanding]), intact. So, we take it in this thesis that the
comparison being made is between the name of Jesus and the name of angels, that the
name of Jesus is more excellent to the one of angels.
However, although scholars on Hebrews are agreed that the comparison has to do
with Jesus' name being greater than angels', there is no attempt, however, to ponder
what this comparison between the name of Jesus and that of angels could mean for the
understanding of Hebrews 1.4. Yet I strongly think that the implication therein that
angels have names is an allusion to their mediation, and in view, therefore, is the
superiority of Jesus' mediation over that of angels. In this regard, there would be value
in exploring in detail the phenomenon of naming angels and determining what it
means,24 but we shall not do so here. What we need to pay attention to is that in Jewish
religious tradition, not all angels bore names but only the 'senior' ones and they were
understood chiefly as mediators. Let us examine this more closely and consider how it
bears on our understanding of Hebrews 1.4 as alluding to angelic mediation and,
consequently, to the superiority of Jesus' mediation to theirs.
24 The significance of names in biblical and post-biblical literature has been noted (see for example
Eichrodt 1963, 40, and [Bietenhard 1967, 252-69]); an observation that may well have relevance to angels
having names. But apart from Olyan (1993) who attempts to track the origins of, and account for, the
naming of angels rather than the significance of so doing, there is nothing forthcoming on the significance
of angels having names.
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As pointed out in our section on mediators (see section 4.21), beliefs in angels in the
2nd Temple period became more elaborate. During this period, it is emphasized that,
'God is enthroned in heaven while carrying out his work in the world by means of
angelic leaders who have myriads of other angels at their command' (Gieschen 1998,
124). These angelic leaders, unlike the many created angels, are distinct and honoured
by the Jewish groups which revere them. Apparently, these angelic leaders (or
'principal angels' [Hurtado 1998, 71-2]) are the ones that assume names.25 Given that
this was the wider religio-cultural context of Hebrews, it is possible, then, to conclude
that in Hebrews 1.4 Jesus is not being compared to angels in general, but to principal
angels and is being perceived to be more excellent than them because he has a more
excellent name to their names as the verses that follow Hebrews 1.4 seek to clarify.
Coincidentally (we would say by no mere coincidence) it is the role of a principal angel
which is found in Hebrews 2.226 (which then makes explicit what is alluded to in
Hebrews 1.4). We consider that role in what follows.
In Hebrews 2.2-4, the word (Abyoc;) spoken by angels is compared to the word spoken
by Jesus, thereby contrasting their mediation to that of Jesus'. Angels, according to
Hebrews, were responsible for giving God's message to the people: (er yap o 8i'
dyyeA-cov XaXriOetq Xoyoq eyevexo (JePaioq teat maa 7tapa(3aaig xai TiapaKot] etaxftev
evSiKov pio0am8oaiav ... 2.2). But whence did this belief come and could the same
enlighten Hebrews' Christology? Its provenance is certainly not the Massoretic Text of
the Hebrew Bible where the Torah is given directly to Moses (Ex. 19 and 20), but, as is
25 See Gieschen (1998, 126-151) for a survey and discussion on these angelic leaders in 2nd Temple period
literature. See also Davis (1994), De Lacey (1987) and Hurtado (1998, 71-92), whose discussion, though,
is limited by concerns to account for the genesis of the worship of Jesus without a compromise on
monotheism in the lsl century.
26 The importance of this point should not be underestimated in understanding the issue ofmediation here
for it is only in this passage, and possibly Hebrew 2.5 (see footnote 33), that we encounter in Hebrews the
role of angels in a more concrete way. The effect of this is to shed light on the precise role of angels in
view in Hebrews 1.4-2.18.
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widely recognized," from the LXX where it is understood that when God came down
from Sinai, 'angels were with him at the right hand' (ek Sei^icov autof) dyyexoi get'
oaiTou, Deut. 33.2). This notion finds further development and elaboration in the
Maccabean period in the Book ofJubilees (see for example, 1.27, 2.1 and 26-7) during
which we encounter the perception that the Torah is dictated to Moses by 'the Angel of
98
the Presence' (both in plural and singular form)." Given Hebrews' religio-cultural
context, it is apparent then that the comparison is between Jesus' mediation and that of a
principal angel, 'the Angel of the presence'. 29 Indeed it is out of this contrast that the
audience of Hebrews are asked to pay attention (7tpoG8X£iv) in Hebrews 2.1 to what
they have heard, which is the great salvation (TpXiKomTng oomprat;) first spoken of
through Jesus (A,a^eia0ai Sta too Kuptou -Heb. 2.3). His mediation is superior since,
first, it concerns a weightier word, i.e., a great salvation while that of angels is the
giving of the law, and second, that word has been confirmed by God and the Holy Spirit
(Heb. 2.4). But on the whole, all of this, i.e., Jesus' superior mediation, is on the basis of
who he is, and what he has done, as the verses that follow (Heb. 2.5-18) clarify. This
leads us now to consider very briefly how both Hebrews 1.5-14 and 2.5-18 clarify the
superiority of Jesus' mediation to angelic mediation.
Following Hebrews 1.4 are seven scriptural quotations from the Old Testament which
serve to make clear the superiority of Jesus over angels, and thus, according to our
foregoing argument, make him a superior mediator. The first two (Ps. 2.7 in Heb. 1,5a
27 Most commentaries on Hebrews point out this despite their reticence on its ramifications (such as the
one we are arguing for).
28 See Gieschen (1998, 137-42) for a relatively detailed discussion on the 'Angel of his Presence' (singular
and plural) who are understood to be four or seven and serving immediately before the throne of God.
29 This raises the possibility that the conception of Jesus as a superior mediator here ought not to be
limited to this aspect of mediation carried out by a principal angel but should be broadened to cover the
other mediatorial roles of these principal angelic beings. If this view is correct, then some of these
functions would include: intercession (Tob. 12.5, 1 En. 9.1-3, 40.6, T. Levi 5.5-6, T. Dan. 6.2), and
revelation and guidance (Dan. 7.16-27, 8.15-16, 9.21-27; 1 En. 72.1, 74.2, 75.4; 4 Ezra 4.1; 5.20; 10.28).
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and 2 Sam 7.14 in Heb. 1.5b) declare the Sonship of Jesus. Angels may have been
collectively called 'sons of God' but no angel was singly declared a Son of God. Such
a quotation, then, in reference to Christ would have underlined his superiority. The
third quotation (Ps. 2.7 in Heb. 1.6) brings out the point that angels worshipped him.31
The fourth (Ps. 104.4 in Heb. 1.7) shows that angels are winds or spirits (jtveupaTcc) and
as his servants, flames of fire (^eiToupyoix;). This, as argued by Attridge (1989, 57-8),
may well show two things concerning angels. One is their transitory and mutable nature
'apparent in their images of wind and flame' (58) which would contrast with the abiding
quality of the Son in Hebrews 1.8-12; and the second is that they are servants who, as
Hebrews 1.14 makes clear, are sent to serve those who will inherit salvation, whilst he
is Lord, as Hebrews 1.13 indicates, seated at God's right hand (Hebrews 1.13). So, we
turn now to the fifth, sixth and seventh quotations.
The fifth quotation (Ps. 45.6-7 in Heb. 1.8-9), as Ellingworth (1993) notes, in
Hebrews 1.8a, 'expresses briefly the eternity of the Son' (122), a theme which is
developed further in the sixth quotation (Ps. 102.25-27 in Heb. 1.10-12). In this sixth
quotation the main emphasis is the eternity of the Son in contradistinction to all creation
(angels too) which are the work of his hands. In Hebrews 1.8b the point of distinction
between Jesus and angels is not that clear but, I think, given the literary context, is
showing the superiority of Christ over angels. Ellingworth (1993) is right in saying that
the point seems to be that 'the the Son exercises royal power, whereas the angels are
mere T.evTOUpYOt [Heb. 1.7]'(122). The quotation's latter content in Hebrews 1.9a
For their discussion and fuller references, see Chester (1991, 47-71), Gieschen (1998, 126-51) and
Hurtado (1998, 71-92). See also footnote 32.
30 See for example, Gen. 9.2, 4, Job 1.6, 2.1, and Ps.. 29.1.
31 Kistemaker (1984, 38) thinks that this refers to the birth of Jesus 'when a multitude of the heavenly host
praised God in the fields near Bethlehem (Luke 2.13)'. This is because the word 'world' (Koapoq) is
Hellenic and would have been used to 'refer to the populated world' (Kistemaker 1984, 38).
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seems to be saying, again given the literary context of Hebrews, that Jesus' anointing by
God sets him above angels (Attridge 1989, 60).32 The seventh quotation (Ps. 110.1 in
Heb. 1.13) shows the seating of Jesus at God's right hand, and already mentioned (in
Hebrews 1.3) is an 'enthronement accomplished at the invitation of God' (Lane 1991,
32), and one that is only given to him and not angels who, in contrast, are servants of
those who will inherit salvation (Hebrews 1.14).
We may turn our attention now to the other clarification of Jesus' superiority to
angels in Hebrews 2.5-18. The opening, 'It is not to angels...' (Ou yap ayyeXoiq) in
Hebrews 1.5a makes it clear that the subject of what follows, yet again, is a comparison,
albeit one which follows, as shown above, a more explicit comparison between Jesus'
mediation and angelic mediation in Hebrews 2.1 -4. In Hebrews 2.5 the point is that the
world to come will not be subjected to angels33 but to the Son, a point made clear in the
following verses. Ifwe may turn to them, beginning with Hebrews 2.6-9, it seems most
likely that the superiority of Jesus over angelic mediators was called into question in the
mind of the audience from the consideration of Jesus being a man, i.e., of his
incarnation.34 If the Psalmist had declared (Ps. 8) that human beings are lower than
angels, and Jesus became a man, how could he be superior to angels? Hebrews uses the
Psalm to point out two things. The first is that Jesus' humiliation was temporary (and
for an important purpose) since he is now crowned with glory and honour, precisely
because of his incarnation (Heb. 2.9). The second is that now, after his incarnation,
32 This is not a foregone conclusion for there are some who argue otherwise (see Ellingworth [1993, 124]
for more on this).
33
Implicit here is that the present world is understood to be in some way under subjection to angels.
Indeed, there seems to have been a belief in principal angels ruling particular peoples on behalf of God.
Sections of the Septuagint (Deut. 32.8 and Dan. 10.21-7 for example) alluded to this. See Kistemaker
(1984, 63) and Bruce (1990, 71-2) for more. It is worth noting that if this is correct, then, our earlier
argument that the comparison is between Jesus and principal angels and not just general angels is
strengthened further.
34 Nash (1977, 112) and Lane (1991, 43), amongst others, think so.
145
crowned with glory and honour, all is subject to him, although at present we do not see
everything having been subjected ("UTtoxExaypEva) to him (Heb. 2.8b). So here the
author of Hebrews argues that Jesus' glory, honour and, eventually, total dominion are
tied to his incarnation. His incarnation, therefore, he seems to say, does not make him
lower than the angels but, to the contrary, superior to them. This argument is made at
the end of the section (Heb. 2.9b) where the author states that it is because Jesus
suffered (7id0r|ga) death, that he is crowned with glory and honour, and, eventually, will
have total dominion thus: 'But we see Jesus, who was made a little lower than the
angels, now crowned with glory and honour because he suffered death...' (xov 8e (3pocxf)
ii reap' dyyeA-out; fiikaxxcogEvov pX£7top£v Ipaouv 8ta to 7td0r|ga too 0avdxox) So^p
Kai Tipfj eaxadavcogevov, onmg ydprn 0eot) wisp navxoq yeuoriTou bavaxox)).
Ellingworth (1993, 158) points out that a further reflection on Hebrews 2.9b is given in
Hebrews 2.10, which is that it was fitting (ETtpETCEv) that God should make Jesus perfect
through suffering in order for him to lead many to glory. However, these two verses
(Hebrews 2.9b and 10) do not say how his humanity, death and suffering have made
him superior to angels, as one crowned with glory and honour, and also made him lead
many to glory. For that, we have to look to Hebrews 2.14-18.
But before the author of Hebrews gets to say how Jesus' humanity, suffering and
death make him superior to angels as one now crowned with glory and honour, and,
eventually, total dominion, he makes the point in Hebrews 2.11-13 that Jesus who
sanctifies and the people he sanctifies (Heb. 2.11) are of the same family (e^ evoc;).35
Seemingly to emphasize this, the author of Hebrews states that, for that reason, Jesus 'is
not ashamed to call them brothers' (Heb. 2.1 lb). Accordingly, he draws the audience's
35 The precise meaning of el; evoc, ('[are] all from one') is unclear. It could mean are of 'one origin', or of
'one stock' or 'common humanity' etc. I think 'are from one family' (New International Version's
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attention to the words of Jesus, taken from the Psalms36 that show Jesus' pride in the
ones he has made holy. We should note that although the purpose of the author here is
to show that Jesus is of the same family with the people he sanctifies, this motif of
holiness introduced here is still related the suffering which Jesus had to undergo as a
human being in order to be a faithful and merciful high priest (Heb. 2.17). This leads
us, then, to Hebrews 2.14-18.
The reasons why Jesus was incarnated and suffered death are now finally given. The
first is to destroy the one who holds the power of death (Heb. 2.14) and free those who
have been held in bondage by the fear of death (Heb. 2.15). However, how this happens
and what it means exactly the author does not say. The second and more explicit reason
is that he may help Abraham's descendants (Heb. 2.16). He does this by becoming a
merciful and faithful high priest (Heb. 2.17a) and making atonement for their sins (Heb.
2.17b). This, as Ellingworth (1993, 190) notes, is clarified in Hebrews 2.18: Jesus is a
merciful high priest, able to help those who are being tempted (7t£ipaa0ei<;) because, as
a human being, he too was tempted (Heb. 2.18). In other words, the author of Hebrews
is saying, in the words of Attridge (1989, 95), 'the incarnation and suffering of Christ
took place so that he might be a high priest characterized by mercy and fidelity'. After
he suffered and achieved this, and for this reason, he is now seated at the right hand of
God in glory and honour (Heb. 1.3, 1.13, 2.7-8) and will, eventually, rule over all.
translation of this text) fits best with the context which speaks of familial relationships (i.e., those that
Jesus makes holy are his brother - Hebrews 2.1 lb-12). For more see Ellingworth and Nida (1983, 42).
36
Here, the words of the Psalm are understood to be the words of Jesus. However, as Attridge (1989, 90)
points out, the occasion and circumstances when Jesus spoke these words is not mentioned.
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To put this in a clearer perspective of Jesus' comparison with angels (Hebrews 2.5-
18), Jesus became man but that does not mean that angels are superior to him. In fact,
the author seems to be arguing, because he became man and suffered death, he has been
brought to honour and glory, a rank and dignity which is greater than that of angels
(Hebrews 2.9). This is because his experience of suffering and death enables him to
become a merciful and faithful high priest, thus helping human beings as their mediator
in a way the mediation of principal angels cannot aspire to.
Given the above, we may conclude that, according to Hebrews, Jesus is like principal
angels but greater. More precisely, he is greater than principal angels, because: 1. like
them he mediates God's word but, unlike them who are spirits, he is God's Son, which
makes him superior to them and; 2. he has shared in the lot ofhumanity which also
makes him superior to them because the kind ofmediation he is now able to offer, of a
merciful and faithful high priest, is one the angels cannot offer. In short, Jesus is greater
than principal angels because, being God's Son and having become a man, he is a
superior mediator: Hebrews 1.4-14 alludes to this whilst Hebrews 2.1-18 makes it
explicit. This is Hebrews' angelomorphic Christology.
I wish to point out here that such an understanding ofHebrews 1.4-2.18 is the
beginning of a train of thought that will continue on in the author's synkrisis of Jesus
with Moses and then with the Aaronic high priests and in so doing bring out the
mediatorial Christology of Hebrews. In the words of Stanley (1994), the author of
Hebrews 'begins with the figures (mediators) that have the closest contact with God -
the angels- and works out from there - Moses, Joshua and then Aaron and the priests'
(264). This being the case, Hebrews 1.4-2.18, as mentioned earlier, forms an integral
part of the overall structure of Hebrews, of Jesus' synkrisis with Jewish mediatorial
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figures, rather than a digression forced on the author by his mention of Jesus seated in
heaven.
Turning to typology, the first characteristic we mentioned as embodying a working of
typology as a theological henneneutic was the correspondence of an Old Testament
personage on the one hand with Christ on the other. Such a correspondence, not being
absolute, can issue out as an analogy, a contrast, or in an objectified prophecy (or as a
combination of two or of all of these). This characteristic is present in the synkrisis
between Jesus and angels as seen in their correspondence that issues out in a contrast.
More concretely, going by the first point of our conclusion above, angels correspond to
Jesus in that they are both mediators but (and herein is the contrast) Jesus is God's Son,
and, also, became man. And on account of the latter, the kind ofmediation he offers,
i.e., of a faithful and merciful high priest, is one that angels cannot offer. The second
characteristic of typology mentioned is the intensification, escalation or heightening in
the antitype of an aspect of the type. This too is present in the synkrisis between angels
and Jesus. The first is that the word Jesus mediates is weightier (a great salvation) than
the word they mediate (the law). The second intensification is that Jesus has inherited a
name more excellent than theirs. (Because the third characteristic, that of typologies
being christocentric, is self-evident here, i.e., Jesus is the antitype, as it is in the other
synkrisis, we shall not comment on it here and in other instances below where it occurs.)
Typology, then, can be seen to be operative in the synkrisis between angels and Jesus.
Such an observation may come as a surprise since, even though Hebrews scholars pick
out the contrast between angels and Jesus brought out in the pericope under
consideration here, they do not perceive it as a typology. Reasons for this are not given;
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in fact Hebrews' scholars seem oblivious that this could in fact be the case.' This in my
view is a grave omission because angelomorphic Christology brought out through
synkrisis in Hebrews is an integral part of its overall Christology, and of its argument,
and should, therefore, be reckoned with. There is no reason why typology in Hebrews
should be limited only to Moses and to the figure of the Aaronic high priests when some
of its characteristics are clearly evident in the synkrisis between angels and Jesus. As
we have shown, there is a correspondence between principal angels and Jesus with
aspects of the former variously contrasted and intensified in the latter. And this makes
for a typological relationship between principal angels and Jesus.
I surmise that the reason why principal angels are not seen to be in a typological
relationship with Jesus is because they are not typical historical figures as are Moses or
Aaronic high priests. But should this be reason enough to fall short of accepting a
typological relationship? The figure ofMelchizedek is not a typical historical figure
and yet, he is seen to be in a typological relationship with Jesus (see footnote 16 and
58). Still, whatever may be said of the presence, or lack, of a typological relationship
between principal angels and Jesus, their comparision with Jesus shows them
anticipating his mediation and shedding light on him and his work. As will become
clear, this observation is crucial in our typology-based theological interpretation of
Hebrews' Christology in Africa.
37 This is best exemplified in the works of two scholars of Hebrews (Sowers 1965 and Smith 1976) who
to date seem to be the only ones to have dealt at length with typology in Hebrews. Both of them are mute
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4.2.4. Moses-Christology
The perception of Moses as the greatest prophet of Israel is beyond doubt.38 As the
leader of Israel and the mediator of the Torah he was believed to have received on
Sinai, diverse traditions developed around him, with the burning bush account (Ex. 3),
his ascent of Sinai (Ex. 19), and the manner of the end of his life (Deut. 34) providing
critical points (even raw data) for speculation in the said traditions. It would seem prima
facie that these traditions as found in the 2" Temple period are unrelated to the
discourse of Hebrews 3.1-6, which contains the synkrisis between Moses and Jesus, and
cannot therefore provide any meaningful religious context for the explication of the
Moses-Christology therein. Consequently, commentators on Hebrews seem to make no
use of post-biblical Moses traditions in considering the content of Hebrews 3.1-6. By
this I mean the following. In the comparison of Moses and Jesus here, it is clear that
Hebrews 3.2 (racxov ovxa xcp 7totf)aavxi auxov toq kou Mcouafiq sv oAcp too o'Ikco auxof))
and Hebrews 3.5 are central, and that between them, v.5 (kou Mcouarn; pev 7uctx6<; ev
oAoo xcp ovkco truxou toq Bspcbtcov si<; papxbpiov xoov XaA,r|0poopsvcov) is decisive, not
least because in it we encounter the only Old Testament citation in the pericope but
also because it elaborates and gives precision to Hebrews 3.2.40 It is for this reason that
I view it as a key verse whose explication within 2nd Temple Moses traditions
enlightens considerably the Moses-Christology of the pericope. Yet in discussing
on the typological relationship (or even the possibility of such a relationship) between angels and Jesus as
portrayed in Hebrews!
38 For more on 'Moses traditions' see Meeks (1967, 100-285) and Gager (1972).
39 There are some such as Attridge (1989, 110) who feel it is not a citation from LXX but rather one
derived from it, possibly because its word order is not quite the same (Kistemaker 1984, 87). We should
bear in mind here that a lack of complete verbal correspondence between a citation and the two principal
witnesses to LXX, (Alexandrian Codex [A] and Vatican Codex [B]), should not rule out a citation, given
the apparent multiplicity of Septuagintal manuscripts in existence then. Consequently, Old Testament
quotations in Hebrews that do not verbally correspond with LXXA or LXXB may in fact have been from
his Vorlage. For more on the discussion of Old Testament quotations in Hebrews, see Kenneth (1964),
Howard (1968) and, especially, McCullough (1986).
40 A few such as Lane (1991, 76-77), D'Angelo (1979, 69) and Aalen (1962, 236) see I Chronicles 17.14
as another scripture cited (or at least alluded to) in this pericope. Such an observation would still not
remove the decisive role of v.5 since, as they themselves argue, the presence of I Chronicles 17.14 is to
structure the comparison between Jesus and Moses, rather than to explain it (which v.5 does).
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Hebrews 3.5, Hebrews commentators do not see the need to use Moses traditions
existing in the 2nd Temple period in illuminating this section of Hebrews,41 even though
the scripture cited in it is taken from the LXX (which embodies an exegetical tradition
current to Hebrews' time ofwriting). We need, then, to look at Hebrews 3.5 closely,
and explain it using exegetical traditions on it in existence in the 2nd Temple period. In
so doing, we shall see clearly that, as with angels, the comparision between Jesus and
Moses in this pericope has to do with their mediatorial function. We turn to this in what
follows.
To the best ofmy knowledge, D'Angelo (1979) offers, to date, the most
comprehensive reading of Hebrews 3.1-6 (of which she gives Hebrews 3.2 and 3.5
special attention as key to the understanding of the pericope). More importantly, she
relies mostly on exegetical traditions of the Hebrew scriptures - i.e., the LXX, the
Targumim (in the 2nd Temple period), and Rabbinic literature to illuminate Numbers
12.7, the scripture cited in Hebrews 3.5. (Much of our quite brief examination then of
Hebrews 3.5 will be based on her study.) D'Angelo looks at the Moses tradition of the
Hebrew scriptures originating from, or based on, Numbers 12.7 by examining its
function as far as it can be determined by its literary context, Numbers 11-12. She
shows that what is at issue here, and subsequently addressed, is the question of the role
ofMoses as a prophet and the nature of his prophetic authority (98). The nature of his
prophetic ministry is answered by Numbers 12.6-7 (99ff): Moses enjoys an intimate
more direct communication with YHWH than any other prophet. The details of these
immediate and direct revelations that Moses enjoys occupy later exegetical traditions on
41For example Moffat (1924, 43-44) hardly took time to consider v.5, while Lane (1991. 78), Bruce
(1990, 92), Attridge (1989) and Kistemaker (1984, 86-7) limit their discussion to the Moses tradition of
Hebrew scriptures. Buchanan (1972, 59) is the only commentator I found who attempts to look at this
pericope in dialogue with the Moses tradition among the Samaritans but even so, he does not examine v.5
vis a vis that tradition.
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Numbers 12.6-8, as D'Angelo goes on to illustrate.42 She shows that the LXX's
translation of Numbers 12.7 gives the same 'an increasing degree of definition' (100), in
the sense that in that translation the reference to the oracle in the encounter ofMoses
with YHWH is Exodus 33.17-23 where Moses asks YHWH to show him, and is granted
to see, his glory. Also, she points out, the LXX translation relates Exodus 33.11 and
Deuteronomy 34.5, 10 (all dealing with Moses' encounters with YHWH in a 'face to
face' manner) more closely to Numbers 12.7 (101-102). D'Angelo demonstrates that the
Targumim are similar to the LXX, in interpreting Numbers 12.6-8 with reference to
Exodus 33, 34 and Deuteronomy 34 (102-104). However, in both renditions, 'my house'
Cm) is substituted with 'my people' Cot;).
Coming to the Sirach (45.4-6), D'Angelo points out that the 'occasion of when God
spoke face to face with Moses is further defined' (105) as being at Sinai when, and
where, Moses received the commandments from God. For our purposes, it is important
to note that these interpretations of Numbers 12.7 underscore the uniqueness ofMoses
as a mediator between God and the people. Without reference to them as a background
against which we read Hebrews 3.1-6, we would have no way of being enlightened on
this allusion to Moses in the synkrisis between Jesus and Moses in Hebrews 3.5. As it
were, God speaks face to face with Moses because He trusts Moses, and because God
speaks face to face with him, Moses is able to give the people the commandments of the
Lord.
42 Though she points out two more occupations of later exegetical traditions on Numbers 12.6-8, viz,, the
role of Moses as servant in God's house and the establishment of the uniqueness ofMoses's prophecy
(107), they ultimately spring from the one we have mentioned, i.e., the character of the immediacy and
directness of Moses' revelation.
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Tannaitic Rabbinic literature, like the others in their exegesis ofNum. 12.6-8,
continue to occupy themselves with the nature of Moses' revelations. In Siphre Zuta,
for example, D'Angelo shows that Job 4.13-18 is used to explain the distinction between
Moses' prophecy and that of other prophets (108-109). The main reason given as to
why they do not share the immediacy ofMoses' revelation in their mediation is because
they are not trusted by God (109). In fact, such an understanding would make Hebrews
3.5b more clear since, we may argue, the reference, which comes immediately after the
quotation ofNumber 12.7, ofMoses' testifying of things to come (erg paxopiov xcov
A,a?ir|0r|aopevcov)4:! has to do, precisely, with God's closeness to him on the basis of his
trustworthiness. The other reason (we may look at it as secondary) brought out is that
his prophecy is without any mediation, i.e., not 'by the hand of an angel' (110).
What, then, we see here in the preceding exegeses of Numbers 12.7, the verse cited in
Hebrews 3.5, is the unique mediatorial role ofMoses in Israel. This unique mediation
of Moses is not only found in the exegetical tradition of the Old Testament just looked
at, but, also, in other 2nd Temple Jewish literature as well.44 Indeed these writings have
some portions delineating the unique nature of Moses' revelation and thus his
superiority to other prophets (for example Jubilees 1.1-6, 26; 4 Ezra 14.1-9; Syr. Bar.
43
Although, we have to acknowledge, as shown by Ellingworth (1993, 208-209) that the precise meaning
of eiq uaxnpiov tcov Xraxr|0rtgo|ievo)v is hard to pin down because it is not clear, on the grounds of
grammar and Old Testament context, who the witness is, the reference, to my mind, must surely be
Moses. For this reason, Kistemaker (1984, 87), Attridge (1989, 111) and Lane (1991, 78), for example,
point out that this is a reference to Moses' prophecy of things that have now come with the advent of
Jesus.
44
Indeed, without the help of these exegetical traditions the uniqueness ofMoses as a mediator in this
passage ofHebrews would not be thrown in sharp relief. Let us take for example the exegesis of Isaacs
(1992) as an illustration of the point I am making here. For Isaacs, Numbers 12.7, as the LXX cited in
Heb. 3.2&5, enables the author to: 'stress, not that Moses was supreme among the people ofGod, but that
among the wilderness generation he alone was faithful' (135). Moses' mediatorial role in her exegesis
here is not brought out because she does not contend with the ways that Numbers 12.7 has been
understood in exegetical traditons in the 2"d Temple. Had she done so, she would probably have arrived
at a different conclusion since the faithfulness talked of in the said traditions has to do so with the trust
that God has in the prophet, enough to speak to him in a very direct way. The audience of Hebrews
would have in all probability understood any allusion to Number 12.7 within the exegetical traditions we
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59.8; and Bib. Antt., xix.l4ff), showing that they are not unrelated to the discourse of
Hebrews 3.1 -6 as implied by most commentators on Hebrews when they fail to use
these traditions in elucidating Hebrews 3.1-6. (Thus the writings provide a religious
context too for illuminating a Moses-Christology.) If granted that this is the case, then,
in effect, what Hebrews 3. Iff says is that Jesus is like Moses: like him because he is the
closest to God and speaks with him face to face and also like him because he is
appointed and trusted over God's house. Yet he is not like Moses but superior to him
because: he has more glory (bo^pt;) than him as a builder has over the house he has built
(Heb. 3.3-4); and unlike Moses who is a servant (Geparcov) in (ev) God's house, he is
the Son (uiot;) over (era) God's house.45 (It is possible to add here also: because Jesus is
the mediator of a better covenant.)46
Again, in respect to typology, we see in the synkrisis between Moses and Jesus the
first characteristic of typology mentioned above, which is that of a correspondence that
issues in, in this case, a contrast. Moses, the type, corresponds to Jesus, the antitype,
through his closeness to God and through his appointment and trust in the house of God.
However, in contrast to Moses, Jesus is superior by virtue ofbeing a Son over, rather
than a servant in, God's house (and being a mediator of a better covenant). The second
characteristic of typology mentioned above, that of intensification of an aspect of the
have used to explain Hebrews 3.5, i.e., they would have understood that Jesus is a superior mediator to
Moses.
45 The contrast encapsulated in the prepositions 'in' and 'over', i.e., of Jesus being a Son over the house
and not in the house may further the superiority of Jesus over Moses. As Lane (1991) suggests, Moses
being a servant ev the house and not erd the house shows that he is a servant within the household, while
Jesus is more; the Son who presides over the house's administration.
46 This is brought out incidentally in the course of the synkrisis between Jesus' high priesthood and the
Aaronic priesthood (Heb. 7.11, 22; 8.6; and 9.1, 15). What seems to be the case is this: the Aaronic
priesthood is connected with Mosaic law, and so to replace it with a different order of high priesthood
presupposes the replacement as well of Mosaic law; thus if a high priesthood emerges that is superior to
the Aaronic one, it follows that the law/covenant that undergirds it must as well be superior to that of
Moses. For more see Horbury (1983, 54-55).
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type in the antitype, is present when it is said that he has more glory than Moses (glory,
an aspect in the type, is intensified in the antitype).
4.2.5. High-Priestly Christology
The bulk of the content of Hebrews has to do with high priesthood (first introduced in
1.4, touched on in 2.17 and 3.1 and the focus of 4.14-10.18), and because priests must
have a sanctuary to attend to, discourse on the high priesthood also has to do with the
tabernacle47 and the activities therein.48 To set the stage for the synkrisis between Jesus
and the Aaronic high priests, a few preliminary remarks are in order. There have been
studies on the high priest based on the Hebrew Bible and on later developments from it
in the 2nd Temple period with both astonishing conclusions and far-reaching
consequences.
One such conclusion is that the high priest, particularly on the 'Day ofAtonement',
was apotheosized (some would have, angelomorphosized) when he entered the holy of
holies.49 Inextricably related to these conclusions is the view that the temple (or
sanctuary) is a microcosm of creation, wherein heaven meets the earth, with the holy of
holies being heaven itself (Barker 1991 and Hayward 1996).50 Though important in
bringing out the mediatorial role of high priestly figures and in contributing to the
understanding of the religious context of Hebrews' discourse on high priesthood and
47
The fact that Hebrews does not mention the temple is subject to a variety of interpretations. We should
note that the temple and the tabernacle could be viewed as synonymous and as different (Koester [1989,
2] and Haran [1978, 198]). With respect to their synonymity, they are, first, both sanctuaries ofYHWH
and, secondly, the description of the tent in the Pentateuch and sacrifice regulations to be observed therein
would seem to apply in both - hence my usage of tabernacle/temple in the relevant section below. This is
to say that whatever interpretation one would make of the fact that Hebrews does not mention temple
would not invalidate the high-priestly Christology there.
48
Johnsson (1977) argues that it is in fact the cultus that is central to understanding Hebrews.
49
See especially Barker (1998a, 93-111 and 1998b, 1-21), Fletcher-Louis (1997a, 118-29, 186-96 and
1997b) and Gieschen (1998, 169-75).
50 We may even add here studies of'Heavenly Temple Traditions' that are numerous in the 2nd Temple
period and especially in Hekhalot literature (De Conick [1998, 310-21]).
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related matters, these studies will not concern us here. For our purposes, we must
restrict ourselves to the very specific discourse of Hebrews on high priesthood, the
tabernacle and sacrifice (as the principle activity therein that Hebrews considers) by
giving priority to its immediate context in all our efforts to elucidate it. As noted by a
good number of commentators, the discourse of Hebrews on the high priest, especially
on his role in the liturgy of Yom Kippur, is informed by what is found in Leviticus and
Exodus (we may add; through the eye of the Septuagint)51 with only two exceptions;
Hebrews 7.5 and 9.3.52 We shall therefore take this to be the immediate context for
understanding the high-priestly Christology resident in Hebrews.
The place, then, to begin is by seeking to determine the mediatorial roles of the
Aaronic high priesthood that are in focus here. Two (intercession and mediation of
forgiveness) stand out, and are brought out in contrast to, and side by side with, the
superiority of Christ's high priesthood. Intercession is mentioned directly with regard to
Christ, who lives forever to intercede (exoyxaveiv) for those who come to God through
him (Heb. 7.25), but it is mentioned as such in the context of the Aaronic priesthood,
whose primary role is to intercede for the people.53 With the Tabernacle/Temple cultas
this intercession is done partly in virtue of the high priest appearing before God on
behalfof the people (Heb. 9.24), which he does cardinally on the Day of Atonement.
As for mediation of forgiveness/cleansing, most of the discourse on the high priest is to
do with his activities on the Day ofAtonement, thus the spotlight is on the sacrifice that
he offered on that day and, accordingly, the author ofHebrews discusses this at relative
51 I must single out Horbury (1983) for his, in my view, conclusive argument on this.
52
Though this could be viewed to indicate influences outside the Pentateuch or pentateuchally-rooted
traditions, they should be understood, as argued by Horbury (1983, 51), to reflect 1st century
understanding of the Day of Atonement.
53 Montefiore (1964) points out how Aaron took on this responsibility by bearing the names of the
Israelites 'on the breastplate of judgement when he went into the Holy Place' (129 [Ex. 27.29]). Later
speculations that revolved around the symbolism of the high priest's vestments all point to his
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length (Heb. 9.1 -10.18). What is important to note here is that on the Day of
Atonement, the high priest offered a sacrifice for his sins and those of his people (Heb.
9.7) through which they were forgiven and cleansed. The Hebrews' writer, however,
perceives, for a number of reasons, that the expected cleansing and forgiveness did not
actually take place or was at best only an outward cleansing (more on this to follow).
The Aaronic priesthood's roles of intercession and mediation as mentioned is
highlighted in contrast to, and interwoven with, the superiority ofChrist's priesthood.
The first contrast is with the sanctuary (aKuvf)<;) in which they minister (8.1-6). The
Aaronic high priesthood serves on earth in a sanctuary made by hands and 'as a copy
(u7io5eiyp«ti) and foreshadow (okioc) ofwhat is in heaven' (5), whilst Christ serves in
heaven, in the 'true tabernacle set by the Lord' (8.2). In virtue of this, Christ has a
superior ministry (AmTUpyiac;)54 and is a superior mediator.
More importantly (because it is more specific than the first) the second contrast is
with the ineffectiveness of the Aaronic priesthood's mediation of forgiveness compared
to the efficacy of that of Jesus. Hebrews points out that the sacrifices offered by the
Aaronic priesthood in the Tabernacle/Temple did not (and could not), save for outward
purity (9.13), bring cleansing and forgiveness to the people, and thus free or effect
access to God (9.8),55 necessitating the giving of the sacrifice annually (9.9-11 and 10.1-
4, 11). Also, he considers the Aaronic priesthood's mediation as part of the old order,
which is in the process ofbeing dispensed with (9.9-10).56 But Christ's priesthood,
intercessory role (Barker 1991, 112-24). Also, by pointing to the relevant literature, Attridge (1989, 211)
shows that priests as well were understood to function primarily as intercessors in 2nd Temple period.
54 As Lane (1991, 208) points out, the LXX usage of the verb A.eixoupyeTv has 'a cultic nuance' of devine
service.
55 Sin being inimical to the approach to God; also echoed in Hebrews 9.14.
56 See Young (1981) for a detailed discussion and further reference.
158
heralding the new order and the dissolution of the old (9.11), is effectual: not only does
he enter a sanctuary not of this creation (9.11,24) but does so with his own blood which
cleanses indeed (9.14), hence the once-for-all nature of his sacrifice (9.25-26, 10.10, 12-
14). He is therefore a superior mediator of God's cleansing and forgiveness. This
contrast between the Aaronic high priesthood and Christ's high priesthood is done only
after the validation of the high priesthood of Christ (Heb. 4.14-5.10): because a high
priest must be able to sympathize with those he represents (5.1-3), Jesus sympathizes
with those he represents (4.14-15 and 5.7-10). Because a high priest must be divinely
S7
appointed (5.4), Jesus is appointed a priest in the order (xdl;r|v) of Melchizedek.' In
explicating the latter (7.1-28), Hebrews again brings to relief the superiority ofChrist's
high-priestly intercession and mediation over the Aaronic one. Scholars of Hebrews are
not agreed on exactly what kind of relationship there exists between Melchizedek and
Christ.58
For our purposes, it suffices to note that we have a correspondence between
Melchizedek and Jesus, which Hebrews uses to validate and illuminate the priesthood of
Christ, with the result that the understanding of the high priesthood ofChrist in
Hebrews is interpreted with reference to the priesthood of Melchizedek. There are two
basic correspondences which are used accordingly to show an aspect of the superiority
ofChrist's priesthood over the Aaronic one.
No consideration is given here to the Qumran's Melchizedek tradition as possibly contributing to the
religious context ofHebrews because, as shown by a number of studies (see Aschim 1998 and De Jonge
and Van Der Woude 1966), it does not contribute significantly to the interpretation and use of
Melchizedek that is found in Hebrews.
58
Proposals on Melchizedek's relationship to Christ include the following: an antitype of Christ (Horton
1976, 161-64), a pre-figurement ofChrist (Delcor 1971, 125-27), even a pre-incarnation ofChrist
(Hanson 1964, 398-402).
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The first is with the eternity ofMelchizedek and his priesthood (7.3, 7):59 because
Christ's priesthood is in the Td^rjv of Melchizedek, it is forever. Therefore Christ's
priesthood is superior to the Aaronic one since, unlike Aaronic high priests, he has a
permanent priesthood, and thus always lives to make intercession (eTuyx«vetv) for
'those who come to God through him' (7.23-25).
The second correspondence is with the 'other' in the Melchizedek priesthood, i.e.,
Melchizedek shows the existence of another order of priesthood not founded on Aaronic
pedigree (aaKpivr|<;) but on indestructible life (^copt; dKaxaX-uxou) and on an oath that is
unchangeable (7.11, 15-20). So, Jesus' priesthood, being of the order of Melchizedek, is
introduced to replace the Aaronic one that has failed to perfect the people (7.1 1, 18).60
So we see again Jesus being like an Aaronic high priest because he meets the
requirements of being a priest, and also performs their roles. However he is superior to
them because, being a priest in the order of Melchizedek, he surpasses them (thus
making them defunct) by his effectiveness in those roles.
Here again we see the replication of the two kinds of typologies encountered in the
synkrisis between angels and Jesus, and between Moses and Jesus. Specifically, we
have the first characteristic of typology where, as mentioned, there is a correspondence
between the type and antitype that ends in a contrast. The Aaronic high priest (the type)
corresponds to Jesus' high priesthood (the antitype) in the sense that both mediate
forgiveness/cleansing and intercede for people, but Jesus' high priesthood, unlike the
59 We shall not discus here the enigmatic dttdTcop d|rf|Tcop dyevECxXoYriTOt;, pf|T£ dp^ryv fipepcov giftE
xekoc; excov (Heb. 3.7) but only note that whether conceived of literally, or symbolically, or
otherwise (see Demarest's [1978] for some history of its interpretation), it signifies eternity, which will
suffice for our argument.
60 Note how the Aaronic priesthood is tied to the Mosaic covenant, just as Jesus' priesthood is tied to the
new covenant; see footnote 35.
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Aaronic one, serves in heaven, is effective in mediating cleansing, is of a new order, and
is eternal in nature. The second characteristic is in the intensification of an aspect of the
type in the antitype, which we encounter here in the sacrifice offered. That is, one of
the reasons Jesus' mediation of forgiveness is superior to that of Aaronic high priest is
because the sacrifice Jesus has given is his own body in a heavenly tabernacle and not a
goat or bull in an earthly one.
However, it must be stated here that while we had to justify why we think a
typological relationship between Jesus and angels exists, and argue out from Numbers,
and its interpretation tradition, the nature of the typology between Jesus and Moses, the
typological relationship here between Jesus and the Aaronic high priest is quite
forthright and spelt out in Hebrews itself. This is best encapsulated in the words of the
author himself in Hebrews 10.1, where the Aaronic high priesthood and its cultus are
understood as foreshadows (otaav) of the good things to come (xcov geAAovxcov
ayocGcov),61 (the Hebrews writer has already intimated that with Christ have come the
good things [Heb. 9.11 Xpiaxoq 8e rcapayevopevoq ap%iepen<; xwv yevogevcov
ayocGcov]).
Putting all the foregoing together, I submit that, according to Hebrews, Jesus is the
mediatorpar excellence, or the definitive mediator. He is greater than angels, Moses,
and the Aaronic high priest, because his being is superior to theirs, and because, and for
61
Apparently none in more recent Hebrews scholarship would take the view that otcux here in Hebrews is
used in the Platonic sense of a shadow, something unreal or passing, a lesser reality of the eternal, as was
held before by scholars such as Moffatt (1924, 135). If this was indeed the case, then the cultus of the
Old Testament would stand in quite a different relationship to Christ than the one given above which
understands the cultus as having a 'horizontal nuance' (phrase from Hurst 1990, 16) by pointing to Christ
in a temporal (eschatological) way. As Peterson (1982) puts it' ... our writer does not use enact in the
Platonic sense, as if the things referred to were unreal or even deceptive: our writer is not primarily a
Platonic idealist but an eschatologist. He means that "the new order was at hand, at the door, projecting
itself on the plane ofOT history, announcing its advent. The history, the law and the cultus of Israel were
to this extent witnesses in advance to the Christian salvation'" (144-45).
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this reason, he carries out more effectively the mediatorial roles they are understood to
carry out. This Christology is one that selectively exploits the religious context of the
2nd Temple period, with regard to mediators, broadly conceived, but also adds to it.
Consequently, we can say that Hebrews' Christology is to a large extent indebted to, and
indeed derived from, the said religious context. That is, Jesus in Hebrews is understood
to be the definitive mediator between humans and God, an apprehension that is
conceptualized and expressed through the use of known mediatorial figures (angels,
Moses, and high priest) in the 2nd Temple period, and as they were conceived at the
time. As we have shown, this exploitation is not random but carried out consistently
within a typology framework, which is debatable in the case of angels, alluded to in the
case of Moses, but most clearly seen in the case ofAaronic high priests. A brief critical
comment now on the implication of typology in Hebrews is in order, for it will help
advance our typology-based reading of it in Africa in subsequent chapters.
In the previous chapter we discussed how typology acts as a theological hermeneutic
of the Old Testament in the New; this is precisely what is taking place in Hebrews.
Through typological interpretations, the Old Testament is interpreted and made sense of
in a way that speaks anew to the faith and life of the Christian community which
Hebrews addresses. The result of this - on account of the theology of typology earlier
discussed that God is the entelechy of history bringing it to a fulfilment in Christ - is
that the figures in synkrisis with Jesus can be understood to anticipate him (thereby
illuminating him), and in varying degrees to be incomplete or imperfect, so that their
roles are completed or perfected in him, i.e., are fulfilled in him. As it were, these
mediatorial figures in the history ofIsrael are works ofGod in its history in order that
they may lead to, and in some cases, be fulfilled in Christ. So strong is this motif in
Hebrews that the Aaronic high priesthood and the cultic institution of Israel and the
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revered mediatorial figures of principal chief angels and Moses are surpassed and made
redundant by Jesus. As Hays (1989) observes, the typological strategy of Hebrews is
uniquely 'relentlessly supersessionist' (98). If the typological strategy in Hebrews were
to be divested of the theological presupposition just described, the pointing to Christ




JESUS, THE GREATEST ANCESTOR: HEBREWS' CHRISTOLOGY IN
AFRICA
The kind ofNew Testament biblical interpretation we proposed, one which is
characterized by the direct transfer of a New Testament typological text's1 meaning
from its initial context onto a present contemporary one, we called typology-based
theological interpretation of the New Testament. This is how we pointed out that it
works. When we have parallels between a New Testament typological text's initial
and contemporary contexts, where portions of the text's initial context correspond to
elements in a contemporary context, then, on the basis of the theological conviction
that correspondences between the two are due to God's working in the histories of
both contexts, we can have a direct transfer of the text's message from its initial
audience onto its present contemporary audience. In this chapter, we wish to carry
out such an interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa. In other words, we
shall attempt to transfer Hebrews' Christology of'Jesus the mediator par excellence'
directly onto a contemporary African context. In order to do this, we must show a
clear parallel between Hebrews' initial context and its contemporary African one.
Such a parallel is found in the traditions ofmediation that exist in both contexts:
principal angels, Moses, Aaronic high priests in the one, and ancestors in the other.
1
That is, as we explained, New Testament texts that are themselves typological interpretations of
parts of the Old Testament.
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So, it is necessary to investigate critically and interpret the ancestor tradition in
Africa en route to a typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews'
Christology in Africa.
5.1 ANCESTORS IN AFRICA
In this section we are interested in establishing, as far as we can, a general picture
of the role of ancestors in Africa, with the purpose of showing, within this general
picture, that they function as mediators. We should, then, bear in mind two things:
the first is that the portrait of ancestors in Africa that we shall paint in this chapter is
only a general one. Any detailed, unitary, or over-arching view is illusory since there
are differences in the details of the beliefs in, and veneration of, ancestors among
various African peoples. Consequently, we must be content with a modest attempt to
establish a general view of ancestors in Africa, for anything other than that, unless
restricted to a particular ethnic group, would not be true to observations on the
ground. Secondly, whatever may appear excursive in any section of this chapter, i.e.,
not directly relevant to the crux of our study, should not be dismissed as such, since
all that is discussed below is designed to aid our conception of ancestor figures in
Africa and thus, in turn, our grasp of their mediatorial functions.
Years back, in an apparent concession to the ubiquity of ancestors in Africa's
religious heritage, Young (1950) wrote: 'No approach to any appreciation of
indigenous ideas regarding God can take any path but through the thought-area
occupied by ancestors' (38). Whilst this is the case, it must be emphasized, as Fortes
noted (1965), that ancestors 'are only a part of a total complex of religious and ritual
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institutions of an African people' (16). This means that any study of ancestors in
Africa not only has to look at the beliefs in, and thus rituals concerning, ancestors,
but also should try to make sense of them within the cosmology in which they
operate. Starting with the ontology and the abode of ancestors, therefore, we will
attempt to do this against the background ofmy reading, which covers more or less
14 ethnic groups found in different regions of Africa.2 At the end, we should be able
to grasp something of a concrete but generalized view of ancestors in Africa, and,
more importantly, their mediatorial functions.
5. 1. 1. The Ontology and Abode ofAncestors
On looking at ancestors in Africa, one encounters a plethora ofbeliefs in and
rituals concerning them that converge in some ways but also diverge and are in
tension in other ways. Nevertheless the following is common. Ancestors are
believed to have been human beings (now spirits) who have died and are understood
to have a close relationship with the living, pervasively influencing their affairs by
helping or punishing them (depending on their conduct). The ancestors themselves
are in certain cases classified into various groups. The Shona, for example, have
three groups: supra-tribal ones from the past ruling class, tribal ones, and family ones
(Daneel 1970, 51). It would appear that in all cases, upon death and subject to the
necessary funeral rites, the qualification to be an ancestor would normally be
parenthood and a virtuous life (Mutah 1999, 1 19, Uchendu 1976, 292ff, and Idowu
2 The Igbo of Nigeria (Mutah 1999), the Kamba of Kenya (Gehman 1989) the Tellensi of Sierra Leone
(Fortes 1987), Xhosa of Southern Africa (Hodgson 1982), the Ganda ofUganda (Kyewalyanga 1976),
the Tiriki of Kenya (Sangree 1974), the Yoruba ofNigeria (Idowu 1973), the Mende of Sierra Leone
(Sawyerr 1970), the Shona of Zimbabwe (Daneel 1970), Sotho-Tswana of Southern Africa (Setiloane
1973), the Anlo ofGhana (Gaba 1969), the Songo of Tanzania (Gray 1963), the Zande of Sudan
(Evans-Pritchard 1962), and the Lugbara ofUganda (Middleton 1960).
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1973, 186). But there are exceptions to this: Kabasale (1991, 118) for example,
though without reference to any ethnic group in particular, has death in old age, i.e.,
a death that is not premature, as a qualification; the Malawi people seem to have no
qualifications except, perhaps, adult initiation (Morris 2000, 222); and the Lugbara
admit the childless into ancestorhood (Middleton 1960, 33).
As opposed to the ontology of ancestors and the qualifications of ancestorhood,
the abode of ancestors is vague. Some like Middleton (1960, 28), with reference to
the Lugbara, have concluded that details on the abode of ancestors are not available;
however, this is not representative. Despite a 'lack of elaboration and indeed interest
among the Africans in the cosmography of the afterworld in which the ancestors
reside' (Kopytoff 1971, 129), some details on the abode of ancestors have been
gleaned from the amorphous information available from some studies ofAfrican
people. For the Zande of Sudan (Evans-Pritchard 1962, 201) they live with Mbori,
the Supreme Deity, in the sacred caves,3 while for the Suku ofCongo (Kopytoff,
1971, 130) they live near graves and at crossroads, or even in places that are natural
phenomena, such as lakes, rivers, forests, caves and mountains. What is significantly
prevalent in this fragmentary information on the beliefs concerning the abode of
ancestors is that wherever they are, they are not beyond reach, time or space. This is
an observation that would fit with the belief (even where information on the abode of
ancestors is not forthcoming) that ancestors are near and around African peoples:
they have a living presence amongst them.
3 Some names ofGod in African languages are the same as the name of the abode of ancestors
(Dammann 1969, 87-89), which suggests that ancestors live with God.
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5.1.2. Ancestor Worship?
A look at ancestors in Africa cannot avoid the question ofwhether ancestors are
worshipped, if only because some perceive this to be integral to the ancestral
phenomena in Africa and proceed to describe it as such, i.e., 'ancestor worship'.
According to the literature on African religions that I have studied, it appears that
prior to the 1960s it was taken for granted that Africans worshipped their ancestors.4
But this was increasingly called into question with different scholars of African
religions (e.g., Brain 1973, 126 and Mbiti 1969, 8-9) arguing that they did not. In
my opinion the answer given to the question ofwhether Africans worship ancestors
will always be relative to the assumed understanding ofworship. So, as a first
example, we have some African theologians,5 probably due to their theological
commitments to monotheism and the subsequent implications that worship of
ancestors may have, denying ancestor worship, and preferring, (following St.
Augustine's categorization of kinds ofworship) to look at the beliefs and attitudes of
Africans to their ancestors as Dulia,6 i.e. the 'veneration of ancestors' or 'communion
with ancestors'. Then, as a second example, we have scholars such as Hammond-
Tooke (1978), who call into question such an understanding and categorization of
worship. Hammond-Tooke questions what 'veneration' here really means and thinks
that importing our own ideas ofworship into the concept, laden as they are with
4
Kenyatta (1938, 265-68) is one of the exceptions here; he felt that worship was not a true depiction
of the relationship between Africans and their ancestors.
5 These are Bediako (1994), Kabasale (1991), Ela (1989), Nyamiti (1984), Fashole-Luke (1974);
Sawyerr (1966 and 1970) appears here to be the exception.
6 As opposed to Latvia which is given only to God. In traditional Roman Catholic theology reverence
is classified into three categories: 1. Dulia, which is understood as honour usually given to saints 'who
manifest in a unique way the activity of God in their lives' (McBrien 1995, 435). This reverence is
said to honour God by 'recognizing the presence of God manifest in the lives of the saints' (Ibid.). 2.
Hyperdulia, which is special honour given to Mary. She is 'uniquely honoured because of her role as
the Mother ofGod' (646). 3. Latvia, which is 'the worship and adoration owed to God alone' (758). It
168
Judaeo-Christian theological presuppositions, does not help in assessing whether
Africans worship their ancestors or not, but to the contrary, borders on cultural
arrogance. He consequently proposes a different understanding ofworship adopted
from Smart and, accordingly, uses it to judge that Africans indeed worship their
ancestors. According to Smart (1972), there seem to be five basic elements that
constitute worship. These are:
First, worship is a relational activity: one cannot worship oneself... Second, the
ritual ofworship expresses the superiority of the Focus to the worshipper(s).
Third, the ritual also perfonnatively sustains or is part of the power of the
Focus. Fourth, the experience which worship expresses is that of the
numinous, and the object of worship is thus perceived as awe-inspiring (26-
27).
These elements, in Hammond-Tooke's view, are all fulfilled in the way that African
relate to their ancestors except in the case of the fourth element, which he does not
consider as necessary to the concept of worship. He thereby concludes that Africans
worship their ancestors.
But discourse on the nature and meaning ofworship is complex, even within the
circumscription of a particular religion. And, contra Hammond-Tooke's view, there
is no escaping theological presuppositions since it is from the practice of religions
that the concept has arisen in the first place (which means one cannot have
definitions and understandings ofworship that are independent of the practices of
religion - they are inextricably related. Indeed Smart's understanding is on the basis
of the religions he observes!). In consequence, taking up this debate on worship in
this thesis would take us too far afield and distract us from our main pupose, so we
is such distinctions between reverential attitudes that African theologians have found useful in
understanding, and defending, the attitude of Africans to their ancestors as not worship, i.e., not latria.
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must refrain from it. In any case, as what follows will show, I do not consider it as
immediately crucial to the argument ofmy thesis. It suffices for us here to note
simply, whatever our views on worship, that African peoples have traditionally had a
thriving and elaborate ancestor cult: shrines are built for them, there are special
places designated for them, sacrifices, libations and other offerings are made to them,
and they are consulted, appealed to and invoked in a variety ofways and in various
circumstances. We may call the beliefs in, and rituals concerning, ancestors in
Africa, 'the ancestor cult',7 which seems more acceptable as a descriptive term to
most, than the more evaluative and, for reasons alluded to above, threatening,
'ancestor worship'.
5.1.3. Interpretations ofthe Ancestor Phenomena
Tensions are to be found in attempts to make sense of the ancestor cult. The
problem is made more acute because of the indefinite nature of the data available.
Several interpretations have been advanced but seem to suffer from 'reductionism'
and, with it, the loss of accountability for vital aspects of religion, which is always
rich, diverse, and even ambiguous. For example, based on his study of the Tallensi
in Ghana, Fortes (1987, 66-82) proposed that the ancestor cult (he called it worship)
'is rooted in domestic, kinship and descent relations, and institutions' (66). Thus it
could be understood as an extension of such relationships, or as a reflection of such
relationships, or even as ritual expression of such relationships. In other words the
7 Whereas the term 'cult' may have a more technical meaning where, for example, it refers to worship
that involves sacrifice, or as a small closed group that is distinct from the mainstream religious body, I
am using the term here in a rather loose way to denote some form of veneration. In using it this way, I
follow the way it has been used in much literature on Ancestors in Africa, and in some literature on
Saints (e.g. 'Cult of Saints' [Horbury 1998, 445]), to denote or signify some kind of veneration a
group, or groups, may have for a particular figure.
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ancestor cult is, in essence, the extension of kinship or communal (human) relations
beyond the gulf occasioned by death. A good number of scholars dealing with
o
ancestors in Africa take this view. However his interpretation reduces, or limits, the
understanding of ancestors in the religious life of Africans to what can be accounted
for sociologically. Yet as Turner (1981, 13) points out, any study ofAfrican
religious heritage that limits it to what can be accounted for sociologically, or
psychologically, or philosophically, or even phenomenologically would blind the
person concerned from seeing some of its other features and meanings.9 Indeed two
important suggestions of how traditional African religion can be interpreted and
understood are bedevilled by reductionism.
The first suggestion was by Tempels (1959) who proposed that the concept of vital
force should be used in the understanding of African philosophy and religion among
the Bantu. Tempels' argument is centred on the belief that a people's ontology ('a
concrete conception of being and of the universe' [17]) will define and thus unlock,
inter alia, their beliefs and religious practices. We, therefore, understand people to
the degree that we are cognizant of their ontology. Tempels' investigation of the
Bantu of the Congo led him to the conclusion that their ontology is to be found in the
notion of vital force (30-39). Tempels himself struggles to define this concept
precisely. But the general impression created from his explication of it is that vital
force is the power or force of life or behind life, so that 'being' to the Bantu is to have
this vital force (34ff). This force is of utmost importance to the Bantu; the 'Bantu
8 For example Ela (1989, 15-17), Fashole-Luke (1974), and McKnight (1967).
9
Indeed there are a number of approaches to making sense of religious phenomena (see Whaling
1984). See Idinopulos and Yonan (1994) for more discussion on reductionism.
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soul hankers after life and force' (33), Tempels writes. It can be made stronger,
weakened or even rendered powerless. Niirnberger (1975, 176-79) employs
Tempels' concept to explain the place and role of ancestors amongst the Sotho in
Southern Africa. According to him, life-force is the experience of reality among the
Sotho people and whose 'operational centre is the lineage' (176). By this he means
the life of a son is derived from the father, who in turn derives his life from his father
etc. This endowment of life should not be taken in a biological sense since, he
explains:
The decisive criterion of true sonship is that the son is endowed with the life-
force of the lineage through the mediation of the father or his rightful
representative... Once he is integrated into the ongoing lineage he becomes a
potential channel of its life-force. This life force has passed through many
generations before it reaches the son through the father... All members of the
lineage, not only those who are still to be born, depend on the vitality of this
life-stream, which manifests itself through its forceful perpetuation (176).
When this is understood, the role of ancestors is grasped as that of being the life-
force's 'most formidable channel and representatives' (178).
The second suggestion is by Mbiti (1969, 15-28), who proposes that the African
concept of time be used to make sense of African religion. Mbiti is of the opinion
that, 'the concept of time may help to explain beliefs, attitudes, practices, and the
general way of life of African peoples...' (16). According to him, time in African
society must be lived to make sense and to become real. This renders the future,
except the future that is expected ('what is certain to occur, or what falls within the
rhythm of natural phenomena' [17]), an alien concept in African societies.
Consequently, there are only two dimensions of time in Africa: the past (Zamani)
and the present (Sasa). Sasa is the 'time region in which people are conscious of
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their existence, and within which they project themselves both for the short future
and mainly into the past (Zamani); Zamani is the past into which people on the whole
cannot project themselves (because this time region goes further back beyond than
their capacity to do so). So, in traditional African societies, history moves
backwards, 'from the Sasa period to the Zamani, from the moment of intense
experience to the period beyond which nothing goes' (23). The effect of this is to
make Zamani foundational for African peoples as the place towards which they see
all of life ever moving, and thus the place to look to for issues of life. Mbiti then
concludes that it is in the Zamani period that we ought to look to understand African
philosophy and religion. Accordingly, this is the context in which he locates his
discussion of African religion and philosophy. It would be interesting to see what
interpretation one would come up with using this concept of time to make sense of
the phenomenon of ancestors in Africa. In my research, I have yet to come across
anyone who has used it to do so. Mbiti himself does not use it to look at ancestors,
whom he seems least interested in; and in the end he dismisses the tenn 'ancestor'
offhand as a rather unhelpful, if not, confusing one (85)!
The main point, then, is clear: both Mbiti and Tempels limit the interpretation of
African religion to what can be accounted for by their African philosophical
schema10 thus suffering the consequences of reductionism just alluded to. We must,
therefore, look for an alternative interpretation of the Ancestor cult that is, perhaps, a
more inclusive one, able to offer a truer perception of the role and function of
ancestors in Africa.
10 This is in the sense that their philosophical schema is derived from African peoples themselves.
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Mbiti (1969, 4-5), more promisingly, observed that African religions are
anthropocentric, an observation that seems to me both acute and relevant to
understanding the ancestral phenomena in Africa. Mbiti is not alone in this
observation; Zahan's (1970) study on the religion of traditional Africa led him to the
following conclusion:
...the essence ofAfrican spirituality lies in the feeling that man has of being at
once image, model, and integral part of the world in whose cyclical life he
senses himself deeply and necessarily engaged. All of African spiritual life is
based on this vision ofman's situation and role. The idea of a finality outside
ofman is foreign to it. Man was not made for God or for the universe; he exists
for himself and carries within himself the justification of his existence and of
his religious and moral perfection. It is not to "please" God or out of love for
God that the African "prays," implores, or makes sacrifice, but rather to
become himself and to realize the order in which he finds himself implicated.
The sky and the divinity are only thought of insofar as they represent
something about man, who constitutes, so to speak, the keystone of the African
religious structure (5).
Indeed it may well be, as argued by Horton (1993, 192), that the chief elements in
the religious life ofmost African societies are explanation, prediction and control of
the world around them. Instead of seeing these elements as orientated merely to
worldly events as he does, I would see them orientated to the community in the
entirety of its life. Accordingly, it seems to me, the sustenance or preservation of the
community is what determines the role, if not the raison d'etre, of ancestors: it is
squarely at the heart of the ancestor cult. It is in such a context that one can
understand the remarks ofChidester (1991), that, 'Historically, ancestor religion has
operated as a force of conservatism, maintaining lifestyles and social relations
associated with the past' (12), in short sustaining the community. This is why
ancestors are consulted, appeased, appealed to, and invoked. I should think that such
an understanding allows for most of the multifarious functions of ancestors (such as
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guardians of the land, providers, guarantors of fertility, custodians of the morality,
and customs of the community etc.) to be accounted for.
One such function, which is strictly my prime interest in the ancestors of Africa, is
mediation. Allusions to the mediatorial role of ancestors are frequent in literature on
African ancestors,11 but they do not meet with universal countenance.12 The crucial
question that needs to be answered for our purposes at this juncture is this: Between
whom do ancestors mediate? Should it be taken for granted that it is a straight¬
forward mediation between an Ultimate Deity (God, the Supreme Being etc.) and
humans? This leads us to the discussion of the cosmology that ancestors operate in,
for it is only against the background of African cosmology that the mediatorial role
of ancestors is thrown into relief.
5.1.4. Ancestors as Mediatorial Figures
As Idowu (1973, 139), amongst others, makes clear, the religious cosmology of
Africa is encompassed by spirit beings: ancestors/ancestor spirits, spirits, and
divinities or deities. It could be further argued that to this be added nature or natural
forces (whether as animistic or theophanous). This supra-human or spirit world is
hierarchically ordered. Some communities such as the Shona of Zimbabwe (Daneel
"
See, for intance, Sawyerr (1970, 5), McVeigh (1974, 35, 115), Kyewelyanga (1976, 274), Morris
(2000, 231), Idowu (1973, 184), Hodgson (1982, 85), Daneel (1970, 18), and Gaba (1969, 78).
12 A notable example is Ilesanmi (1991). He asserts that in the past, the Yoruba understood their
ancestors as deified (i.e., given the status of gods), and the only and final point of reference (thus not
intermediaries) when appealed to or invoked (221). In response we may note that other studies (see
Idowu 1973) suggest otherwise, whilst the fact that an ancestor figure may be appealed to without
further reference to any other force or person does not rule out a mediatorial role; one can still be the
final reference in acting on behalf of another or because s/he or it has been given the powers to do so
as we argue in the following section. Another example here is Hammond-Tooke (1978). He writes,
'... the oft-repeated statement that the ancestors stand in a hierarchical relationship to the supreme
being and mediate between him and man, is not part of any indigenous world-view', (138). His bold
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1970, 51) may have a simple hierarchically-ordered spirit world starting with humans
(themselves having a hierarchical ordering) at the bottom, then ancestors, and then a
Supreme Deity at the top, while others such as the Yoruba ofNigeria (Idowu 1973,
139) have a complex hierarchically ordered spirit world, having humans at the
bottom, then ancestors, then a horde of deities, and lastly a Supreme Deity at the top.
Simple hierarchically-ordered spirit worlds seem to characterize East, Central, and
Southern African societies, while complex ordered spirit worlds characterize West
African societies.
At issue in the understanding of these spirit worlds, and therewith the
understanding of the mediation of ancestors, is the notion of a Supreme Deity.
Contingent on how one understands African beliefs on the notion of a Supreme
Deity, the spirit world, so described, could be understood as a form of polytheism, in
which case the mediation of ancestors would be between humans and a deity, or not
be there at all. Those who are convinced that the latter is the case (e.g. Illesanmi
1991 and Hammond-Tooke 1960, 138) perceive the ancestor cult to be an end in
itself, meaning that ancestors are autonomous entities, acting in their own power and
authority, and independent of other personae. Alternatively the spirit world could be
understood as more or less a pantheon which has an Ultimate Deity at its head; in
which case the mediation of ancestors is understood to be between humans and the
Ultimate Deity. Here, other deities (applicable only to West African societies)13 as
well as the ancestors are understood to have power and authority that is derived from,
and sweeping judgement cannot be accepted because it is based only on his study of the South-Eastern
Bantu peoples and, also, is not checked against data from elsewhere in Africa.
13 This is so because in East, Central and Southern Africa the belief in other deities seems to be
lacking unlike in West Africa where it is pervasive.
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and finally accountable to, this Ultimate Deity. Furthermore, their role is seen as a
delegated one and they are, as a result, seen as representatives of the Ultimate Deity
(some would say his manifestations).
So what notion of the Ultimate Deity prevails in African societies? From West to
Southern Africa we encounter (at least traditionally) most widely the notion of a
great deity who is above all others primarily because he/she/it ('he' from here on)14 is,
essentially, believed to be responsible for the creation of all things. However, for a
variety of reasons, he is now far away up in the sky and thus almost inaccessible (cf.
McVeigh 1974, Gaba 1969, Evans-Pritchard 1962 and O'Connell 1962); a
characteristic that is at times called Deus otiosus or remotus.'5 Consequently, this
Deity is commonly associated with, if not identified as, the sky and sun, and it is for
this reason, that the term often used for this Deity is the 'High God/Deity'. Though
on some points debatable, Damman (1969) captures this phenomenon appositely in
writing:
...besides spirits and deities there is an isolated deity, quite independent from
and not related to other deities, solitary and of unknown origin, without
dependants, neither wife nor family. Certain general characteristics always
recur. This High God is usually known as creator, but not necessarily in the
sense of creatio ex nihilo. He has set certain rules of human conduct. The
phenomenon of death is traced back to him, and it is he who calls away those
whose time on earth is over. In the beginning he used to live near places of
men, but later - sometimes in consequence of some human awkwardness - he
has withdrawn (6).
I have chosen to use 'he' when referring to this higher deity in African cosmology more for
convenience than anything else, since it is evident that not all notions of a higher deity conceive of the
deity as, male, or even, as female.
15
Interestingly enough the same fate follows ancestors: with each succeeding generation the current
crop of ancestors - apart from those who become deified - begin to recede in the background and are
eventually forgotten as they join the family of ancestors no longer having any crucial relationship with
the living.
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This notion of a High Deity in Africa is found in the mythologies of the African
peoples.16 The most common reason put down in the myths for the withdrawal
(though by no means absolute) of the High Deity is, as alluded to by Damman, in the
quotation above, due to the unacceptable conduct of human beings. So, for example,
among the Barotse of Zambia, the High God withdrew because Nyambi (the first
man) murdered other creatures (Sprowl 1991, 35-36); among the Yao of Tanzania
(36-37), it is because they were burning up everything in their environment; whilst
among the Ngombe of the Congo, it is because of the quarrelsomeness of human
beings (47-48).
However, the withdrawal of this High Deity is not absolute; he may be withdrawn
but he has not disappeared altogether. This means that some things can be said about
him apart from credit for creating the world. Indeed there are beliefs in, and
conceptions of him that can be gleaned through a semantic study of his names. One
of the best illustrations of this is found in Setiloane's (1973) study of'Modimo: God
Among the Sotho-Tswana', where he looks at not only the significance of the name
of the Supreme Being, but also the praise names given to Modimo. For instance, he
points out that Modimo is a noun of the second class. 'This class contains also mosi,
"smoke", motto, "fire", moya, "wind", ngwedi, "moon", mohodi (Sotho) or muwane,
"mist" and meane, "lightning"' (6). All of these are intangible elemental objects
which points to a perception ofModimo as intangible and mysterious, a primary
quality of the deity, Setiloane notes.17
16 A collection of some of these myths can be found in Sprowl (1991).
17 See also Gaba (1969) for a similar study on An/o.
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Generally, with few exceptions, there is no worship around this High Deity; but if
he is ever approached, whether directly or through intermediaries, it is mostly in
times of a major crisis (Pobee 1979, 47) or when all else has failed (McVeigh 1974,
35). It is not clear whether the deity is a persona and, thus, whether in
anthropomorphic representation he is male or female; neither is it clear whether he is
moral or amoral. What seems clear from my reading of the relevant literature is that
the spirit world ofAfrica's religious cosmology has a sense of a superior deity in its
hierarchy of power and authority and would therefore best be described as a
pantheon with the High Deity, at its head. This High Deity in Africa's religious
cosmology may then be conceived of as the Ultimate Deity, as God.
Ancestors and other spiritual beings, consequently, can be understood to function
as mediators of the Ultimate Deity. This is more openly the case, for example,
amongst the Ngoni of Malawi (Read 1956, 191-192), the Mende of Sierra Leone
(Sawyerr 1970, 66) and the Ibo ofNigeria (Mutah 1999, 90), where Unkurukulu,
Ngweno, and Chukwu, respectively, have mediators in ancestors.18 However, we
must concede that in some African societies, there is vagueness in the precise
relationship of God to spirits, divinities, ancestors, and human beings principally
because addressees of prayers are the ancestors themselves. They seem to be
understood to act in their own power without recourse to God to whom they would,
presumably, forward the prayers of the people. (In fact it is this that has led to some
scholars to reject the notion of an ultimate Deity.) But then vagueness of relationship
18
Consequently attempts have been made to classify the different types ofmediations that exist in
Africa's religious cosmologies. Shorter (2001, 48-50), for example, classifies them into six models,
viz., 'strict theism', 'modified theism', 'symmetrical mediation', 'asymmetrical mediation', 'modified
deism', and 'strict deism'.
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does not mean there is none whatsoever. The very fact of a transcending and
defining ultimate Deity (defining in the sense that he is credited with creation and, by
extension, life) means there is a relationship of ancestors and other beings to this
Deity. Such a relationship could be understood in various ways, of which I consider
two.
We argued earlier that ancestors in Africa should be understood chiefly in terms of
sustaining and preserving the community they belong to - that is, they serve as
guarantors of life to their communities. It would therefore follow that if the Ultimate
Deity is credited with creating life, then those who serve to sustain it are not quite
unrelated to him but on the contrary are mediators between him and the people. If
we may paraphrase this: to havepower to sustain life is to mediatefor the one whom
the people understand ultimately to be the source of that life. It is for this reason that
on rare occasions ancestors are simply bypassed and the Ultimate Deity invoked
directly. Nurnberger (1975), while looking at the relationship ofModimo and the
ancestral spirits of the Sotho in South Africa isolates this argument in a way that
deserves full quotation:
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There can be no doubt that the real addressees of prayers and sacrifices are the
ancestors themselves and not a further authority beyond them, to whom they
have to forward the supplications. There is also no doubt that they act -
benevolently or malevolently - in their own right and power. Nevertheless
there is a connection of some sort, and it has to be. After all dynamistic reality
is unitarian. The life-stream of the lineage is part and parcel of a greater whole
of dynamistic power. If Modimo is the source of all dynamistic power around,
then it is obvious that ancestors are "closer" to the Modimo in the sense that
more of such power is at their command than at the command of the living.
This power they are expected to utilize for the benefit of the living offspring.
Put into mythological imagery the ancestors appear as mediators (bcitseta)
between man and Modimo. Obviously the example of normal social
relationships between a minor and a superior (say a commoner and a chief)
through the agency of intermediaries lends itself perfectly to such an imagery
... Existentially nothing more can be said than that there is some sort of
continuity between the power of ancestors (i.e. that of lineage) and Modimo as
the great beyond of all dynamistic power (187).
The second kind of relationship between ancestors and the Ultimate Deity is the
perception that the Ultimate Deity manifests himself, consequently becoming
immediate to the people, through ancestors and other beings. Here ancestors are
understood to be his proxy. This is very clear amongst the Lugbara of Uganda where
the power of Onyiri is manifest in, amongst other things, the form of spirits which
include ancestors (Middleton 1960, 27). So then, this much can be said, even in the
absence of a clear and openly defined relationship between the High Deity and
ancestors: ancestors function variously as mediators between people and God.
Some, such as Horton (1993, 161-193), have sought to vitiate the conclusion just
made that there is an Ultimate Deity in Africa's religious cosmology by insisting that
such a view is an interpretation highly shaped by Judaeo-Christian and, I should add,
Muslim templates. Sharevskaya (1973, 38-48) has gone even further in criticising
this conclusion by insisting that the conclusion is a product of the 'fideists', of the
church and its objectives and that in Africa, there is no existence whatsoever of an
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Ultimate Deity. We need not take Sharevskaya's sustained critique seriously; her
thesis is not backed at all by any concrete data on studies done on the religions of
Africa's peoples, nor has she taken time to ponder the significance of the numerous
myths in Africa that support heavily, as pointed out, the notion of an Ultimate Deity.
We may turn now to Horton's critique. Whereas I concur that Judaeo-Christian
and Muslim templates are a factor in the descriptions, if not analyses, of the notions
of an Ultimate Deity as found in Africa's religions (missionaries tended to study
African religion to help their efforts to evangelize Africa, history of religion studies
privilege one religious tradition in analyzing the other), I think that our conclusion
would largely be accounted for by the encounter ofAfrican societies with
Christianity and Islam. The impact of these encounters has been colossal, making
their mark on all aspects of Africa's cosmology and not least in their conceptions of,
and belief in, a supreme Deity.19 Of course, this is not to say that the impact was
one-way or on a passive recipient (Sanneh 1980).
So, our conclusion should not be in question, since we are dealing with African
ancestors in the Africa of today (not in the pre-colonial Africa of yesteryear) and
within the cosmology they are understood to operate in today. Such an Africa has a
cosmology that bears simultaneously both the marks ofAfrica's religious tradition
and the legacy of Christianity and Islam. It therefore follows that it is the second of
the two conceptions of the spirit world mentioned above (i.e., a pantheon with a an
Ultimate Deity at its head) that should be taken as the proper cosmology in which to
19 For more on this see Frankl (1990), Hodgson (1982), Hexham (1981), and Daneel (1970, 36ff).
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understand the role of ancestors in Africa. This role, as mentioned, is that in a
variety of ways ancestors mediate between humans and 'God'. Having established
this, we conclude, then, that ancestor figures in Africa provide a parallel context to
Hebrews' initial context because as mediators they correspond to mediatorial figures
in Hebrews' initial context of principal angels, Moses, and Aaronic high priests. It is
now possible to proceed to a typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews'
Christology in Africa.
5.2 HEBREWS' CHRISTOLOGY AND ANCESTORS
What we want to do now is it to transfer directly Hebrews' Christology from its
initial audience onto a contemporary African audience. We can do this because we
have shown that there are parallels between Jewish mediatorial figures in Hebrews
and ancestors in Africa who provide for Hebrews' contemporary context in Africa.
Such a transfer, therefore, will consist of the typological interpretation of ancestors
along the same lines as the typological interpretation in Hebrews of Jewish
mediatorial figures. We will carry out this direct transfer in two, not unrelated,
distinct stages: the first stage will be broad and general, based on the communication
20
principle of analogy/metaphor," while the second stage will be narrow, based strictly
on the theology of typology.
20 How is analogy different from metaphor? Perelman is of the view, for example, that a metaphor is
a 'condensed analogy1 (92), (analogy, to him, understood as a similitude of relations); while for Black
(1962), a metaphor (the comparative view of it) is related inextricably to analogy because it consists in
the presentation of an underlying analogy (35-36). This is not the place to argue against, or for, the
nuanced distinctions between metaphors and analogies, nor even to show the nuance. It suffices here
for us to note that basic to analogy and metaphor is that communication is in varying degrees sought
to be made of something unfamiliar, or hard to grasp, or unclear, or even alien etc., by relating it to
what is already known and familiar. In other words, analogy and metaphor overlap considerably in
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The communication principles of analogy are integral to typology-based
theological interpretations because they are used when there are some significant
similarities between what is known by subjects of a discourse and what the
communicator seeks to be known,21 whereby the known is used to communicate the
unknown (or the unfamiliar and less known), as is the case in type-antitype
relationship. In this first stage of transferring Hebrews' Christology to Africa, we see
this communication principle at work when Jesus is reconceptualized in Africa as an
ancestor: because ancestors have similarities, as mediators, with Jewish mediatorial
figures, and since they are known in the African world, they are used accordingly to
know Jesus as the definitive mediator.
However, we need to understand here that this re-conception is only a part of
transferring the understanding of Hebrews' Christology from the world of its initial
audience onto the world of its African context. The transfer is completed when it is
related to the typology that attends it (this will be the subject of our second stage in
the said transfer). A purely analogous re-conception of Hebrews' Christology in
Africa, devoid of the typology that goes with it, will not suffice to be considered an
outcome of a direct transfer of Hebrews' Christology to Africa envisaged in
typology-based theological interpretations. It will not suffice because it is not related
to typology and is thus disqualified from being a typology-based theological
meaning and usage. So, although using the term analogy more frequently than metaphor, I simply use
the two terms interchangeably throughout this study.
21 It is important to note here that the 'known' and the 'unknown' not only have significant similarities
but that, also, they have fundamental differences, else the use of analogy will not be needed. At this
stage in our typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa we are
concerned only with the similarities that enable the reconceptualization of Hebrews' Christology in
Africa, hence our understanding of'Jesus as ancestor' (section 5.2.1.). In the next stage, which is in
our sixth chapter, we shall consider the outcome of fundamental differences in this analogy, which
issue out in Jesus being understood as 'the greatest ancestor' (section 6.1.3.).
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interpretation. It is for this reason that we have the second stage of the transfer
alluded to, where we relate this analogical re-conception of Jesus in Africa to
typology by considering the theological bases for such a re-conception. It will be
seen that these bases - the whys and wherefores - are found in typology, which then
make the interpretation a typology-based theological interpretation ofHebrews'
Christology in Africa. In other words, even though the direct transfer ofHebrews'
initial Christology to Hebrews'present context in Africa involves the usage of
analogy, the transfer is based on the theology oftypology. It is this relationship of
analogy to the theology of typology that makes the interpretation, which we are in
the process of giving of Hebrews Christology in Africa, a typology-based theological
interpretation. We turn our attention, then, to the first stage of transference of
Hebrews' Christology to Africa.
5.2.1. Jesus as'Ancestor'
We must preface the first stage of transferring Hebrews' Christology to Africa by
giving more thought to what I call Hebrews' predominant Christology, in order to
have a proper grasp of the basis, in the first instance, of the re-conception of
Hebrews' Christology in Africa. We may do this by asking: how did the conception
and articulation of Jesus as the mediator come about? And how is it related to the
possibility of an ancestor-Christology?
We noted in the first chapter that Christianity started with a particular historical
person: Jesus ofNazareth, his person, work and deeds. However it was left unsaid
that Jesus himself did not go around spreading news ofhimself and of his
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significance to all and sundry; it was those who claimed that in him they had met
God who did so. Cognizance of this would make us appreciate that, interwoven with
the person of Jesus, both in his words and deeds, were the experiences of those who
believed in him. Much as other valid accounts centring on Jesus may be given credit
for the provenance ofChristianity, the dimension of religious encounters with him
cannot be overlooked as a factor as well. Though seemingly a neglected point of
view, especially the post-crucifixion or Easter Jesus experiences, religious
experiences are very important in understanding the origins ofChristology. This
granted, we should be able to perceive that it was because the early Christians
encountered Jesus, and had their lives changed in one way or another, that they
accentuated his significance, made efforts to make sense of (or interpret) their
encounters with him, and not least, made efforts to express that significance of Jesus
to others in an intelligible manner. Both making sense of their experiences of Christ
and communicating it in an intelligible manner were done inevitably within and
through their religio-cultural milieux. Johnson (1986), who gives credit to the
phenomenon of religious experiences ofChrist as a factor behind the emergence of
Christianity and the New Testament writings (11-18, 86-113), brings out this point
well when he writes:
It is in the experience of the first believers that the origin of Christianity and of
the New Testament must be sought. Something happened in the lives of real
men and women; something that caused them to perceive their lives in new and
radically altered fashion and compelled them to interpret [and express] it by
means of available symbols (96).
He also makes the point that there was no core experience to these experiences of
Jesus but rather a variety of experiences evidenced in the plurality of the New
Testament writings (93-96). So some had, for example, experienced in Jesus a
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release from cosmic powers that had hitherto controlled their lives (ICor. 2.6-10;
Rom. 8.38; Eph. 2.1-10; Col. 1.13; IPet. 3.22), while some had experienced peace in
him (Rom. 5.1; ICor. 7.15; 2Cor. 13.11; Eph. 2.17, 4.3; Phil 4.13; Col. 3.15; Jas.
3.18).
Given the above, we could understand Hebrews to be an expression of one claim,
amongst others, by the early Christians, which is based on a particular experience of
Christ that they had (in the midst of other experiences). It is an expression of Jesus
as a definitive mediator through the use of Jewish 2nd Temple religious milieu, as we
sought to demonstrate, because he was experienced as such in the lives of the early
Christians. It could be argued that had the 2nd Temple religious milieu been
inhabited by a different set ofmediatorial figures, they would have been the ones
used to communicate Jesus as the definitive mediator and not angels, Moses and the
Aaronic high priests. In other words, had the context and audience been different,
the mediatorial figures in question would have been different. It is important to note
that this predominant Christology does not preclude, but rather is interwoven with, a
substantive typological interpretation of the Jewish mediatorial figures in question as
would have been understood from the Old Testament at the time. In the final
analysis, what we have, then, is the usage ofmediatorial figures to communicate
Christ as the definitive mediator, accompanied by a theology of history about them
which, in the first place, justifies their typological interpretation.
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Given the above, what, then, needs to be made sense of in Africa and re-conceived
of is Jesus as the definitive mediator, the predominant Christology of Hebrews, and
not so much Jesus as the one greater than Principal Angels, Moses and Aaronic high
priests. It is precisely here that we look to the ancestor figure in Africa for the
purpose of re-conceiving and speaking of Jesus as the definitive mediator between
humans and God in Africa, and in effect re-conceiving Jesus there as an 'ancestor'.
As discussed in the preceding section, ancestors are integral to Africa's religious
cosmology and are chiefly, if not entirely in some cases, mediatorial figures. It
follows that if Jewish mediatorial figures are used analogously, as noted above, to
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conceive and speak ofChrist as the definitive mediator, there is no reason then why
ancestors should not be used, as such, to conceive and speak of Jesus as the definitive
mediator in Africa. For just as principal angels, Moses and high priests straddled the
2nd Temple Jewish religious cosmos as mediators between God and humans, so do
ancestors, as such, straddle Africa's religious cosmos.
Consequently, and as an outcome of employing the ancestor figure, the perception
of Jesus as an 'ancestor' in re-conceiving and expressing Hebrews' Christology in
Africa means we are doing two things. Firstly, we are applying the same
communication principle of analogy at work in Hebrews, a principle that could not
apply in re-conceiving Hebrews' Christology in Africa were it not for the similarities
the context in Africa (as Hebrews' present contemporary context) shares with
22 Two Hebrews scholars have made some detailed comments on metaphor in Hebrews. Isaacs (2002,
69-71) judges Hebrews with bringing 'us face to face with the metaphorical character ofmuch of the
language ot the New Testament' (69), whilst Smith (1976) sees Hebrews as an extended metaphor.
However, it is apparent that their discourses, though, are not concerned with the use ofmetaphor in
Hebrews in the conceiving of Christ. Isaacs is concerned to underline the point, within her discourse
of why we ought to bother with the study of Hebrews, that metaphors are not literal but useful in
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Hebrews' initial context. Secondly, we are ipso facto, through the use of analogy,
transferring Hebrews' Christology from its initial audience onto its contemporary
audience in Africa. Crucially, this second point is accompanied theologically, as we
shall see, by the typological interpretation of ancestors in the same way that angels,
Moses and Aaronic high priests can be understood to be interpreted in Hebrews.
But this is not all in this stage of transferring Hebrews' Christology to Africa. In
employing the ancestor figure to re-conceive Jesus as the definitive mediatior in
Africa, we need to do so mutatis mutandis. This is because the similarities between
Christ and ancestors are not in toto, which, then, necessitates comparisons and
contrasts between the two. This, too, is a characteristic of analogy, for in an analogy
there is tension between affirmations and negations, similarities and differences.
Such a process, as we saw, takes place in Hebrews, in the synkrisis between Jesus
and the Jewish mediatorial figures, where Jesus is like a principal angel but superior,
like Moses but greater than him, and like the Aaronic high priest but of a different
order. Consequently, I submit that Jesus as the greatest ancestor, being the result of a
direct transfer of Hebrews' Christology to Africa, is the proper re-conception of the
same in Africa. Jesus is an ancestor on the basis of the similarities in mediation that
he has with African ancestors, but greater than them on the basis of significant
differences with them. This, as far as I can see, is how an African Christian could
easily hear, read, and understand Hebrews' Christology for his/her faith, ethos and
worship in Africa today.
acquisition of new insights (71), while Smith is concerned to argue out that (contra Sabourin [1973])
Christ's priesthood should not be taken literally but metaphorically.
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Some objections could be raised against the re-conceiving of Christ as an 'ancestor'
in Africa. We begin with an objection that we may term metaphorical, which we
need to respond to given that our transference of Hebrews' Christology to Africa as
part of a typology-based theological interpretation of the same makes heavy use of
analogy. Associations between ancestors in Africa on the one hand and Jesus on the
other are not isomorphic. Ontological and some functional differences exist that, for
some, would bar Jesus from being conceived of as an African ancestor. Jesus, for
example, is the 'Son of God' (Hebrews 1.1 -5ff), while ancestors are not.
Furthermore, some may feel that we have an inherent problem of'christifying' the
African mediatorial categories with the result that, instead of understanding Jesus as
an 'ancestor', ancestors are understood as Jesus; or, instead of the ancestor category
acting as an analogue to conceive of and articulate Jesus, Jesus sheds light on who
the ancestor is.23
Two reasons may account for this kind of objection to the re-conception of Christ
along the lines of an ancestor. The first we could call the subversion of a metaphor.
To use Black's (1962, 38-47) analysis, a metaphor has a principal and subsidiary
subject, and works by applying to the principal subject features associated with the
subsidiary subject. But this can be subverted when the subsidiary subject takes the
place of the principal subject and vice versa. The metaphor then would be working
in reverse. So that in our case, Jesus who is supposed to be the principal subject in
the metaphor becomes the subsidiary, while the ancestor figure becomes the
principal subject.
23 Schoffeleers (1989) in a section of his work, 'The Nganga (a mediator) as Christ' (169 brackets
mine), cites several examples in which Ngangas have been understood as Jesus or as an alternative to
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The second objection to seeing Jesus as 'ancestor' is primarily because the
worldview (world ofmeaning) in which the functions of African mediators are
comprehensible (and in which 'ancestors' acquire meaning), has differences from the
one in which Jesus may have been understood to function, in Hebrews. To illustrate:
the ancestor cult has traditionally been understood within a cosmology that
recognizes the interdependence between two spheres: the world of the living and the
spirit world of the dead. As King (1994), albeit in a highly oversimplified way,
describes it:
Ancestors are considered to have passed from this plane of existence to a new
plane which is sometimes referred to as the supernatural, or the invisible. ...
Whatever the metaphysical system involved, this change is seen as giving the
ancestors a closer access to God or the Supreme Being. This role can be seen
either in tenns of distance or language: the ancestors who now know the
languages of the invisible are better adapted to such communication than men
and women in this realm. The personal relationship of the ancestors to the
living also helps what we might call the "downward" communication in which
they engage as mediators: their position makes the ancestors more familiar
with the petitioner as well as the Supreme Being. Communication is thus
enhanced in both directions (11).
One may wonder whether Jesus as the definitive mediator, the dominant Christology
of Hebrews, would be understood both concretely and noetically, significantly
altered, or distorted against the background of such a worldview.24
Before we respond to these objections, we should note that the charge of an
analogy working in reverse such as cited by Schoffeleers (1989, 169) seems to me a
deliberate choice, on the part of those involved, to use Christ (who then functions as
Jesus.
~4
For more, see especially Gerhart and Russell (1984) who provide a useful discussion on the
relationship of analogies, metaphors, and worldviews.
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the subsidiary subject in the analogy) to shed light on 'Nganga'"" (the principal
subject in the analogy); it is not something that occurs because an analogy has gone
wrong. In principle, I think that what is really being objected to here is
fundamentally a way of communication which we must address. Analogies are
linchpins in communication, especially in communicating something new, the
knowledge ofwhich cannot be attained directly.26 Analogies function on the
presupposition that there is some measure of similarity between the 'known' and the
'unknown' so that the unknown is made known through some of its similarity with
the known. The fact, therefore, that analogies often bring with them some measure
of accretions and distortions such as the extreme one (subversion of analogy) pointed
out above ought not to lead to their invalidation. In any case, analogies are inevitable
in communicating the unknown especially when it cannot be known directly. What
is crucial is that, despite differences (which must be there, otherwise there is no need
of analogy) between the known and the unknown, there is something sufficiently
similar between them, resulting in knowledge of one leading to knowledge of the
other - the very thing envisaged in our foregoing re-conception of Hebrews'
Christology in Africa. The assumption is that it is ancestors who are the 'known' (or
familiar) in this analogy, and Jesus as the mediator the 'unknown', with ancestors
leading to the knowledge or conception of Jesus as a mediator, or at the very least,
deepening that conception.
25 As alluded to, a common figure in Africa who is understood multifariously as priest, healer,
medicine man etc.
J' Davidson (2001, 245-64) and Martinich (1996) provide helpful readings on this.
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As for the different worldviews of the two entities in the analogy distorting
knowledge that could be gained of the unknown via the analogy, I do not think that
the different worldviews of the known and unknown entities constitute a serious
objection to an ancestor-Christology. This is because the worldview of the known
holds sway as the one used to shed light on the unknown, and in which the unknown
entity must be understood. In Hebrews itself, for example, it seems that Christ as the
mediator is interpreted within the worldview of 2nd Temple religious heritage. On
this assumption, we could say that the making sense of Jesus as mediator in Africa
must be plotted on Africa's religious cosmos, to which conceiving him as an ancestor
is already a step in so doing. This, of course, may lead to some significant changes
and to new meanings in the worldview in which the unknown is being made sense
27of. In fact it is apparent that in Hebrews' Christology, the conceiving of Jesus as
the definitive mediator, by the very fact of synkrisis, moves beyond 2nd Temple
perceptions of the key Jewish figures of the Old Testament in question.
There would have been a second objection, but we have already forestalled it
through our discussions of the hermeneutical basis for typology-based theological
interpretations of the New Testament. This is the theological objection that is against
the use of ancestors for re-conceiving Jesus in the same way as Jewish mediatorial
figures in Hebrews. It is felt that to do so is to perceive them as preparatory to, and
fulfilled in, Jesus in the same way that Jewish mediatorial figures are understood to
be in Hebrews. Of course, such an objection cannot be divorced from the wider
canvass of those who object to any non-Jewish religious heritage acting as a
27
Masson (2001,584-89) has succintly brought out this aspect in his discussion of the workings or
results of analogies in the making known, and in the creation of, meaning. More on this in the next
praeparatio Christi (or having prophetic elements which find their eschatological
fulfilment in Christ) since that would be giving them a theological status akin to
Judaism, and also Christianizing them, both of which are judged to be erroneous.28
The crux of this objection is simply the perception that the working of God in history
is exclusive to the Heilsgeschichte of Israel. We shall not rehearse here the argument
we made (see section 3.2.2.) that God's working is not limited to the Heilsgeschichte
of Israel. This brings us to the second stage of our typology-based theological
interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa.
5.2.2. Jesus an Antitype ofAncestors
Our re-conceiving of Jesus as one greater than an ancestor, as the outcome of the
transfer of Hebrews Christology to Africa, has been based, so far, on the
communication principle of analogy. So far as it goes, this should be understood as
the first stage or instance of a typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews
in Africa. This is because the communication principles of analogy may have other
bases quite unrelated to the theology of typology. For example, the legitimacy of the
use of analogy could be justified by the following argument.
2" Temple Judaism was not monolithic and simply to be understood en bloc as
brought to fulfilment in Christ, but diffuse. The Old Testament for example, is,
firstly, to be found in its Hebrew, Septuagint and Targumim versions, and, then,
chapter.
2S
Fornberg's (1995) article based on Hebrews is a good introduction and reference to those who resist
(and some who welcome) the view given to the Jewish religious heritage being extended to other
religious traditions as well. As for the interpretation of Africa's religious heritage as a praeparatio
Christi, P'Biteck (1990) is most representative. He vehemently attacked such interpretations by
African Christian scholars claiming that they were based on their fictions of African religions and as
failing to honour African religions in their own right. See also Kato (1975, Ch. 5-9).
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secondly, understood through the exegetical traditions of the diverse Jewish groups.
Even though the Old Testament is the religious heritage of the Jews and authoritative
to them, its inherited versions and continued use are not homogeneous. In addition,
no particular inheritance and exegetical tradition lends itself freely to be seen as
fulfilled in Christ. This precipitates the need for it to be made to relate to Christ
through an interpretative, highly selective and creative process, since it is not self-
evidently a preparation for, and fulfilled in, Christ.
One such interpretative procedure brought to bear on the scriptures by the early
Christians, and which is unique to them, is Christological interpretation of selected
texts.29 It could be argued that this is exactly what is going on in Hebrews, implying
that the conceptualization of Jesus was not so much formulated as a fulfilment of the
diverse Jewish religious heritages encapsulated in the Old Testament (i.e. a
typological interpretation) but, rather, was itself used to interpret those traditions in
relation to him. From such a perspective, Jesus' re-conception in Africa as an
'ancestor', on the basis of Hebrews' Christology, can be understood as an
interpretation, even a selective and creative one, of the existing religious traditions
on ancestors. So, it could be argued further, the practice of the early Christians
interpreting their religious heritage through a Christological prism does not become
29
Following Fitzmyer's (1961) analysis, concerned though with explicit citations, we may understand
the other interpretative procedures to be: 1. Literal, 'in which the Old Testament is actually quoted in
the same sense in which it was intended by the original writers' (305); 2. Modernization, 'in which the
Old Testament text, which originally had a reference to some event on the contemporary scene at the
time it was written, nevertheless was vague enough to be applied to some new event' (Ibid.); 3.
Accommodation, 'in which the Old Testament text was obviously wrested from its original context,
modified or deliberately changed by the new writer in order to adapt it to a new situation or purpose'
(Ibid.); and 4. Eschatological, 'in which the Old Testament quotation expressed promise or threat
about something to be accomplished in the eschaton and which the Qumran (or Christian) writer cited
as something still to be accomplished in the new eschaton ofwhich he wrote' (305-06 in brackets
mine). For more on biblical interpretation in early Christianity, see Dodd (1952), Miller (1971), who
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exclusive to that period or generation but is a paradigm for succeeding Christian
generations.
The point of this argument is that the basis for the use of analogy in the re-
conception of Hebrews' Christology in Africa could be placed elsewhere and not on a
theology of typology, which would bar it from being a typology-based theological
interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa. Moreover, this would expose it to
the second objection that we cited could be raised against such a re-conception of
Jesus in Africa, that ancestors as part of Africa's religious heritage cannot be
understood in the same way as Jewish mediators in Hebrews. To do so, it is felt, is to
perceive Africa's religious heritage to be on the same footing with Jewish religious
heritage and, consequently, to see it as praeparatio Christi, having prophetic
elements which find their eschatological fulfilment in Christ. Such an objection
would prevail unless, apart from analogy, we offer a theological basis for such a re-
conception. This means that our typology-based theological interpretation of
Hebrews' Christology in Africa must go further and show that the re-conception of
Hebrews' Christology in Africa by means of analogy is on the basis of typology,
which would then make it a typology-based theological interpretation proper of
Hebrews' Christology in Africa. We do this in what follows.
We argued in the last chapter that Hebrews is a typological interpretation of some
key Old Testament mediatorial figures as understood in the 2nd Temple period: in the
synkrisis between Jesus on the one hand, and angels, Moses, and the Aaronic high
gives a good survey and discussion of studies available (up to the time of his article's publication) on
the use ofOld Testament in the New Testament, Ellis (1991), and Evans and Stegner (1994).
196
priests on the other, these Jewish mediatorial figures are types of Christ, and he is
their antitype. As pointed out (section 3.1.2.), the theology of typology would have it
that God is at work in history, ordering it according to his own goals and purposes,
hence the invariable interconnectedness between type and antitype, past and present.
In consequence, the Jewish mediatorial figures are perceived as the working ofGod
with the ultimate purpose of shedding light on Jesus the definitive mediator who had
appeared then. So, in their roles and functions among the Jewish people, they
anticipate him and, ipso facto, prepare the people for the understanding and reception
of Jesus as the definitive mediator, hence their typological interpretation in Hebrews.
When looked at closely, the converse of this typology is that the use of Jewish
mediatorial figures analogously to conceive of and speak of Jesus as the definitive
mediator is directly tied to the relationship of type to antitype. This is because the
type and antitype are in an analogous relationship, by virtue of the known, or
familiar, in 'types' (principal angels, Moses and Aaronic priests) being used to
communicate what needs to be known of the 'antitype' (Jesus).
The question that presses itself on us here, then, is this: can the same be said of
ancestors in Africa? Can it be said that God is at work in Africa's religio-cultural
heritage with the purpose of shedding light on Jesus the definitive mediator in the
same way that he has in Jewish religious heritage? If such is the case, can ancestors
be typologically interpreted in the way that Hebrews can be understood to interpret
Jewish mediatorial figures? This is an important question. Important because if the
answer is 'yes', then the use of ancestors analogously to re-conceive of Jesus as a
mediator in Africa becomes an integral part of typology-based theological
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interpretation of Hebrews, as the means by which the direct transference ofHebrews'
Christology to Africa is carried out. In other words, the analogical re-conception of
Jesus as ancestor just made would simultaneously be a typological interpretation of
ancestors in the same way that Hebrews can be understood to interpret typologically
key Jewish mediatorial figures - the stuffof typology-based interpretations of the
New Testament. We need to consider briefly the specific reasons for this.
Analogy is a tool of communication, while typology is a theological issue, and
invariably they both meet in an inseparable way in Hebrews' Christology: the type-
antitype relationship is at the same time an analogous one. We, therefore, cannot be
at liberty to use analogy in re-conceiving Hebrews' Christology, wherever that may
be, if there is no accompanying typological relationship between what we are using
analogously (in the given context) to re-conceive of Jesus, and Jesus himself. It
would be possible for us to be at liberty were we to separate the analogous
relationship from the typological one, but that would mean we were no longer
conducting a typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology since
our basis for such a re-conception would have to lie elsewhere. So, because ours is a
typology-based theological interpretation, we cannot use the category of ancestors
analogously to re-conceive Hebrews' Christology in Africa simply on the grounds
that they are the mediators in an African context as angels, Moses and Aaronic
priests are in the initial context of Hebrews.
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But we are at liberty to use them analogously, if ancestors can be shown to be in a
similar kind of typological relationship with Jesus which Jewish mediatorial figures
enjoy with him in Hebrews. In other words, there is a theological element required
for the above analogical re-conception ofHebrews' Christology to pass muster as an
outcome of a typology-based theological interpretation of the same. This way, the
transfer of Hebrews' Christology from Hebrews' initial context to Africa is made on
the basis of typology but through the use of analogy. With this in mind, we return to
our question: Can God be said to have been be at work in Africa's religio-cultural
heritage in the same way that he is understood to have been in the Jewish religio-
cultural heritage?
We have already argued for the view that God's working in history cannot be
limited to the Heilsgeschichte of Israel (section 3.2.2.). However, this argument, that
God is at work in all histories directing them to their finality in Christ just as he was
in the history of Israel, is only in principle. It does not resolve the problem of the
question that arises subsequently, viz., how are we to tell whether this or that aspect
of a religio-cultural heritage of a particular people is the working ofGod? It is one
thing to subscribe to the view that God is at work in all histories directing them to
Jesus, but another matter to detect what particular aspects of those histories are a
work of God pointing to Jesus.
It is here that the Heilsgeschichte of Israel, through, specifically, its typological
interpretations in the New Testament, becomes the means by which we can identify
specific aspects of a history to be the work of God pointing to Christ. This it does in
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this way. Any aspect of a religio-cultural heritage that is similar to an aspect of the
Heilsgeschichte of Israel, as interpreted typologically in the New Testament, qualify
to be discerned as the work of God (the same God as the one of Israel and for the
same typological purpose). To paraphrase, what we perceive as the working of God
in the specific aspects of the Heilsgeschichte of Israel, interpreted typologically in
the New Testament, we perceive to be his working as well in aspects that are similar
to them in other histories, precisely on account of their similarities. The similarities
are the evidence of the workings of the one and the same God, and for the same
purposes. It is for this reason, to go back to our third chapter, that the criterion of
similarity of contexts is central to typology-based theological interpretations of the
New Testament. The similarities, as evidence of God's working in other histories in
ways similar to Israel's allows for the transfer of the message from the initial context
to the present one to take place. In consequence, the transfer of the message consists
in the interpretation of an Old Testament person, event or institution as a type of
Christ in the New Testament being applied to a person, an event or institution of the
religious heritage in question in a contemporary context. This person, event or
institution in the religious heritage of the present contemporary context becomes,
then, a type of Christ in the same way as those of Israel's personage, event or
institution are interpreted to be in the New Testament pericope.
The question, then, is whether ancestors could be said to represent the working of
God in Africa in the same way that Jewish mediatorial figures in Hebrews are
perceived to be in Jewish religious heritage, thus qualifying, in application of the
reading of Hebrews in Africa, to be interpreted as a type of Christ. This we have
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answered affirmatively by showing, in the first half of our chapter, that, as mediators,
ancestors are somewhat similar to the Jewish mediatorial figures and therefore
provide a similar context to the one in Hebrews. And so we have to conclude that
ancestors in Africa are a 'type' of Christ similarly to the way Jewish mediatorial
figures are interpreted as 'types' in Hebrews. Because God is at work in both
histories, similarities are an indication of his work in both histories, and for the same
purposes. It follows, then, that what is said and interpreted of one, can be said and
interpreted of the other.
I submit, therefore, that ancestors are a type of Christ, and conversely, Jesus an
antitype of ancestors. This is what constitutes, on the basis of typology, the transfer
of Hebrews' Christology to Africa, where 'Jesus, the definitive mediator', as the
Christology of Hebrews, is re-conceived in, and thus transferred to, Africa as 'Jesus,
the greatest ancestor'.
Consequently, it needs to be noted, our analogous use of ancestors in the re-
conception of Hebrews' Christology is here, in the second instance, typological (i.e.,
on the basis of typology) since its usage is in virtue of ancestors' type-antitype
relationship with Jesus. Indeed, we have used ancestors analogously in the re-
conception of Hebrews' Christology in Africa as the typological interpretation of this
Christology in Africa in the same way that Hebrews uses analogously Jewish
mediatorial figures in its conception of Jesus in its initial context. We have done so
on the conviction that it is the same God at work in the two histories (as supported by
the similar contexts) and for the same purposes. Consequently, in their roles and
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functions among African peoples, ancestors, like Jewish mediatorial figures,
anticipate Jesus and thereby prepare the people for the understanding and reception
of Jesus, and their functions are understood here to be fulfilled in him.
Our two-stage theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology is almost
complete now. We mentioned, only too briefly, that using ancestors to articulate
analogously Hebrews' Christology in Africa was not all there was to such a
Christology. In employing the ancestor figure to re-conceive Jesus as the definitive
mediator in Africa, we pointed out that we needed to do so with some qualifications
because of the fact that the similarities between Christ and ancestors are not there in
all respects, a situation that necessitates comparisons and contrasts, and affirmations
and negations, between the two. This is why we submitted that Jesus is not an
ancestor but 'the greatest ancestor'-, he is an ancestor on the basis of the similarities
in mediation that he has with African ancestors, but greater than them on the basis of
some of the contrasts he has with them. We now have to articulate this Christology
in more detail and ponder it concretely in what remains of a typology-based
theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa. This will make up the
beginnings of our sixth chapter, which will also see us explore the significance and
implications of the typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews'
Christology in Africa for the faith, ethos, and worship of African Christians.
Consequently, we shall be able to see how an African theology on the basis of a
sustained and appropriate interpretation of a biblical text plays a significant part in
the life of Christian communities in Africa, the very aim of African theology.
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CHAPTER 6
JESUS, THE GREATEST ANCESTOR: QUALIFICATIONS AND
IMPLICATIONS FOR CHRISTIANITY IN AFRICA
We mentioned in our last chapter that employing the ancestor figure to re-conceive
of Jesus as a definitive mediator in Africa was not all there was in a typology-based
theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa. We said we needed to
do so mutatis mutandis because the similarities between Christ and ancestors were
not in toto. That this ought to be the case should be obvious on account of the nature
of typology. This is because, as the discourse of our last chapter made clear,
typology presupposes similarities and contrasts between the two elements it has
brought together in a typological relationship. In effect then, any interpretation or
conception of Jesus typologically calls for some qualifications. This necessitates, in
what follows shortly, some qualifications of Jesus' reconception in Africa along the
lines of the ancestor category. The qualifications will also be the means by which we
will articulate this ancestor-Christology in slightly more detail. Thereafter, we shall
consider the implications for African Christianity of this theological interpretation of
Hebrews' Christology in Africa. But first, we need to revisit the way the
understanding of Jesus as the definitive mediator is qualified in Hebrews. This will
add clarity, as a parallel and prelude, to the qualifications we shall give of Jesus as a
mediator along the lines of an ancestor in Africa.
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6.1 QUALIFICATIONS OF JESUS AS MEDIATOR
6.1.1. Jesus as the Definitive Mediator
Beginning with angels, we will highlight from previous reflection (section 4.23)
the similarities in the synkrisis and the typology embedded therein, between Jesus
and angels, Jesus and Moses, and Jesus and the Aaronic high priests. Jesus is like an
angel (a principal angel to be precise) because like them he mediates God's word
and, like them, we may say, he too has (inherited) a name. With regard to Moses,
Jesus is like Moses for he is close to God, and, also, like him he has a role with
regard to God's house. As for the Aaronic high priest, Jesus is like an Aaronic high
priest because he intercedes for God's people and offers sacrifice for their cleansing.
Looked at carefully, one thing runs through all of these similarities, viz., in a variety
ofways, Jesus acts like, or is, a mediator in a similar way to the Jewish mediatorial
figures in question. As we showed in a previous chapter, these similarities are the
ones that warrant the typological relationship. In other words, the similarities are the
ones that enable the audience in view to understand Jesus as the definitive mediator.
But this is not all in the articulation of Jesus in Hebrews' Christology. Were this to
be the case, Jesus would be no different from principal angels, Moses and the
Aaronic high priest, and only one amongst them as a mediator in Jewish religious
heritage, an understanding far from the Christology of Hebrews as discussed in this
thesis.
Highlighting, therefore, from previous reflection the differences brought out in the
typological relationship, by means ofwhich Jesus' identity and function is explicated
in the Christology of Hebrews, helps us to see the ways in which Hebrews'
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mediatorial Christology is qualified. Starting with principal angels (see section
4.2.3.), the first difference we may highlight is that, although Jesus mediates God's
word like principal angels, unlike them who are ministering spirits and flames of fire,
he is the Son of God but who, also, became man. Secondly, Jesus has inherited a
name more excellent than theirs. With Moses, we see that although Jesus, like him,
is close to God and has a role over God's house, he is different from him by virtue of
being a Son over, rather than a servant in, God's house, and having more glory than
him. As concerns the Aaronic high priests, although Jesus mediates
forgiveness/cleansing, and intercedes for people, he: 1. serves in heaven; 2. is
effective in mediating cleansing; 3. is of a new order; and 4. is eternal in nature being
a priest in the likeness of Melchizedek.
In principle, we may understand these differences to be of two kinds: functional
and ontological. Functional differences are the differences that are there by virtue of
the higher quality or kind ofmediatorial roles offered by Jesus, in comparison to
those offered by Jewish mediatorial figures. For example Jesus' mediation as a high
priest is in one sense of a higher quality than that of the Aaronic high priest because
his is effectual while that of the Aaronic high priest is not. In another sense, it is of a
higher kind because the sacrifice offered is himself and not a goat or a bull!
Ontological differences are those that set Jesus apart from the Jewish mediatorial
figures by virtue of who he is, his being. For example, in the case ofMoses and
angels respectively, he is superior because he is a Son over, not a servant in, God's
household, or a ministering spirit; while in the case ofAaronic high priests, he is of
the likeness ofMelchizedek and not from the Aaronic pedigree.
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Consequently, we may say that Jesus is like principal angels, Moses and Aaronic
high priests to the extent that, like them, he functions as a mediator, but that he is
unlike principal angels, Moses and Aaronic high priests to the extent that his
functions are of a higher quality and kind, and his being is different from theirs. In
the final analysis, the result of these contrasts, as argued, is that Jesus is not only
understood to be a mediator in the same manner as the Jewish mediatorial figures,
but he is understood to be the mediatorpar excellence, the definitive mediator.
Moreover, there is another important result of the qualification of Jesus as a mediator
so conceived that we need to note, viz., we have a mediatorial Christology that uses
Jewish traditional understanding ofmediators but at the same time, moves beyond
them. Because of the importance of this observation to our qualification of Jesus as
ancestor in Africa, it is important that we consider it and its implications however
briefly. A look at the qualification of Jesus as mediator along the lines ofAaronic
high priests will help us do this.
6.1.2. New Understandings ofJewish Mediatorial Notions
We have just noted how the author of Hebrews, in qualifying Jesus as a mediator
like an Aaronic high priest, brings out a number of differences between the two, the
result ofwhich makes Jesus superior to the Aaronic high priests and thus a definitive
mediator. In consequence, the understanding acquired of Jesus as a definitive
mediator is not only that he perfects or supersedes the mediation offered by Aaronic
high priests, but that his is a unique kind of priesthood. This is manifest in the
qualification of Jesus as different from the Aaronic high priest on the predicate of
being a priest in the likeness ofMelchizedek. Here the author of Hebrews, as it
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were, introduces us to Jesus as a priest functioning in a certain sense as an Aaronic
high priest but who does not belong to the Aaronic pedigree but rather the
Melchizedek one. This merging of the two traditions - of Aaron and Melchizedek -
in the conception of Christ as a definitive mediator is alien to, and a clear break from,
the Jewish traditions on both of these priestly figures. Though there is an abundance
of literature on eschatological and angelic traditions around the figure of
Melchizedek (see Ch. 4 footnote 16), Hebrews confines itself to the two that appear
in the Old Testament (Gen. 14.18-20 and Ps. 110.4). A look at the two Old
Testament passages indicates that there is nothing in them to suggest a merging of
the priesthood of Melchizedek with that ofAaron. On the contrary, Genesis 14.18-
20 seems to contemplate a priesthood that is royal, superior to, and different from,
the Aaronic one,1 while Psalm 110. 4 has been regarded as a reference to a royal
priesthood modelled on that ofMelchizedek,2 which is quite distinct from the
Aaronic high priesthood. If it is granted that Hebrews is in fact drawing from
interpretative traditions that understood Genesis 14.18-20 and Psalms 110.4 as
references to a royal priesthood, then the merging of the two is a creation of a unique
high priesthood, one that functions in the Aaronic mould but is in being of the
likeness ofMelchizedek, and is, therefore, endless (i.e., an eternal, royal high
priesthood). So far as scholarship can tell, there is no Jewish tradition that envisages
the Messiah as a Davidic personage receiving the priestly prerogatives of the tribe of
Levi.3 So, here we witness an instance where the articulation of Jesus as a mediator
1 There are many discussions of Hebrews' treatment of Psalm 110.4 that bring this out. See, for
example, Fitzmyer (1963, 309-321), Ellingworth (1993, 354-64) and Rooke (2000, 84-86)
2 See Delcor (1971, 120-122) and Hughes (1977, 258).
The closest we come to this is with the Hasmoneans, if it is understood that they used Psalm 110 as a
precedent to legitimize their double function of Priest and King (Longenecker 1978, 162-64).
Nonetheless their fusion of priest and king would have failed to capture the fusion we find in Hebrews
on three counts. Firstly, the Hasmoneans were not members of the tribe of Judah to lay any claim on
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is based on the tradition of the Aaronic high priesthood but in a qualified way and,
ipso facto, introduces a new conception of priesthood lacking in the tradition. Two
implications obtain from this, one analogical in nature, the other typological.
From the point of view of analogy, this means that analogies can go beyond the
function of shedding of light on the unknown through the use of the known, to that of
the generating of new understandings. As alluded to, the potential of this is already
resident in the fundamental differences in the two entities (the 'known' and the
'unknown') in the analogy. We may understand how this happens in the scheme
developed by Gerhart and Russell (1984), known as the metaphoric process.
According to their scheme (as analyzed by Masson [2001, 584-94]) which is
concerned about how new understandings and meanings develop through the use of
metaphor, comprehension of the world, and of ourselves, occurs in worlds of
meanings, which are 'made up of networks of interrelated concepts' (585). Further:
The concepts within these fields do not stand directly for things in themselves,
but for our notions of these things. These notions are defined by their
interrelation with other notions. For example, to get some conception of
"house," one must have other notions available (lumber, bricks, tin sheets, wall,
window, roof etc.) These other notions are variable, as well as the relations
between them.
On this basis, meaning is understood to arise,
...out of the interaction of concepts and relations, and is expressed in the
topography of the field. Necessary concept changes, such as those which
might arise from a new experience, alter relations; and changes in relations,
such as occur when one attempts to understand an experience in a new way,
relocate old concepts (Gerhart and Russell 1984, 119, in Masson 2001, 585).
Psalm I 10, and therefore, secondly, could not claim any association with Melchizedek. We may take
it then that, in the words of Bruce (1990, 126), 'the writer to the Hebrews was the first to identify these
two eschatological personages in such a way as to provide the fulfilment of the divine oracle in Ps.
110: 4.' Moreover, thirdly, they were a non-Aaronic and non-Zadokite high priesthood (Rooke 1998,
207).
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What this means is that new associations between existing notions in a field of
meaning can significantly alter their meaning, if not change the field ofmeaning
altogether. I suggest that this is what is going on in some of the qualifications made
on the identity of Jesus as a mediator in Hebrews generally, and in particular Jesus'
identity as a mediator along the lines of the Aaronic priesthood. According to this
scheme, we can take mediatorial figures in the various Jewish traditions, their
functions and purposes therein, as a field ofmeaning. It would then follow that we
take mediator figures like Aaronic high priests and angels as notions within that
field. This being the case, the association of Melchizedek and the Aaronic high
priesthood (two distinct notions in Jewish thought and belief) through their merging
by the author of Hebrews, brings about changes in this field, significantly altering
these notions by the formation of a new notion, viz., a unique priesthood which
functions in the Aaronic mould but is in being of the likeness of Melchizedek, and
thus perpetual (an eternal royal high priesthood).
From the point of view of typology, it means that the generation of new meanings
and understanding is to be anticipated in typological relationships. This is so
because typology, as we mentioned, is characterized by some aspect of the type
contrasted with, or intensified in, an aspect of the antitype. Contrasts and
intensifications can easily end up with new meanings. Going by the theology
underpinning typology, we would understand that God is the architect of new
meanings that come about in typological relationships, having ordered the past into
the present in this way. That is, it is the type (God's work in history) that allows the
new understanding of an aspect of it in the antitype; a situation which from the
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standpoint of the theology of typology, is intended by the providence of God. So in
this case, the Aaronic high priesthood prefigures that of Jesus, and Jesus' appearance
results in a new understanding of a high priest different from the Aaronic ones.
(They are not identical, but have similarities that have enabled the one to foreshadow
the other.)
I have discussed the qualification of the identity of Jesus as a definitive mediator
and its implications as a prelude and parallel to the objective of the first half of this
chapter: the qualification of Jesus as an ancestor in Africa and what that may mean.
We turn to this now.
6.1.3. Jesus as the Greatest Ancestor
In our last chapter, we made the point that ancestors straddle African cosmologies
as mediators in somewhat similar ways to those in which angels, Moses, and Aaronic
high priests do in Jewish cosmology of the 2nd Temple period generally, and of
Hebrews in particular. On this basis, given our elaborated theology of typology, we
argued, subsequently, that Jesus could be understood in Africa as an ancestor,
analogous to the way that he is understood in Hebrews' cosmology as a mediator
along the lines of angels, Moses and Aaronic high priests. It then follows that
similarities exist between Jesus as conceived of in Hebrews and ancestors in Africa.
In principle, these similarities are that both of them are mediators, who have once
shared in earthly life but are now living in a different sphere (see below), from which
they carry out their mediatorial functions. Jesus, in effect, is an ancestor to the extent
that like them he is a mediator who has shared human life, has passed through death,
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and now lives in God's presence where he conducts his mediatorial functions.
However, as we noted, this is not all there is in the reconception of Hebrews'
Christology in Africa. Were it to be the case, we would end up with a Christology
that interprets Jesus as one in the family of ancestors in Africa, which would not pass
for a typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa.
Therefore, to complete our typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews'
Christology in Africa, we must attend to the differences and in the process qualify,
and add some details to, the conceiving of Jesus as an ancestor in Africa by pointing
to his greatness over them.
We start by highlighting the ontological differences. As we noted (section 5.1.1.),
ancestors in Africa are perceived to have been human beings who have lived in a
particular community and have died, thus becoming spirit-beings or, better put,
disembodied human beings. It is apparent that in all cases, upon death and subject to
the necessary funeral rites, the qualifications to be an ancestor are normally
parenthood, a virtuous life and death in old age. Furthermore, we noted, ancestors do
not live forever; they cease to exist as such (in the sense that they are no longer
appealed to as ancestors) after about five generations of their existence, which is the
time when they are no longer in the collective memory of the living in the
community.4 Compared to ancestors, Jesus, as presented in Hebrews, is different
from ancestors on two main scores. The first is that whilst the identity of ancestors
springs essentially from their relationship to a particular community, as those who
4
It is well known amongst Africans that one's family tree goes back up to more or less the fifth
generation. As a child, when my family tree was recited to me, I was only given the names ofmy
forefathers up to the fifth generation, and so was my father. Now, since ancestors exist so long as they
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have once shared in its human life as one of its members, Jesus' identity is that of the
Son of God but who has also shared, concretely, in the human life of a Jewish
community. The second is that whereas ancestors cease to exist after about five
generations of their existence on becoming ancestors, Jesus lives on eternally.5
What about functional differences? In what ways are the functions ofmediators in
Africa different from the functions of Jesus as a mediator in Hebrews, on account of
which he becomes the greatest ancestor as alluded to already? The answer to this
question is slightly complex. This is primarily because in Hebrews, the mediatorial
figures of angels, Moses and the Aaronic high priests have relatively clearly defined
functions, which makes it easy for one to bring Jesus' mediation alongside theirs and,
then, draw out the ways his mediatorial functions are portrayed to be superior to
theirs. But this is not the case when it comes to the functions of ancestors in Africa,
because their functions are not as clearly defined (to enable one to highlight easily
Jesus' mediation alongside theirs in order to draw out the superiority of his
mediatorial functions). The modality, then, of identifying the functional differences
between Jesus and ancestors in pointing out Jesus' greatness over them is not the
same as the one in Hebrews between Jesus and Jewish mediatorial figures, regardless
of the similarity ofmotif that exists between Jewish and African mediatorial figures.
Consequently, in contrast to our preceding subsection, in order to point out the
functional differences between Jesus and ancestors which encapsulate his greatness
are still retained in the collective memory of the community, they 'disappear' after the fifth generation
of their existence (certainly ancestors are not believed to live endlessly as such).
5 We may want to go on here and cite, inter alia, that Jesus was never a parent, nor did he die old, as
other differences. However, this we are not at liberty to do for at all times in this thesis we have
limited what we consider and interpret of Jesus to what we can gather, directly or otherwise, from the
discourse of Hebrews.
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over them, it will be necessary to look at, by way of reminder, the general function of
ancestors. When this general function of ancestors is understood, it is possible to
perceive Jesus on account of who he is (in Hebrews) as best suited to perform them
effectively. In other words, unlike our previous exercise in pointing out the
differences between Jesus and Jewish mediatorial figures, we are here formulating
the functional difference between Jesus and ancestors in relation to ancestors' general
functions, as opposed to their numerously varied, specific, and localized functions.
(The general and specific functions of ancestors, however, are inextricably related,
because the specific functions are carried out in fulfilment of the general functions.)
It is on this basis that we shall demonstrate the greatness of Jesus over ancestors.
We pointed out earlier (section 5.1.4.) that, often, there was vagueness in the
precise relationship of God to spirits, divinities, ancestors, and human beings,
principally because addressees of prayers are the ancestors themselves. They seem
to be understood to act in their own power without recourse to God to whom they
would, presumably, forward the prayers of the people. But we argued that vagueness
of relationship where it exists did not mean none whatsoever. The very fact of a
transcending and Ultimate Deity who is credited with creation, and by extension life,
in African cosmologies means there is a relationship of ancestors and other beings to
this Deity. Indeed, we pointed out two types of relationships that exist. The first was
that, since ancestors in Africa are understood in virtually all mid-African ethnic
groups as sustaining and preserving the community they belong to (that is, they serve
as guarantors of life to their communities), they mediate life on behalf of the
Ultimate Deity who is credited as the source of life. The second was that ancestors
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mediate the presence of God who is believed to manifest himself through spirit
beings and, not least, ancestors. Indeed, ancestors are understood to be his proxies.
What is to be noted here is that at the heart of these mediatorial roles of ancestors is
concern for the wellbeing of the community, a point which ties in with the first, but
is also related to the second, of the two mediatorial roles just outlined. In Africa , as
we argued, it seems that the sustenance or preservation of the community is what
determines the raison d'etre of ancestors: it is central to the ancestor cult, despite the
differences that may be found in the details of how this is carried out. For this
reason, Africans for a variety of purposes related to their general wellbeing, consult,
appease, appeal to and invoke, their ancestors. This wellbeing of the community
they belong to is what we need to understand as the general function of ancestors in
Africa. This understood, we shall now focus on the ontology of Jesus and use it to
show how he is better placed to carry out the general function of ancestors in a more
effective manner, thus making him the greatest ancestor in Africa.
The greatness of Jesus over ancestors lies in Hebrews' presentation of him as the
Son of God, which also crystallizes Jesus' basic contrast to ancestors: while they are
the sons of the community who cease to exist after about five generations on
becoming ancestors, he is the Son of God who lives eternally. In the first instance,
Jesus' greatness over ancestors is seen in his being closer to God than ancestors
because he is God's Son. The belief that ancestors possess the power to look after the
wellbeing of the community stems largely from the belief that as spiritual beings they
are closer to God, the source of life, than earthly humans. As such, they are in a
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position to mediate this life to the community on behalf of God. King (1994)
comments on this appositely:
Ancestors are considered to have passed from this plane of existence to a new
plane which is sometimes referred to as the supernatural, or the invisible. ...
these planes are not seen as distinct, but overlapping. Whatever the
metaphysical system involved, this change is seen as giving the ancestors a
closer access to God or the Supreme Being (11).
But following Hebrews' emphasis, Jesus, as God's Son, is closer to the source of
life than any other ancestor, since none of them is God's son. Indeed, as God's Son,
Jesus is seated at the right hand ofGod (Heb. 1.3), a position of closeness that no
ancestor in African belief can be said to have. Jesus, therefore, can be regarded as
being much more effective in taking care of the wellbeing of the community than
ancestors.
The greatness of Jesus over ancestors can be seen, in the second instance, in Jesus
being a better mediator than ancestors in regard to interceding for the community
before God, and in regard to guiding the community on behalf of God, because he is
God's Son. Ancestors (in instances where their intercessory mediation and guidance
is recognized) have been expected to intervene through presenting the needs of the
community to God and offering God's guidance to the community. This is so
because, perceived to be spiritual beings, they are believed to present the needs that
pertain to the wellbeing of the community to God more effectively than earthly
human beings. Also, having participated in the human life of the community they
are believed to have intimate knowledge of what would contribute to the wellbeing
of the community they intercede for. Together with this, they are seen to offer God's
guidance in a way better than, say, other spirits or divinities, because the
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communities they serve know them personally and thus feel closer to them. This
role, to quote King again:
... can be seen either in terms of distance or language: the ancestors who now
know the languages of the invisible are better adapted to such communication
than men and women in this realm. The personal relationship of the ancestors
to the living also helps what we might call the "downward" communication in
which they engage as mediators: their position makes the ancestors more
familiar with the petitioner as well as the Supreme Being. Communication is
thus enhanced in both directions (11).
Jesus, then, can be regarded as the greatest ancestor because, being God's Son and
having lived amongst human beings, he is more effective than ancestors in
performing both functions of intercession and guidance in taking care of the
wellbeing of the community. In him, we may say, we encounter the ideal ancestor,
who shares both in the life of God and that of the community.
An objection, however, can be raised to this second instance of the greatness of
Jesus over ancestors. If intercession and guidance is based on an intimate knowledge
of the community an ancestor is said to serve, how can Jesus be an ancestor to a
specific community in Africa if he has not shared in its life as one who has once
lived in this community? The answer to this objection lies in the incarnation of
Jesus. According to Hebrews, Jesus was from the tribe of Judah (Heb. 7.14) and
lived amongst Jews at a particular time and place (Heb. 1.6,2.9-17, 5.7-9). Although
this would seem to limit his mediatorial role to Jews from the standpoint ofbelief in
ancestral function in Africa, its implication is that Jesus has lived amongst us as a
human being and so understands and knows the needs of our communities in the
same way as ancestors are said to. Moreover, it is apparent that Hebrews 2.5-18
allows for the viewing of Jesus' participation in human life generally, which would
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lend itself to an argument for his participation in the life of African Christian
communities.6 Consequently Jesus is an ancestor to the extent that like them he
functions like a mediator in catering for the wellbeing (we may think here of the
redemption) of the community, due to his closeness to God and his participation in
the life of the community. However, he is unlike ancestors to the extent that he is the
Son of God and eternal, and, ipso facto, conducts their functions more effectively.
Consequently, Jesus is not only an ancestor in Africa but rather, and more
importantly, the greatest ancestor, i.e. the definitive mediator in Africa.
6.1.4. New Understandings ofAfrican Ancestral Notions
The reconception of Jesus as an ancestor in Africa as qualified above means that
we have a typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in
Africa that uses African perceptions of mediators, but at the same time moves
beyond them. This is on account of, firstly, ending up in our Christology with an
'ancestor' who is the Son of God seated at his right hand, and who lives forever.
Secondly, Jesus is an ideal ancestor who is not limited to a specific community but
who relates to all of humanity. Such an ideal ancestor is unheard of in ancestral
traditions of Africa, for he is an ancestor who is both human and divine (here in the
sense that he is related to the Ultimate deity, to God, as his Son). For this reason
there are some who may want to say that we have pushed the notion of ancestor
beyond recognition or even distorted it in re-conceiving Hebrews' Christology in
6 For others such as Bediako (1994), the implication is deeper than this and manifests the greatness of
Jesus over ancestors. He argues that: 'Ancestors are considered worthy of honour for "having lived
amongst us" and for having brought benefits to us; Jesus Christ has done infinitely more. They,
originating from amongst us, had no choice to live amongst us. But he, reflecting the brightness of
God's glory and the exact likeness of God's own being (Hebrews 1.3), took our flesh, shared out-
human nature and underwent death for us... His incarnation implies that he has achieved a more
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Africa. However, analogies, as we mentioned earlier, can go beyond shedding light
on the unknown through the use of the known, and can generate new understandings.
This is precisely what is taking place here; a new understanding is generated that
there is an ancestor who is both human and divine. To be even more precise, ifwe
may go back to our previous discussion (section 6.1.2.), the merging of ancestors (a
notion in the field ofmediatorial figures in Africa) with Jesus (understood as an
ancestor) who is both human and divine (an alien notion in the field ofmediatorial
figures in Africa) brings about a change in this field by significantly altering the
notions in question, viz., the concept of the existence of the greatest ancestor, an
ancestor par excellence, we may say.
Such a new understanding of an ancestor does not stand alone in our typology-
based theological interpretation of Hebrews, but is anchored first in the dynamics of
typology, and, secondly, in its theological underpinnings. Since typological
relationships are characterised by contrasts or intensifications of the type in the
antitype, they easily end up in the generation of new meanings. Here we have
contrasted the being (i.e., ontology) of ancestors with that of Jesus, and on that basis
we have seen how ancestors' functions are intensified, and performed more
effectively in him, ultimately leading to a new understanding of a unique type of
ancestor. This typological relationship, ending up in a new understanding, is
legitimized theologically by the theology underpinning typology. God is the
architect of the new understanding because he has so ordered the past (ancestors) to
point to the present (Jesus) in this way. It is God's work in history that allows for the
profound identification with us in our humanity than the mere ethnic solidarity of lineage ancestors
can ever do' (117).
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new understanding in the present. Ancestors prefigure Jesus; they are not identical,
but, owing to God's work, have similarities that have enabled the one to foreshadow
the other. In effect, Jesus as the greatest ancestor surpasses and consequently
displaces the ancestral cult in Africa. So, for example, whereas there existed
previously a number of ancestors in Africa, with the emergence of Jesus in African
cosmology we now have only one ancestor as a mediator. Also, whereas we had a
number of ancestors continually joining, or making exit from, the family of
ancestors, the exits and replacements no longer affect who the community looks to
for mediation, for the greatest ancestor does not need to be replaced since he lives
forever. This conclusion appropriately leads us to the next section in which we
grapple with the implications of Hebrews' Christology in Africa, so interpreted for
the faith, life and worship of African Christian communities.
6.2 IMPLICATIONS FOR CHRISTIANITY IN AFRICA
We have so far conducted an interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa by
reconceiving it in an image appropriate to Africa. Such an interpretation, i.e., Jesus
as the greatest ancestor, should be taken as part of an African theology that comes
about via the interpretation of the Christology of a specific biblical text in an African
context. This is in keeping with the aim of our thesis, which is to carry out an
interpretation ofHebrews' Christology within an African context as part of African
theology. Since an integral aim of African theology is the building and sustenance of
authentic African Christian communities in faith, ethos and cultus, what remains now
is to consider the implications of this interpretation of Hebrews Christology for
Christianity in Africa. Also, from the standpoint of theological interpretations, this
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consideration of the implications of Hebrews' Christology for African Christianity
remains because theological interpretations of biblical texts seek to make them
accessible to the Church in its contemporary setting for the sake of actualizing them
in, or applying them to, the life of the Church as the word of God. What follows,
then, is not only the use of an African theology (Jesus the greatest ancestor) arrived
at through biblical interpretation for the building ofChristianity in Africa, but
simultaneously the completion proper of the theological interpretation of Hebrews'
Christology in Africa.
Before we proceed, we need to recall summarily a critical assumption we touched
on earlier in this thesis, to help us grasp what underlies and informs this latter
exercise. We mentioned that the Bible, however conceived, holds a central position
in African theology insofar as it wishes to be a Christian theology and thereby be of
service to the building and sustenance of authentic African Christian communities.
The reason for this, we argued, was that the Bible is the locus of what is authentic to
Christianity, and as such, any theology, or praxis that wishes to be considered
Christian, must be validated by it. What this means is that our considerations of the
implications of our theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa will
be characterized by a bringing together of that interpretation on one hand and
relevant aspects of Christianity in Africa on the other. The aim of such a dialogue
will be to let the said interpretation (as part of the Bible) bear on African Christianity
as an affirmation or instruction or correction to its faith, life or worship for the sake
of fostering authentic embodiments of the Christian faith in Africa. In other words,
if an African Christian were to hear the word of God from Hebrews saying to
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him/her that Jesus is the greatest ancestor, what would be the possible implications to
him/her of that word? This brings us full circle to the question of this thesis: what
would be the significance of Hebrews' Christology for African Christian
communities? We are now in a position to argue for an answer to this question.
6.2.1. The Character ofChristianity in Africa
To understand the possible implications of our typology-based theological
interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa for African Christianity, we need to
consider, for reasons that will become clear, the character of African Christianity.
More precisely, we need to take into consideration an aspect of the context of
African Christianity and, subsequently, how that aspect affects the issues that African
Christianity grapples with and the forms it takes. As we noted in our fifth chapter on
ancestors in Africa, the religious cosmology of Africa is made up of ancestors,
spirits, divinities or deities and natural forces (whether animistic or theophanous).
To Africans, this higher world is in constant interaction with the material world of
humans, greatly influencing its fortunes. As Gifford (1998) notes, 'for most
Africans, witchcraft, spirits and ancestors, spells and charms are primary and
immediate and natural categories of interpretation' (382).7




One may be tempted to think, as suggested by Schoffeleers (1988) that such a
phenomenon is limited to rural Africa, or has been attenuated by the economic and
social modernization forces of globalization. But clearly this is not the case. This
phenomenon is still alive in Africa even in the very big cities as shown by Setiloane's
(1978, 407-8) reflections, contra Schoffeleers (see footnote 8 below), on the
persistence of traditional world-view in Africa. Moreover, there are suggestions
(Chabal 1996, 32-34) that due to the current conditions ofAfrica, there is a re-
traditionalization of Africa where 'individuals in Africa increasingly are, or are
perceived to be, behaving according to norms, criteria, values and so on, more
readily associated with what passes for "traditional" Africa than with the Africa
which the colonial masters thought they had constructed' (33). Put differently, there
seems to be a revival, relatively speaking, of the traditional African worldview,
contrary to the expectations that economic and social modernization following on the
worldview of the Enlightenment would eliminate it. This African worldview, which
sees a constant interaction of the physical and spiritual world, with the latter
perceived to be heavily influencing the former, is a significant part of the context of
Christianity in Africa. Indeed, one could argue that it is the most significant context
for African Christianity given its ubiquity; no avenue of life in Africa is spared the
influence of this traditional worldview.
8
He suggests this in the context of his argument that Black theology, and not African theology, took
hold in South Africa because it was an urban creation unlike African theology which derived from
peasant culture. This argument implies that the mentioned African cosmology does not hold sway in
the urban centres of Africa because it is limited to peasant cultures. Indeed, according to him, the
migration of blacks in South Africa from their rural homes to black townships meant that, 'the rural
world-view which had been once dominant ideological orientation for black South Africans, gradually
lost its relevance and self-evidence' (101-2).
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From various perspectives and concerns, surveys of Christianity in Africa show
that it is punctuated by its efforts to deal with this context.9 In the words ofGray
(1990): 'These fundamental assumptions about the nature of the world and the place
of human beings within it have profoundly influenced the development of African
Christianity' (6). To put it perhaps in a clearer perspective, Christianity in Africa has
had to (and still does) address the spiritual world that African Christians find
themselves immersed in, and this rightly characterizes the forms that Christianity
assumes. What orientation are African Christians to have towards these spiritual
entities which they cannot ignore and are particularly prone to deal with in times of
crisis? Are they to be taken as illusory or real? If real, are they to be identified with
forces in conflict with the Christian God, or benevolent and not contrary to the
Christian God? If they are in opposition to the Christian God, how are African
Christians supposed to deal with them? If they are benevolent, how are they to be
incorporated into the Christian faith? Nowhere else do we see this world being
addressed head-on in African Christianity than in the so-called 'African Independent
(or Instituted) Churches' (AICs),10 and in particular, following Sundkler's (1970, 38-
59) typology of AICs,11 in the Zionist AICs. (Of course, the so-called Mission
12Churches have striven to address this as well but in a relatively less pronounced
way, primarily because of the missionary legacy to deny the African worldview in
question here.)
9 See for example Welbourn (1965, 34-42), Mullings (1996, 75-81), Gray (1990), and Schoffeleers
(2002).
10 For definitive studies on AICs, see Barret (1968) and Sundkler (1970).
" See Turner (1968) and Kailing (1988, 51-56) for more on typologies for AICs.
12 As opposed to AICs, these are churches 'that have developed from modern missionary work,
together with the churches of white settlers and administrators... They range through most of the
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Ositelu II and Pobee (1998, 40-43) isolate the following as the characteristics of
the Zionist AICs: experience of the Spirit, a penchant for healing and exorcism,
personal testimonies, protest movements and rediscovery of the earliest Christian
communities' self-understanding of'the way'. A few comments here are in order. Of
the enumerated characteristics, healing and exorcism, and the experience of the Spirit
seem the most fundamental in AICs, so much so that all Zionist AICs share these
characteristics.13 This is the reason why Sundkler (1970), comparing the Zionist
AICs to the Catholic and Protestant Churches, wrote: 'While the Roman Church is an
institute ofGrace through its sacraments, and the Protestant Church in Africa appears
as an institute of the word through teaching and preaching, the Independent Church,
the Zionist type, is an institute of healing' (220). It is in this form ofChristianity in
Africa, where it is expressed chiefly as a healing faith, that the mentioned African
worldview is squarely tackled, and in so doing Christianity in Africa has met directly
the felt needs of Africans (Loewen 1976, 409-419). This is because to the African,
sickness is related to this 'enchanted'14 world. So, one is sick because an ancestor is
displeased, or some hostile spirit has invaded one's life, or because an evil spell has
been cast on one, etc. In various ways, AICs deal with this by providing power and
protection by means of the Christian faith against these causes of sickness, and also
by the ability to isolate (through prophets and other charismatic figures) the
particular source of a sickness, and subsequently provide a Christian solution to the
same. This is what gives AICs great appeal among Africans as particular
familiar names in the ecclesiastical spectrum of the West, Anglican, Baptist, Congregational,
Lutheran, Methodist, Presbyterian, Roman Catholic,...' (Turner 1968, 10).
1 And for that reason Zionist AICs are also called 'spirit' or 'prophet-healing' churches.
141 am using the term 'enchanted' in this thesis in a rather loose way to signify the spiritual world.
This world is composed of entities that cannot be measured or identified in an empirical or scientific
way but no less real.
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manifestations ofChristianity, because they deal with their felt needs. (It is precisely
for this reason that various forms of Pentecostalism, which have been in Africa for a
while,15 are fast taking root as forms ofAfrican Christianity [Gifford 1993 and Cox
1996, 243-262]). In regard to the Spirit, some AICs have substituted the Holy Spirit,
angels and other servant-spirits as the ones through whom God's activity is mediated,
for the myriad spirits populating African cosmology. This replacement has been
effected either by the demonization of the various spirits in the African cosmos as
opposed to God and the church, thus seeking to banish them (Hastings 1976, 55 and
Malone 1987, 25), or by showing that compared to the Christian spirits that have
replaced them, they are not as powerful or are simply surpassed by them, and thus
should be abandoned. Other AICs have accommodated some of the spirits in the
African cosmos, and African Christians have continued to relate to them alongside
their Christian faith (Philip 1975, 185).16
The essential point of the foregoing is to see that the forms of Christianity in
Africa have been dictated by the context in Africa and in particular by the enchanted
world of this context. As a result, one would say that African Christianity is in a
significant way the product of the interface between the Christian faith and the
'enchanted' world of Africa. This 'enchanted' world, as it were, shapes African
Christianity considerably, for in the efforts to apply the Christian faith to this world,
African Christianity has been, and is still being, fashioned. For this reason, it is in
15 Maxwell's (2002) comprehensive study on Pentecostalism in Southern Africa underlines this point.
16 Walls (1996) argues that this is especially the case with second or later generations of African
Christianity. He writes: 'In later, "Christian", generations, those who resort to old powers usually
intend no apostasy, no abandonment of the Christian framework... Rather, they have run out of
resources to face the difficulties of the contemporary world, and are looking for additional resources
beyond the Christian framework' (192).
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this interface that we need to ponder the implications of Hebrews' Christology for
African Christianity. As discussed already, it is an important exercise, since we
cannot take it for granted that all forms of Christianity resulting from this interface
are authentic in the sense of being faithful to Christian tradition generally and
founded in the Bible in particular.17 It is this recognition in the first instance that
makes African theology critical in contributing to sustainable and authentic African
Christian communities. The question for us now is this: in efforts towards the
forming of authentic African Christian communities, what might Hebrews'
Christology, as part of the Bible, say to African Christians who inhabit the ancestral
world of Africa as a part of their 'enchanted' world? We shall answer this question
by considering the implications of Hebrews' Christology, i.e., Jesus as the greatest
ancestor, for ancestral practice in Africa. In so doing we shall be helping in efforts to
fashion authentic forms of African Christianity and in sustaining the same.
6.2.2. Absorption ofAncestors in African Christianity
Broadly speaking, the importance of Jesus as the greatest ancestor for African
Christianity lies in this very conception of Jesus. In reconceiving Jesus as the
greatest ancestor, we have him cast in an image appropriate to Africa, thereby having
a Christology that is placed squarely within African cosmology. This would mean
that we have a Christology that is African, and, crucially, one that interacts with an
important sphere of its cosmology, viz., its 'enchanted' world of ancestors. The result
17 Indeed it is observed (Turner 1968, 6-10) that the encounter of Christianity and African traditional
religion has brought some syntheses that are clearly not Christian in form but rather described as 'Neo-
pagan' and 'Hebraist'. The former being new forms of African traditional religion that have come
about in various ways by amalgamating selected elements of traditional religion and Christianity, and
the latter African religious movements that 'have made a radical break-through from paganism, by the
rejection of idolatry and all magical practices in favour of faith in the one God they find in the Old
Testament...' (8).
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have a Christology that is recognizable to Africans, and one that they can easily
relate to. In other words, when Jesus is identified as the greatest ancestor, he is
understood and signified within, and in reference to, African cosmology. This is
crucial because it helps integrate Christianity into African cosmology and in
consequence, as we shall see below, helps African Christians have an adequate
Christian orientation to their ancestral world. It is in this way that Hebrews'
Christology interpreted in Africa as part ofAfrican theology helps towards the
realization of an authentic African Christianity. We will proceed now to consider in
detail the implications for Christian practice and worship in Africa of the
understanding and significance of Jesus when he is identified as the greatest ancestor
in African cosmology.
We mentioned that the major factor determining the shape ofChristianity in Africa
is its interaction with Africa's 'enchanted' worldview. This is also where the
challenge to forming an authentic African Christianity lies. African Christian
communities must relate their faith to their 'enchanted' worldview, else there will be
no African Christianity but a Christianity that runs parallel to African cosmology.
Indeed, we may say, the degree to which this relating is done, without compromising
Christianity altogether, is the degree to which authentic African Christianity would
be realized. Now, the comprehension of Jesus as the greatest ancestor can
profoundly influence the way African Christians perceive, and subsequently relate to,
their ancestors, particularly with respect to their general mediatorial functions.
According to our typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology,
ancestors are part of the work of God in Africa with the ultimate purpose of shedding
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light on Jesus, i.e., ancestors are a 'type' of Christ. This means then that ancestors in
Africa are no longer alienated from Christianity in Africa, nor are they seen as
inimical to the faith. Rather, they are a part ofHeilsgeschichte, in the sense that the
story of the salvation ofGod wrought in Christ is understood now to extend as well
to Africa's enchanted worldview, particularly in the mediatorial roles of the
ancestors.
The implication of the above understanding for Christianity in Africa is at least
twofold. The first implication would be that African Christianity absorbs or
integrates ancestors into African Christian consciousness. This is derived from the
significance and value for Christianity that can now be placed on ancestors in Africa
by African Christians. In the past, Mission Churches have viewed ancestor-practice
in Africa as diabolical. As well noted, Africa's pre-Christian religious heritage was
considered evil, a sentiment which modern missionary movements brought with
them when they brought Christianity to Africa. Anna Scott (1969) for example, in
Day Dawn in Africa called the deity of the Grebos 'the grand devil', and its priest
'demon doctor' (89), while Bishop Tucker viewed the religion of the Baganda to be
'the Lubare superstition' and her priests 'Doctors of Satanity' (Wilson 1955, 8). More
recently (ifmy experience is anything to go by) Mission Churches, especially the
Protestant ones, have been mostly indifferent to ancestor-practice, if they have not
ignored it, resulting, in practice, in a nebulous relationship between Christianity and
ancestors in these churches (Walls 1996, 194). As for the AICs, in the more
Pentecostal ones especially, ancestors seem to be rejected as evil or inconsistent with
the worship of the true God (Hastings 1976, 55).
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To be noted is that in both these cases, there is no value placed on ancestors as a
part of African Christian consciousness, leading, in my opinion, to an unsatisfactory
relationship between the Christian faith in Africa and ancestors. It is for this reason,
I surmise, that despite this demonization of, or indifference to, ancestors, the
ancestral cult in Africa, even amongst African Christians, still thrives. I submit,
therefore, that placing significance on ancestors as representing part of God's work in
African history aimed at leading Africans to recognize Jesus' ultimate and superior
mediation, leads us out of this problem of the inability to absorb ancestral practice
into African Christianity. This is because, if ancestors are looked upon as types of
Christ, they will be valued as such and in consequence absorbed into African
Christian consciousness while allowing for an authentic Christian belief in Jesus'
unique and ultimate significance as the definitive mediator between God and human
beings.
6.2.3. Displacement ofAncestors by African Christianity
Out of the first implication comes the second, viz., African Christian worship
would displace ancestors, in their general mediatorial functions, with Jesus who is
now seen as the one they have been pointing towards. The very fact that significance
is placed upon the ancestor figure as a type of Christ leads to his displacement. If the
type as the work of God functions to point forward to the antitype (which it is
providentially meant to do), then when the antitype emerges, the type gives way to it.
This is because, from the point of view of the theology of typology, a type is not an
end in itself; its function and significance are inextricably related to the antitype, so
that in the presence of the antitype, the type (together with the practices revolving
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around it) ceases to function. The only function it would still hold is in its use to
illuminate the antitype but not to function in real terms as it did prior to the arrival of
the antitype. Here it is worthwhile to note that, before the arrival of an antitype, the
type functions in a real way in the religious lives of the people without their
knowledge of its replacement in the future because it is a part of a wider picture of
God's work in history. The understanding of a personage, or institution, or event, to
be a type comes only after the fact of the antitype is made known and not before. So,
ancestors have played and continue to play an important role in the lives ofAfricans
as mediatorial figures, but with Jesus' arrival in African cosmology, they cease to
play their mediatorial roles, for they are now to be understood as types of Christ, who
performs their functions in a more effective manner. Indeed, this is what takes place
in Hebrews with Jewish mediatorial figures. Their mediatorial functions were real in
the lives of the people involved with them, but after the advent of Jesus, Hebrews'
argument shows that their proper function remained one only of pointing to Jesus'
superior mediation, which had surpassed theirs and thus displaced them.
We need to make some noteworthy observations on the implications for African
Christianity of absorbing ancestors, on the basis of Hebrews' Christology, into
African Christian consciousness, and thereby displacing them with Jesus. The first is
that we would have a form of African Christianity that displaces ancestors whilst at
the same time not rejecting them as evil and inimical to the purposes ofGod, contra
older Mission Churches practice and Pentecostal AICs, as mentioned. This is an
important observation because displacement of ancestors in African Christianity has
230
been at the expense of disparaging the practice, which, I have contended, leads to an
unsatisfactory relationship between Christian faith and the African belief.
This negative view of ancestors is not necessarily in terms of their being evil or
inimical to the purposes of God, as has tended to happen in the aforementioned
churches, but is also in terms of calling into question their actual reality and function.
This latter displacement of ancestors is on the basis of the argument that they are
illusory, a product of society's mythmaking. Bediako (1994, 96-104, 116-19) is an
example of this view of ancestors. He has sought to articulate an African theology
that displaces ancestors with Jesus on this very argument. He does so by denouncing
ancestors in Africa as a presumption, having no demonstrable, actual function, and,
he contends, that it is in fact Jesus Christ who is the only true and actual ancestor.
This is because he perceives the cult of ancestor as the 'product ofmyth-making
imagination of the community' (116). He asserts that the power of ancestors stems
from, and is sustained by, the corporate beliefof the community, and not from their
intrinsic, real demonstrable power to act. Bediako feels that this is not the case with
Jesus, who, coming into the world from the transcendent realm as the Son of God,
took on human nature, underwent death and conquered it by his resurrection,
showing and demonstrating his intrinsic powers. His argument, therefore, for the
displacement of ancestors in Africa with Jesus casts aspersions on their concrete
reality, thus pejorating them. And this, we are saying, leads to an unsatisfactory
relationship between the Christian faith and African belief in ancestors. A better
way, as we have argued on the basis of Hebrews' Christology, is to displace ancestors
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with Christ in African Christianity while, at the same time, giving them subordinate
value in African Christianity as a part of an African Christian consciousness.
The other observation is that the displacement of ancestors in Africa by Jesus on
the basis of Hebrews' Christology in African Christianity is strictly to do with their
mediatorial functions. That is, with the arrival of Jesus, their antitype, ancestors
should not continue to perform their mediatorial functions amongst African
Christians. In other words, our argument has not extended to include, or consider the
possibility of, the displacement of ancestors by Jesus in their social role of
communion with the living members of the community, nor have we considered how
the displacement of ancestors by Jesus in their mediatorial function may affect
African Christians' relations to ancestors in these other roles. Although this is
important and merits consideration, it would be beyond the ambit of the
interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa to prescribe the way African
Christianity could interact with ancestors in Africa in their social functions. Of
course there are forms of African Christianity, especially from Roman Catholic
Churches and theologians, that are doing this already by incorporating them, on the
basis of their social roles, into African Christianity as part of the communion of
saints, the body of Christ in its widest sense. At issue in such incorporations is not so
much the mediatorial role of ancestors as the view that they are members of the
18
community and thus in a given relationship with it. But for reasons just given, we
shall not look at them here in the present study.
18 See for example Fashole-Luke (1974, 212-220), Nyamiti (1993, 29-30), and Triebel (2002). It is
worthy to note here that I think Hebrews 11.1-12.1 is relevant to this discussion given its view that
those who have died are somewhat still a part of the community of faith from whom that community
ought to draw inspiration for their lives here on earth.
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6.2.4. Abandonment of the Ancestral Cult by African Christianity
As we showed in chapter three, the Christology of Hebrews is hammered out in
the synkrisis between Jesus and Jewish mediatorial figures. In between these
synkrises lie the author's paraenesis, which, essentially, contains dire warnings from
drifting away from God through a combination of disobedience and a crisis of faith.
It is possible, as we pointed out earlier that a number Hebrews scholars argue, that
the Christology of Hebrews and its paraenesis are not concretely or directly related.
In other words, the labour of the author in explicating a Christology with reference to
Jewish religious heritage may not be dictated by the real situation of the audience,
which would be that of a Jewish audience faced with the threat of relapse into
Judaism, but merely for a paraenetic purpose. However, in my opinion and that of a
number of Hebrews scholars, the nature of the Christology of Hebrews means that it
is in all probability shaped by a real issue of a relapse to Judaism. If this indeed is
the case, then, we could understand Hebrews' Christology as a prophetic word to a
Jewish Christian community, a prophetic word that is critical and apologetic of the
community's religious heritage (to which they are tempted to fall back). It is an
apologetic word in the sense that it affirms the religious heritage of this Jewish
community through a positive definition of its relationship to Christ, and it is a
critical word in the sense that it urges this Jewish Christian community, at the same
time, to abandon (in the sense of redefining) its loyalty to its religious heritage in the
greater light of the reality of Jesus (to whom its heritage has been pointing). So
strong is the latter motif in Hebrews that a falling back to its previous practice is
considered an apostasy that will not go unpunished. The significance of Jesus is such
that he alone is to be looked to for mediation, without any recourse to mediatorial
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figures in the audience's religious heritage. We could say, therefore, that the
Christology of Hebrews is not only interested in explicating the identity and
significance of Jesus within a Jewish religious context for the sake of pre-empting a
falling away from Christianity, but more specifically, it is also engaged in an effort to
sustain Christian belief and foster appropriate Christian praxis in the face of current
Jewish religious beliefs and practices that threaten to compromise it. An implication
ofHebrews' Christology in Africa would be to have African Christianity engage in
the same effort, but with regard to ancestral belief and practice. To this we now turn.
We noted earlier that African peoples have traditionally had a thriving and
elaborate ancestor cult. Shrines are built for them; there are special places
designated for them; sacrifices, libations and offerings are offered to them; and they
are consulted, appealed to and invoked in a variety ofways and in various
circumstances. As we argued at length in Chapter 5, one of the prime reasons for the
consultation of ancestors by Africans is their mediation. Because Hebrews'
Christology in Africa leads to the absorption of ancestors into an African Christian
consciousness and subsequently to their displacement in African Christian praxis, as
we have shown, the need for the consultation of ancestors ceases on the part of the
African Christian. But more than that, not only does the consultation of ancestors
cease, it becomes a compromise of the Christian faith where it persists.19
19 Kabasale's (1991) argument, for example, that the mediation of Jesus does not abolish that of
ancestors goes against this understanding. He writes: 'Just as Christ, the one priest, does not abolish
human mediations but fulfils them in himself, so does he consummate in himself the mediation
exercised by our ancestors, a mediation which he does not abolish but which, in him, is revealed to be
henceforth a subordinate mediation' (126). We need to note here that such a position cannot be taken
on the basis of Hebrews' Christology for it would imply that Christ's mediation is lacking and needs to
be supplemented by that of ancestors, an interpretation that Hebrews' Christology cannot be
reconciled with. Furthermore, it would go against the understanding, on which Hebrews' Christology
is based, that a type gives way to the antitype and thus cannot continue to operate in its presence.
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This is so because Jesus now as the greatest ancestor not only displaces them as
such but is to be looked to solely as the greatest ancestor having surpassed their
mediation and rendered them redundant. Consequently they are in the final analysis
to be abandoned specifically as objects of religious cubic practice. This is an
important implication for African Christianity because of the perpetual threat to
African Christians of compromising their Christian faith on account of the ancestral
cult as an alternative to Jesus' mediation. It has been noted that this is particularly
the case in times of crisis wherein African Christians find themselves falling back to
ancestral cult (Sawyerr 1969, 80). Walls (1996), as cited earlier in the preceding
section, explains this tendency thus: 'In later "Christian" generations, those who
resort to old powers usually intend no apostasy, no abandonment of the Christian
framework... Rather, they have run out of resources to face the difficulties of the
contemporary world, and are looking for additional resources beyond the Christian
framework' (192). From such a perspective, Hebrews' Christology then becomes,
too, a prophetic word to African Christianity. So long as the Christian faith and the
ancestral cult interact and in consequence contest their ground among African
Christians, Hebrews' Christology would be needed to engage critically with ancestor-
reverence in this way, in efforts to foster authentic embodiments of the Christian
faith in its context.
From the foregoing implications of Hebrews' Christology for African Christianity,
we see something of an African Christianity shaped by the interface between Jesus
and the world of ancestors in Africa. More specifically, the relationship between
Christianity and ancestors is defined by the absorption of ancestors into African
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Christian consciousness, their displacement as mediators in African cosmology by
Jesus in African Christianity, and, finally, their abandonment as mediators by
African Christianity. It is important to note that, though distinct from each other, the
absorption of ancestors into African Christian consciousness, their displacement by
Jesus, and their abandonment as mediators as outlined here are inextricably related
whereby displacement and subsequent abandonment of ancestors is based on their
absorption. It is important to explain the significance of this point.
As pointed out already, absorption of ancestors in African Christian consciousness
is a unique contribution of Hebrews' Christology to African Christianity. Indeed in
all the literature of African Christianity and theology I have read in the course of this
thesis, I have not come across any argument of such a relationship. No previous
argument of the displacement of ancestors with Jesus in their mediatorial functions
or their abandonment as mediators in African Christianity is based on their
absorption in African Christian consciousness, a situation that makes the relationship
ofAfrican Christianity with ancestors an unsatisfactory one in practice. It is
unsatisfactory because we end up having a very important aspect of African
cosmology, which Africans feel drawn to, considered by Christianity either as evil,
illusory, or simply a neutral phenomenon that serves no purpose in African
Christianity. The absorption of ancestors in African Christian consciousness that I
advocate sees them as good and real, but now having served their purpose, giving
way to Jesus. So, the unique contribution of Hebrews' Christology in Africa to the
relationship ofChristianity and ancestors is that such a relationship is not just defined
by absorption, displacement and abandonment, but has absorption into African
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Christian consciousness as its starting point, leading on to displacement and finally to
abandonment of ancestors as mediators. This way, while ancestors in Africa are no
longer to be looked to for mediation by African Christians, they are appreciated (and
thus still useful) in African Christianity for their value of pointing to Jesus as his
type.
Such a contribution is welcome, since the relationship of Christianity and
ancestors in Africa, relative to other aspects of its enchanted world, as Walls (1996,
194-196) points out, is nascent, needing African theology to put in more effort in
articulating and building authentic forms of African Christianity in this context. The
interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa as a part of African theology helps
in the said need. Also, in theological interpretative terms, such a contribution is a
product ofwhat it means for an African Christian to hear the word of God from
Hebrews, saying to him or her that Jesus is the greatest ancestor. This is the




Ifwe may recapitulate what has preceded, this thesis has attempted to answer the
question: What would be the meaning or significance of Hebrews' Christology for
southern and mid-African Christian communities? The result has been the
conception of Jesus as the greatest ancestor, arrived at through a typology-based
theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa. Typology-based
theological interpretations, we observed, are characterized by the direct transfer of a
New Testament typological text's meaning in its initial context onto a contemporary
one. Such a transfer of the initial message is on the basis that when we have parallels
between a New Testament typological text's contexts where significant portions of
the text's initial context correspond to elements in its contemporary context, then -
on the theological conviction that correspondences between the two are due to God's
working in the histories of both contexts - we can have a direct transfer of the text's
message from its initial audience onto its contemporary audience. Moreover, this is
also possible because similarities between the initial and contemporary contexts of a
New Testament's typological text bridge its cultural and historical distance, with the
result that what can be determined to have been heard by the text's initial audience is,
with few necessary qualifications, the same message being heard by the text's
contemporary audience.
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In consequence, we compared Hebrews' initial audience with its contemporary one
in Africa and showed significant correspondences between the two. Specifically, we
showed a correspondence between Jewish mediatorial figures, in the initial context
ofHebrews, and ancestors, in a contemporary context of Hebrews, Africa. We
argued that the initial Christology ofHebrews was that of Jesus as the definitive
mediator: Jewish mediators known at the time are understood by Hebrews to be types
ofChrist whose function, therefore, is to point to him. Now in his wake, they are
surpassed by him in their functions and being as mediators, and must give way to his
mediation. This being the case, our direct transfer of Hebrews' initial Christology to
Africa resulted in our re-conceiving Jesus as the greatest ancestor. Ancestors, like
their counterparts, the Jewish mediatorial figures, are understood to be types of
Christ, thus pointing to him. Now that he has been revealed, they give way to him
and are surpassed in their functions and being as mediators by his mediation.
This concern to isolate the significance of Hebrews' Christology for African
Christian communities, we pointed out, was tied to the concerns of African theology,
viz., the building and sustenance of African Christian communities in their faith, life,
and cultus. The result of this has been twofold. The first is that we have conducted a
theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa that is indeed not only a
contribution to African theology, but, more importantly, an African theology which
is derived from the Bible. In other words, the conceptualization of Jesus as the
greatest ancestor is both a theological interpretation ofHebrews' Christology in an
African context and an African theology derived in a more primary way from the
Bible. Since the Bible is central to the validation of any theology wishing to be
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Christian, such an African theology rooted in the Bible is essentially Christian and,
therefore, well placed for the task of African theology mentioned above.
The second result is that because the theological interpretation of Hebrews'
Christology in Africa is part of an African theology, we had to complete it with a
consideration of its implications for African Christian communities. This exercise
was for the purpose of helping to build and sustain African Christian communities, a
crucial role ofAfrican theology. The result of this has been a defining, on the basis
of our theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa, of the
relationship between African Christianity and ancestors in Africa. This relationship
is encapsulated in three interrelated components: 1. The absorption of ancestors into
African Christian consciousness where ancestors are not divorced from Christianity
but absorbed into it through being understood as having been used by God as types
of Christ to point to him; as such they are part ofGod's Heilsgeschichte. 2. The
displacement of ancestors as mediators by Jesus in African Christianity. Here,
ancestors as types of Christ can no longer function as mediators in the face of Christ,
and, having pointed forward to him, they must now give way to him. 3. The
abandonment of ancestors as mediators by African Christianity. This is the logical
conclusion of this definition. Since ancestors are types ofChrist, and consequently
point to him and are displaced by him, they can no longer be actively appealed to as
mediators. They must be abandoned as such, else we have a compromise of
Hebrews' Christology in Africa and, with it, ofChristianity.
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Since our thesis is a theological interpretation of Hebrews and an instance of an
African theology, we conclude this thesis with a brief reflection on the relationship
between our typology-based theological interpretations of the Bible and theological
interpretations in general, and on the relationship of African theology and other
theologies. The reflection is structured in terms of two questions: 1. What
relationship might there be between ad hoc theological interpretations and the more
general theological interpretations? 2. What contributions could African theology
derived in the manner of this thesis give to other theologies in the world? The
importance of these questions will be clear in the course of our discourse.
7.1 AD HOC THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS AND GENERAL
THEOLOGICAL INTERPRETATIONS
Our proposed typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology
in Africa was subsequent to our discussion (in Ch. 2) on models of theological
interpretations proposed by leading New Testament scholars of the 20th Century.
This discussion showed that none of the proposed models of theological
interpretations (we shall call them general approaches to interpretation) was adequate
to the task of theologically interpreting Hebrews' Christology in Africa. More
specifically, we pointed out the following. Fowl's emphasis on Church as definitive
of theological interpretation, so that any reading of the Bible is a theological
interpretation if it promotes faithful lives before God in the light of Christ, lacks
consideration of the place and importance of the historical dimension of the Bible in
its theological interpretations. Watson's insistence, depending on how we understand
him, on concerns with theological issues raised by the final (canonical) text (in-
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Church-and-in-world) as definitive of theological interpretation has a variety of
insights, but which altogether make it quite nebulous for use in specific theological
interpretations of the Bible. Also, his view sits lightly on the historical component of
the Bible as in part definitive of theological interpretations. Morgan's proposal that
theories of religion (or theological belief) could make possible theological
interpretations conducted in conjunction with critical scholarship, as illustrated by
Strauss, Baur and Bultmann, whilst honouring the historical imperative of the Bible,
seems too open-ended to be used in specific theological interpretation of the Bible.
And lastly, Barth's theological interpretation which is defined by certain key
theological convictions brings about a certain understanding of the subject matter of
the Bible (which is key in theological interpretation), but it seems ambivalent about
the historical dimension of the Bible and also seems, for lack of hermeneutical
instructions, hard to follow in practice unless one is Barth himself.
However, we noted that each of the proposed approaches to theological
interpretations of the Bible has some vital element(s) integral to the enterprise of
theological interpretations of the Bible. On account of this, we argued that there
were three possible ways to proceed in using the general approaches to theological
interpretations of the Bible in interpreting Hebrews' Christology in Africa. One
would be to attempt a synthesis of the definitive elements in these approaches, which
would result in a theological hermeneutic that is monolithic. This, we argued, would
be permissible if 1. the writings of the Bible were a homogenous whole, i.e.,
composed of only one genre, a single subject matter, and originally written under
similar historical and cultural circumstances, and 2. if the theological interpretations
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themselves were to be carried out in the same cultural and historical situations.
Because of the heterogeneity of the biblical writings in genre, subject matter and
cultural and historical circumstances and the contexts in which they are received, the
case for theological interpretations that are sensitive to the same is obvious, making
this approach undesirable.
The second possible procedure would be to choose from the general approaches to
theological interpretations the one most suited for theologically interpreting Hebrews
in Africa. But this, we said, is hardly an option for two reasons. Firstly, none of the
approaches is particularly concerned to articulate a theological interpretation of the
Bible that is sensitive to different genres or any particular genre of the Bible; some in
fact see this (in ignoring or rejecting historical criticism) as inconsequential! Then,
secondly, none is sensitive enough to the currently different cultural and historical
contexts of the Bible (with the possible exception of Fowl who is concerned with a
North American reception); they all assume a homogenous cultural and historical
context. The third possible way to proceed would be to articulate an ad hoc
approach to theological interpretation that would be specific to Hebrews and specific
to its given context in Africa. This is the one we opted for, and ended up articulating
a typology-based theological interpretation as an ad hoc theological interpretation of
Hebrews' Christology in Africa. Given this, the question now is whether there is a
relationship between this theological interpretation of the Bible and the general
approaches to the Bible discussed; i.e., is there a relationship between ad hoc and
general theological interpretations of the Bible?
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Essentially, the relationship lies in the existence in ad hoc theological
interpretations of some of the vital elements in these general approaches to
theological interpretations. In dialogue with the general approaches to theological
interpretations, we isolated in our earlier discussion vital elements in theological
interpretations. They were: 1. the biblical text is approached as being embedded in
historical reality and related to the same, 2. the biblical text in its final canonical
form is the subject of interpretation, 3. theological convictions have a place in
informing interpretations of the Bible; and 4. the Church provides the contemporary
context for the results, the goals, of interpretation.
These elements are present in our typology-based theological interpretation, either
in the foreground or in the background. In the foreground of our typology-based
theological interpretation of Hebrews, the vital element is the third of those
enumerated above, i.e., a theological conviction, which is specific and highly
defined. That is, our ad hoc theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in
Africa is informed by the theological conviction that God is involved in all human
histories, with the purpose of leading them to Jesus, the goal of history. And in the
background of our typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews we have the
first, second and fourth of the vital elements mentioned above. For example, the
biblical text in its canonical form is the one in which we have interpreted Hebrews.
Indeed, apart from such a final canonical text, the notion ofHeilsgeschichte would
not stand.1 Another example is that our interpretation of Hebrews is for African
1 The notion ofHeilsgeschichte cannot be sustained on the basis of a New Testament text alone. The
Old Testament is needed for Heilsgeschichte to stand because it is the writings therein that precipitate,
and illuminate, the belief of God's working in the history of Israel, pointing to Christ.
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Christian communities who provide the context for the results and goal of our
interpretation.
What this means is that our ad hoc theological interpretation of Hebrews'
Christology, although not appropriating simply any of the general approaches in
theological interpretations discussed, is not divorced from some of their definitive
elements, but rather, draws, where appropriate, from them. Indeed, we use a vital
element in one of the general theological interpretation models in our typology-based
theological interpretation but in a more narrowly defined way and in a highly
specified manner. At the same time, we have other vital elements we presuppose in
(i.e., in the background of) our typology-based interpretation. What this shows, I
suggest, is that even though generalized forms of theological interpretation may not
be of adequate service for the reading of specific texts of the Bible theologically in a
given context, some of their definitive elements are absolutely vital to any ad hoc
theological interpretation, either to act as an essential background to such
interpretations, or to be in the foreground where they are used in a highly specific
way. This, I contend, is precisely the relationship that exists between ad hoc
theological interpretations of the Bible (in this case a typology-based theological
interpretation of the Bible) and the more general approaches to theological
interpretations of the Bible. Some important comments on this implication are in
order.
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Ad hoc theological interpretations are just that, they are ad hoc. By this I mean
that they are by their very nature limited to the ends for which they are fashioned. In
other words, they are specifically fashioned to show how a particular text can be
theologically interpreted in a particular context. In consequence, the following may
not be possible. First, it may not be possible to use the ad hoc theological
interpretation fashioned to read a specific biblical text in a specific context to read a
different kind ofbiblical text in a different context. Secondly, even if the same kind
ofbiblical text is the one to be read, it may not be possible to read it with the ad hoc
theological interpretation in question in a different context. Thirdly, even ifwe
suppose that the context remains the same, it may not be possible to use the ad hoc
theological interpretation in question in reading a different text in that same context.
So for example, our typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews is
fashioned for the reading ofHebrews' Christology in certain parts ofAfrica where
ancestral traditions exist. It is difficult to imagine this theological interpretation
simply applied to read other different texts of the Bible in the same African context,
or the same text for different contexts in Africa or elsewhere. And whereas it is
possible to imagine the use of this ad hoc theological interpretation in reading other
New Testament typological texts, like 1 Cor. 10. 1-11, their content, being different
from Hebrews, would require a different line of theological interpretation. This is
not the case with general theological interpretations of the Bible. As suggested by
our earlier discussion, they are, in principle, concerned generally with the articulation
of a theory, or model, of theological interpretations with which we can interpret the
Bible. This is to say, they are not specific to any text or genre of the Bible, nor are
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they specific to any particular context in which the Bible is read. Consequently,
when it comes to the reading of specific biblical texts in a specified context, they
seem inadequate. This was the case in our desire to interpret theologically Hebrews'
Christology in Africa where the general approaches to theological interpretations, on
their own, did not suffice. But the various general approaches to theological
interpretations of the Bible are important in giving vital elements integral to enabling
specific approaches to theological interpretations of the Bible.
With this understanding, the relationship between ad hoc and general theological
interpretations not only becomes clear, but their necessity is thrown into sharp relief.
General approaches to theological interpretations are needed for the purposes of
bringing out elements vital for the theological interpretation of the Bible, while ad
hoc theological interpretations are needed in taking up relevant vital elements of
general interpretation and using them in highly specific ways for the theological
interpretations of particular texts of the Bible in specified contexts. In addition, ad
hoc theological interpretations are conducted against the background of some
relevant vital elements articulated in general approaches to theological
interpretations, as our theological interpretation of Hebrews' Christology in Africa
has demonstrated. One could almost think of this relationship in terms of pottery.
General approaches to theological interpretations provide the clay, while ad hoc
mould the clay accordingly since general approaches cannot fashion theological
interpretations specific to certain texts and contexts but ad hoc theological
interpretations do. Conversely, ad hoc theological interpretations cannot provide the
vital elements that they draw from, and presuppose, in theological interpretations, but
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general approaches to theological interpretations do. Thus the dual need for ad hoc
and general theological interpretations, and for them to co-exist and complement
each other in order to achieve the goal of theological interpretations, viz., actualizing
the word of God as such for the church in specific settings.
In view of the preceding reflection, what our thesis illustrates in the academic
enterprise of theological interpretations of the Bible is that there is a huge place, and
need, for ad hoc theological interpretations. This is because, in the course ofmy
research on discourse on theological interpretations, I found the notion of ad hoc
theological interpretations lacking. There may be the odd reading of a text where
one can detect the operation of an implicit ad hoc theological interpretation of the
Bible,2 but none is consciously sought for or articulated. Scholarship, then, on
theological interpretations of the Bible may need to be sensitive to the different
genres of the Bible and the variety of contexts in which the Bible is read, and this
means the development, in biblical scholarship, of ad hoc theological interpretations
in dialogue with general approaches to theological interpretations of the Bible.
6.2 AFRICAN THEOLOGY AND GLOBAL THEOLOGY: POSSIBLE
CONTRIBUTIONS
African theology is tied to Christianity in Africa, yet Christianity is not just in
Africa but in other parts of the world as well. Indeed, Christianity in Africa is
inextricably linked with Christianity outside Africa in three crucial ways:
historically, socio-politically and theologically. Historically, Christianity in Africa
2 For example, Yeo's (1994) interpretation of I Cor. 8 in a Chinese context.
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emerged largely as a result ofmissionary efforts from Europe and is as such, even if
not completely, a product of Christianity in Europe and with historic ties to the same.
(In this regard, it shares with Christianity in the rest of the so-called 'Third World
countries' in other continents.) Consequently, there are contemporary socio-political
ties between Christianity in Africa and other parts of the world, that can be seen in all
manner of exchanges between the two and in their coming together with common
goals in mind. Lastly, because theologically the church has always been held as
'catholic', embracing Christians from all corners of the world because they share a
common faith, it behoves Christians to relate to, and recognize, others who are not
from within their locality. Ifwe may put this more clearly, it means that African
theology, to the degree that it is recognized that the African Christianity it is meant to
serve is part of a wider Christianity, cannot estrange itself from other theologies that
emanate from Christianity outside Africa. There are German theologies, British
theologies, American theologies etc., that is Christian theologies written by
inhabitants of these countries. These inhabitants, male and female, are themselves
influenced by their socio-economic and political contexts, their particular scholarly
tradition of theology, and often by their own confessional/denomination viewpoint
and the various situations and circumstances of the churches they may wish to serve
by their theological scholarship. Consequently, their forms of theology, having
different roles to play in their particular contexts, are different from African
theology. So, it follows, African theology must be related to these other Christian
theologies, as part of a 'Global' theology we may say.
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The raison d'etre ofAfrican theology that we cited, viz., theological independence
from Western theology and the desire to theologize in tandem with African
cosmologies, may seem to undermine this thesis of the necessity of relationships
between African theologies and other Christian, and especially Western, theologies.
Indeed, way back in the 1980s, some scholars such as Hastings (1984, 362)
apparently supported the need for an explicitly African theology divorced from other
Christian theologies. However, to have a distinct African theology does not preclude
a relationship to other Christian theologies; nor is the abandonment of theology in
Africa required to enter the stream of Christian theologies in the world and relate to
them accordingly. The latter again seemed to be the suggestion of Hastings (1984,
362-63), who argued for an African theology independent of other theologies but
only for a while, after which (Hastings did not specify the criteria for identifying the
lapse of time needed for this) African theology would have to be abandoned. There
can, and ought to be, for the reasons cited, an African theology, which is related to
other Christian theologies. What needs to be pointed out is the nature, or the goal of
such a relationship. To this we turn now.
We must acknowledge that any Christian theology is always still in the making,
still unfinished, given the ever-changing circumstances ofChristianity. Wiles (2000)
somewhat captures this, together with its ramifications, in stating, 'All forms of
theology need to learn a greater humility, a greater readiness to acknowledge the
partial and provisional character of even their most basic convictions. They need to
learn to see styles of theology other than their own not simply as fools to be
corrected or foes to be defeated but as dialogue partners in common search' (410).
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For this reason, the desired outcome of the relationship of African theology to other
Christian theologies, I propose, is that of partnerships whereby Christian theologies
understand each other, enrich, complement and even correct each other, through
dialogue, in their common search for authentic Christian theologies.3 We may now,
therefore, consider how African theology could enrich other Christian theologies in
the world. More specifically, we want to consider what contributions African
theology as articulated in this thesis, could offer other Christian theologies in the
world. Of course, there are different sorts of relationships that could be considered,
but we have limited ourselves to this one in order to bring out something of the value
ofAfrican theology so conceived, and arrived at, to other Christian theologies.
We will consider three possible contributions. The first is a general one, in the
sense that it is not tied exclusively to African theology as formulated in this thesis,
but the second and third are specific to the procedure and product (or outcome),
respectively, of our typology-based theological interpretation of Hebrews as part of
an African theology. Let us turn to the first one.
It appears that different theologies in different parts of the world inevitably tend to
have different agendas and try to answer different questions, which heavily influence
the kinds of theologies that they articulate. So, to cite a few examples, Liberation
theology (Gutierrez 1973) has an agenda of service to, and justice towards, the poor;
German theology in the figure of Jtirgen Moltmann (Moltmann 1967) has had an
3 This outcome was the overriding one exhibited by theologians thinking about the place of different
Christian theologies in the world in the book entitled, Different Theologies, Common Responsibility:
Babel or Pentecost? (Elizondo and Gutierrez 1984).
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agenda of hope; and the various systematic theologies have an agenda for
comprehensive and coherent theological awareness of Christian doctrine (Jenson
1997). The distinctive agenda ofAfrican theology is to maintain, enhance and
perfect the life of the church in Africa. As mentioned in our introduction, the
building and sustenance of African Christian communities is a chiefmotivation and
goal in the desire of Africans to theologize within their African cosmologies. This
agenda is an important contribution African theology could make to other Christian
theologies on account of the importance of the church to Christian theology. This is
because Christian theology without a Christian community to serve may have no
meaningful purpose since it is the reality ofmen and women embracing the Christian
faith that validates and gives significance to Christian theology. Thus, African
theology through its overriding agenda of service to the building of African Christian
communities could remind other Christian theologies to endeavour to articulate their
theologies in light of the life and worship of the church; that is to be, for the sake of
Christianity, first-order Christian theologies.4
We turn now to the second contribution of African theology to other Christian
theologies. For a variety of reasons, not least the Bible's relationship to Christian
communities,5 there has been noticeable advocacy in New Testament scholarship for
4 'First-order level of theology' is a term Maddox (1990) uses of theologies that contribute directly to
'forming Christian character and influencing Christian praxis' (664).
5 As identified by Fiorenza (1990), there are two broad approaches to the Bible that make it requisite
for theology in recent times. The first is the functional approach. Here the understanding of the
necessity of the Bible in theology is primarily understood through its functions in the church (and
society at large): because the Bible is used by the Christian community to understand its faith and
order its life, theology must reckon with it. The second, which he calls the 'canonical approach',
perceives the Bible's requirement in theology on the basis of it being the locus of the primal events
and traditions that constitute the beginnings of the Christian community. Because these primal events
and traditions are considered to be definitive of the identity and self-understanding of the Church
(ever since), the Bible is required for a distinctive Christian theology and in forming authentic
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the Bible to be related to theology/' But how this is to be done is not always spelt
out, nor is it self-evident. As broached in our introduction to this thesis, we
identified three possible ways that the Bible can be used in theology, that is, how it
can be related to theology. These are: 1. when the Bible is used as the subject matter
for theology; 2. when it is used as part of theological formulations or discourses; and
3. when it is used as a model for theology. In the first way, ifwe may reiterate,
theology's principle task, is 'to study again and again the basic texts of the New
Testament and the Hebrew Scriptures and to interpret them for successive
generations of Christians' (Jeanrond 1984, 55). Theology here uses the Bible in a
rather direct way as the primary source of study, and thus, can be regarded as biblical
interpretation or biblical exegesis mixed with its, or ending in, appropriation. For
this reason the quest for the meaning of the Bible (now and not just when it was
written) is the fundamental rule in this usage. The content of the Bible here
predominates and is the subject matter of the theology that uses it this way. Our
typology-based theological interpretation ofHebrews as part of an African theology,
therefore, is an African theology using the Bible in this sense. This granted, I submit
that this way of formulating a Christian theology can be a contribution, by way of
example to Christian theologies that may wish to have their theology informed and
directed by primary interpretations of the Bible. It is worth pointing out that such
genres of theologies seem to be in the province of the field of theological
interpretations of the Bible. Of course, we may want to add to this, the field of
Christian communities. In other words, Christian communities are not at liberty to map their faith and
life as they choose but must orientate themselves to the events at the origins of the Christian
community: to depart from, or deny them would be to break ranks with Christianity. This is why this
approach views the Bible from the standpoint of its normativity, or criterion, for what is authentically
Christian and is therefore prescriptive in approach (privileging the Bible), while in contradistinction,
the other approach views the Bible from the standpoint of its function in Christian communities (more
a question of the Bible's importance predicated on the church's praxis of it) and is thus descriptive.
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biblical theology. Going by the writings of biblical scholars such as Johann Gabler
(deemed de facto the founder of biblical theology),7 William Wrede8 (1897, in
Morgan 1973) and most recently Heikki Raisanen (2000, 1-8, 151-87, 203-209), it
seems that the concern of biblical theology is to make biblical readings serve the
Church (or, for Raisanen, society at large), without in the process losing the
distinction between critical biblical readings and biblical readings meant to serve the
church or society. If this is a correct characterization of biblical theology then it
means that the discipline's goal is to some degree the theological interpretation of the
Bible.
The third contribution that African theology could make to other Christian
theologies is in the outcome of our typology-based theological interpretation: Jesus,
the greatest ancestor. Prima facie this Christology would certainly have a fruitful
dialogue with Christian theologies in places that have notions of ancestors. One
would think here of ancestral traditions in East and Southeast Asia with which
Christianity has had to grapple and still does. Smith's (1989) summary of Christian
responses to ancestral traditions in China,9 for example, indicates that Jesus, as the
greatest ancestor, has something of value to offer to Christian theologies in these
parts of the world. It would be interesting to see what the outcome of a dialogue
between Christian theologies from areas with ancestral tradition and our African
ancestor-Christology would be if taken up. Certainly, there is a contribution that this
African Christology would make to such Christologies.
6
See, for example, Green (2002), Jeanrond (1993), and Hodgson (1998).
7 See Eldredge and Sandys-Wunsch (1980) and Morgan's (1987).
R
In his case negatively because he advocates the divorcing ofNew Testament theology from ecclesial
concerns or orientation.
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But what could this Christology offer to other Christian theologies in places that
have no notions of ancestors in their contexts? It would seem that such a
Christology, as part of an African theology, has no contribution to make to other
Christian theologies because it is limited to its context in Africa. This is because
Jesus as the greatest ancestor would make sense only amongst Christians who have
traditions of ancestors. However, there is a possible contribution it can make. A
variety of Christologies abound in different Christian theologies in many parts of the
world,10 in which we see different theologies, within different contexts, seeking to
understand Jesus, largely through interpretations, or adaptations, of models in
Christian tradition, especially the Bible. Jesus as the greatest ancestor would add to
this family of Christologies. This in itself may not seem important but there is a
practical value for this to Christian theologies when seen from the perspective of, we
may say, 'comparative' Christology. This is because, having a family of
Christologies means that a dialogue between the different Christologies is possible.
Critical to such a dialogue would be understanding the re-conceptions of Jesus in
different parts of the world and the factors responsible for such re-conceptions. This
allows for the possibility of having theologies based on such studies of Christology,
i.e., theologies that are generated after, and from, comparative Christology. The
form of such a theology could be the generalization or systemization of Christologies
in Christian theologies. In both cases, comparative awareness would be inevitable,
leading to the enrichment and learning between different Christologies in Christian
theologies. The importance of this cannot be overstated, given the special place that
Christology occupies in Christian theology. So, having a Christology from African
9 See also Komuro's (2004) article on Christianity and ancestor worship in Japan.
10
See, for example, Ford and Highton (2002), Pelikan (1985) and Suirtharajah (1993).
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theology to add to the family of Christologies could help in the dialogue of
Christologies and the potential of this for theology. Conversely, the absence, or
dearth, of Christologies from African theology in the family of Christology would
undermine such ends.
So, unless Christianity in Africa radically changes, African theology, as I have
demonstrated in this thesis, will continue to be needed and it will, in turn, need to use
the Bible in achieving its ends. But this need not be done in isolation from other
Christian theologies. The challenge, then, to African theology is to use the Bible in a
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